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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this research is to examine various issues about market efficiencý 
and market microstructure in the Chinese equity market. ýNhere. to date, there has 
been relatively little attention. Specifically. this thesis intends to ansý, ýer the 
following questions. Is the Chinese equitý market efficient? If not, has it been 
evolving towards efficiency over the years? What are the intraday patterns of 
price behaviour? Which trades move prices? Finally, does Chinese investors' 
psychology have effects on prices? In order to answer these questions. four sets 
of empirical analysis have been undertaken. 
The first study investigates the evolution of China's stock market via anaksim,, 
the ongoing predictive ability and profitability of simple, ýýell known technical 
trading rules. The results suggest that while technical trading rules had short term 
predictive ability and profitability in the Chinese stock markets during the 1990's, 
this lessened as the markets evolved. 
The second research study documents the intraday variation in bid-ask spreads, 
trading volumes and volatility. The findings suggest that the existence of the 
intraday anomalies is not due to the peculiarities of the US markets. However, the 
shape of the intraday patterns in order-driven markets is different from those in 
quote-driven markets, which suggests a need for new theoretical models. 
The third area of work examines which trades move prices by testing three 
hypotheses: stealth trading, public information and price manipulation hypotheses. 
The results show that while medium and large-size trades are associated with 
disproportionately cumulative price changes, it is the large-size trades which have 
the largest effect on cumulative price increases. Aligned with the concerns noted 
by some eminent individuals in China, there seems to be price manipulation in 
China's stock market. 
The final research area studies the influence of Chinese cultural factors on price 
clustering and resistance. The results show a higher propensity of clustering on 
the digit 8 and lower propensity on digits 4 and 7, which is consistent with the 
preference for number 8 and the avoidance of numbers 4 and 7 in Chinese culture. 
The results suggest that investors' psychology does have effects on prices. 
This research hopes to help academics and practitioners understand better the 
market efficiency and the trading behaviour in the Chinese equity market. 
Especially, it has implications for policy makers and regulators who involve in the 
design of an efficiency market. 
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INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
Ever since Fama (1970) introduced the idea of the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
(EMH) there has been a long debate about whether the stock market is efficient, 
In Fama's work the market is said to be 'efficierif if stock prices fully reflect all 
available information. Based on different infori-nation sets, he defined three types 
of market efficiency: weak-form efficiency, semi -strong- form efficiency and 
strong-form efficiency. The weak-form efficiency assumes that the current prices 
of stocks instantly and fully reflect all past infon-nation. The semi -strong-form 
efficiency assumes that the current prices of stocks reflect all publicly available 
information. The strong-form efficiency assumes that the current prices of stocks 
reflect all information, including public and private. 
The EMH sets up a platform for testing and comparing the efficiency of asset 
markets. It assumes that the market is competitive. trading is frictionless, 
infon-nation is costless, and investors are rational. However, the equity markets 
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do not behave like the perfectly competitive markets of frictionless economics. In 
addition, investors are not fully rational in general. For all equity markets, friction 
exists in the forms of, for example, taxes and commissions, order handling, and 
clearance costs, trading halts, and other trading restrictions. Therefore, the 
institutional design of a market matters, and it affects market efficiew, 
Market microstructure research emerged to examine how specific trading 
mechanisms affect the price fon-nation process. The purpose of market 
microstructure research is to reveal the relative efficiency of a market, to identify 
the source of such and to inform on better market design. Previous studies in 
testing the EMH focus on the realized efficiency of a market, while market 
microstructure researchers try to explore the underlying mechanisms of the market 
which lead to market efficiency or inefficiency. Microstructure studies try to 
analyse how demand and supply turn into individual transactions which causing 
the short-run fluctuation in asset markets. This is achieved by relaxing some of 
the key assumptions in EMH and studying the trading frictions (trading costs), 
infon-national efficiency (information diffusion) and the irrationality of investors' 
behaviour in the markets. 
Over the past decades there has been growing interest in the microstructure of 
stock markets. The research is concerned with investors' trading behaviour at the 
level of individual transactions. O'Hara (1997) stated that market microstructure 
is the study of the process and outcomes of exchanging assets under explicit 
SOCA 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
trading rules. Madhavan (2000) argued that market microstructure is concerned 
with the process by which investors' latent demands are ultimatelý translated into 
transactions. Early work focused on the stochastic nature of demand and suppk. 
while later research interests were those from the viewpoint of informational 
economics, which focused on the inform ation-aggregat ion properties of the 
markets. These theories and models have evolved from focusing on inventory- 
based problems to those issues associated with information economics. More 
recently, behavioural finance has emerged as an alternative view of financial 
markets. A number of recent papers in the finance literature have argued that 
behavioural and psychological factors account for asset pricing anomalies (see 
Coval and Shurnway, 2005, Barberis et al., 1998, Daniel et al., 1998, Odean, 1998, 
Benartzi and Thaler, 1995, Shurnway, 1998, Barberis and Huang, 2001, and 
Barberis et al., 2001). The research of investors' psychology would provide 
further insights. 
China is an economy undergoing rapid transformation. Its rapid growth has 
brought great business opportunities for the rest of the world. Its dynamism 
makes it increasingly important for global economic growth. Although China's 
stock market emerged only about 14 years ago, it has become the eighth largest 
market in the world and Asia's second largest. The total market capitalization 
reached some RMB 3,800 billion at the end of 2002, which accounts for 37 
percent of GDP. The development of China's stock market is so impressive that it 
has made foreign investors begin to take the market more seriouslý as an 
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investment proposition, especially after China entered the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in 2001. Moreover, the institutional and regulatory structure 
of China's stock market are different from those of the more mature markets and 
are able to provide insights into a number of aspects of financial markets. The 
findings will have important implications for academics, practitioners and 
regulators. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 discusses the 
theoretical motivations of this thesis, while section 1.3 discusses the objectives. 
Section 1.4 gives a general overview of the results. Section 1.5 discusses the 
contributions and possible implications. The structure of the thesis is presented in 
the last section. 
1.2 Theoretical Motivations 
1.2.1 Market Efficiency 
One of the most important concepts in the financial economics literature is 
efficiency. It concerns the way a market allocates resources. The efficiency of 
the equity market is essential not only to firms for fundraising but also to 
individuals who invest their savings in shares. Schwartz (1988) argued that the 
efficiency allocation of plant, equipment and working capital across firms in the 
economy depends on the efficiency with which financial capital is distributed 
1,930a 
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across firms. A firm will seek to raise funds b,, the sale of a securit\, and "it costs. 
If the capital costs of the firm are inaccuratek. assessed, the distribution of funds I 
and of real investment across firms will be distorted. The price it recekes for its 
newly issued shares will affect the firm's capital costs. Therefore, it is important 
for the primary market to be efficient. The primary market, in turn. requires an 
efficient secondary market for the folloýNing reasons: the marketablilltý, of shares 
and the accuracy of share valuation. The efficiency discussed in this research 
refers mainly to the efficiency of the secondary market. 
Investors are also affected by the efficiency of equity market for the reasons 
relating to the informational efficiency and the operational efficienc-,, as discussed 
by Schwartz (1988). In the dynamic market, prices continuously adjust to the 
arrival of news. The dynamic adjustment of prices to new information enables 
some investors to profit at the expense of others. These profits are reward for 
information gathering activities, which give those investors an advantageous 
position over the information flow. However, if informational imbalances endure 
too long, those who are at the informational disadvantage may be driven from the 
market. This would decrease the aggregate demand of shares and lower the prices 
for all. 
Copeland and Weston (1988) stated that operational efficiency deals with the cost 
of transferring funds. In an idealized world, the perfect capital markets are 
operationally efficient because the transaction costs are assumed to be zero. 
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However, transaction costs do exist in the real v,: orld. The market can only 
become relatively more operationally efficient ýý ith lower transaction costs. 
Moreover, Schwartz (1988) argued that operational eft-icienc,, concerns the 
stability of a market. Prices are more volatile if the quality of the price discoýerx 
process is poor, with price volatility being attributable to operational inefficiency. 
It will have a similar effect to the informational inefficiency: investors reduce the 
demand to hold shares, and the shared prices are lowered for all. 
To conclude, the informational efficiency and operational efficienc-, of the equity 
markets affects both the firms and share owners. The efficient operation of the 
equity market is a matter of importance to a sizable proportion of the financial 
fortunes. Many of the issues related to the efficiency of price discovery have been 
examined at the microstructure level, which will be discussed in the next section. 
1.2.2 Market Microstructure 
The equity markets do not behave like the perfectly competitive markets of 
frictionless economics. Market participants have to take various trading costs into 
account, when they make their strategic decisions to trade. These decisions 
depend upon the market's institutional structure: the rules that determine hovv 
orders are handled and translated into trades. Since the equity market is not a 
frictionless environment, the institutional design of a market does affect the 
market efficiency. 
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Standard microeconomic decision models and market equilibrium models take 
demand and supply as market forces. If demand exceeds supply. competition 
between buyers will cause prices to rise and, if suppl, ý exceeds demand, 
competition between sellers will cause prices to fall. To an extent share prices are 
determined by demand and supply. However, if the equilibrium cannot be 
actually attained, how could the economy coordinate the desires of demanders and 
suppliers to find out a price to trade? Since few economists provide the answer to 
this question, the market microstructure research emerged. 
Madhavan (2000) argued that market microstructure is concerned with the process 
by which investors' latent demands are ultimately translated into transactions. 
Microstructure analysis focuses on the details of the trading process, and is 
concerned with investors' trading behaviour at the level of individual transactions. 
O'Hara (1997) stated that market microstructure is the study of the process and 
outcomes of exchanging assets under explicit trading rules. The major elements 
of this process include; for example, the generation and dissemination of 
information, the arrival of orders, and the rules, institutions, and other design 
features of a market that determine how orders are transformed into trades. 
Microstructure analysis could, in principle, be applied to any market. Thus far. it 
has been developed almost exclusively in relation to securities markets, and ý, N ill 
be the approach adopted in this research. 
CHAPTER I 
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The trading process varies in many ways. Buyers can trade directlN N\ A sellers. 
Or, there might be an intermediary who arranges every trade and sets prices. No 
matter what the setting, there are rules that (-Yovern the tradin, -, mechanism and 
result in the price formation. O'Hara (1997) viewed trading mechanism as *a type 
of trading game in which players meet at some venue and act accordin,, to some 
rules. ' There are three dimensions of a trading mechanism, ý, Nhich are the market 
participants, the exchange, and the trading rules. 
The institutional structure of equity markets differs Nvidely among the various 
markets throughout the world. While most previous research has focused mainly 
on the US markets, there are very few empirical studies examining the Chinese 
equity market at the micro level. Although there has been considerable change, 
innovation, and experimentation with market design during the years of stock 
market development, much still remains to be learned, and many issues remain 
unresolved. 
1.3 Objectives 
This thesis covers a wide range of topics focusing on the Chinese equity market. 
The development of the Chinese equity market is impressive. However, what 
does development actually mean? Obviously. the market has been developing in 
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terms of the number of listed companies and market capitalisation. etc. Ho\\e\er. 
what does this actually tell us about the efficiencý, of the stock market? 
Since market efficiency is of interest to financial economists. the first empirical 
chapter of this thesis therefore examines the evolution of market efficiencý in 
China. The chapter considers whether the Chinese equity market is efficient, or if 
has it been evolving towards an efficient state over time. It intends to provide a 
general picture of what level of efficiency exists in the Chinese equltý market by 
testing changes in the predictability and profitability of technical trading rules. 
The analysis will then consider price behaviours in more detail using high- 
frequency intraday data. This is particularly important for practitioners who make 
their investment decisions by observing tick-by-tick data. The intraday patterns of 
price behaviours will provide practical applications for market participants. 
Therefore, the second empirical chapter examines the intraday patterns of the bid- 
ask spread, volume and volatility. 
The third empirical chapter will further the analysis by examining the relationship 
between variables such as price and trade size. It will focus on the informed 
traders' trade size choice, and show which trades move prices. This is important 
in the Chinese stock market where price manipulation is a serious problem and 
this will be specifically examined. 
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After the analysis of how trading mechanisms affect the price discovery process. 
the last empirical study examines the influence of the investors* behaN iour and 
psychology on prices. Since market participants are one of the dimensions of a 
trading mechanism, it is important to investigate whether their behaýlour or 
psychology affects the price discovery process beyond the influence of the 
institutional structure of the stock market. Therefore, the fourth empirical chapter 
examines how behavioural and psychological factors affect the price discovery 
process. In the case of the Chinese stock market, cultural factors will provide 
unique and interesting insights. 
Specifically, this thesis intends to answer the following questions. Is the Chinese 
equity market efficient? If not, has it been evolving towards an efficient state? 
What are the intraday patterns of the price behaviours? Which trades move prices? 
Finally, does Chinese investors' psychology have an effect on prices? 
1.3.1 Market Efficiency and Evolution 
Much of finance theory depends, explicitly or implicitly, on the notion of market 
efficiency and, therefore, not surprisingly, there has been extensive testing as to 
whether financial markets are efficient (for example, Fama, 1970,1991 and 1998, 
Baillie, 1989, and Campbell, Lo and MacKinley, 1997). However, the vast 
majority of the professional traders do not believe the market to be efficient. and 
they use technical analysis to predict stock prices and make excess return. Most 
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academics had not recognized the validity of these methods until recentlý. Brock 
et a]. (1992) tested two of the simplest technical trading rules. moving, aýerage 
and trading range breakout, and found them to have predjctiý, e ability in terins of 
the Dow Jones Index over the period 1897 to 1986. Hudson et al. (1996) 
conducted a similar type of analysis on the UK FTSE 30 index and found the rules 
to have predictive ability. More recenfly, Gencay and Stengos (1997 and 1998). 
Gencay (1998a, 1998b and 1999), LeBaron (1998 and 1999) and Fernandez- 
Rodriguez et al (2000) have all found evidence to support the predictive abilitý of 
technical trading rules. 
In contrast to this extensive literature on market efficiency and the testing thereof, 
there has been little discussion of the mechanisms which might lead to its 
achievement. If markets are not efficient, and in the absence of an alternative 
mechanism, the theory of financial market efficiency seems to have to rely on an 
evolutionary mechanism. There is an implicit assumption in finance theory that 
natural selection will favour strategies that are more rational and effective in 
investments, capital budgeting, etc. This eventually leads to an efficient market, 
since only the most effective strategies can survive in the marketplace. 
Although China's stock market emerged only about 14 years ago, the growth has 
been impressive. To reach its potential China will need to develop an efficient 
market. However, as an emerging market it seems more likely that markets will 
initially be inefficient but, hopefully, evolve towards efficiency. Chapter 4 of this 
foca 
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thesis investigates market efficiency and evolution of Chma*s stock market \ ia 
analyzing the ongoing predictive ability and profitabilit-, of simple, xýell know 
technical trading rules. 
1.3.2 Intraday Patterns 
Researchers found other evidence against market efficienc\. such as calendar 
anomalies. The major calendar anomalies include: the turn of the year effect 
and/or January effect (Keim, 1983, and Thaler. 1987). the turn of month effect 
(Ariel, 1987, and Lakonishok and Smidt, 1988), the day of the week effect 
(French, 1980, Gibbons and Hess, 1981, and Keim and Stambaugh, 1984), the 
holiday anomalies (Ariel, 1990, and Lakonishok and Smidt, 1988) and the 
intraday anomalies (Harris, 1986). The regularity that the returns vary across 
months, weekdays and time intervals suggests the possibility that the use of past 
price information might yield potential excess profits. 
Due to the data constraints early research could only examine the calendar 
anomalies at a low frequency base, while the availability of high frequency data 
has provided finance researchers with the enviable opportunity of being able to 
explore intraday variables, such as bid-ask spread, trading volumes and volatility 
(see Mclnish and Wood, 1985, Wood et al., 1985, Harris, 1986, Jain and Joh, 
1988, and McInish and Wood. 1990b). For example, returns and its volatilitý tend 
to be greater at the open and close than at other times during the trading day and 
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exhibit a U-shaped pattern (see McInish and Wood, 1985. Wood et al., 1985. 
Harris, 1986, Jain and Joh, 1988, and McInish and Wood, 1990b). The U-shaped 
intraday patterns have also been documented in bid-ask spreads (Mclmsh and 
Wood, 1985, and Abhyankar et al.. 1997), and trading volume (Jain and Joh, 1988, 
McInish and Wood, 1990a, and Atkins and Basu, 1995). Previous studies 
consider the possible explanations for the intradaN patterns by considering the 
market with specialists or market makers (See Brock and Kleidon, 1992, Admati 
and Pfleiderer, 1988, and Foster and Viswanathan, 1990). 
However, Brockman and Michayluk (1997) suggested that the calendar anomalies 
might be attributed to market micro structure -re I ated underlying causes. Since the 
intraday variation of stock market activities has been well documented in the 
literature with the evidence band on US data, the study of China's stock market is 
important for the following reasons. First, the institutional setting of China's 
stock market is different from the US market in at least three ways. They include 
the use of a fully centralized and computerized screen based dealer system, the 
used of order-driven system without any market makers or specialists, and a 90- 
minute lunch time. Second, it would be useful to examine whether the intraday 
regularities are consistent with the predictions of theoretical models, such as those 
of Brock and Kleidon (1992) or Admati and Pfleiderer (1988). It is important that 
predictions of theoretical models are tested in a variety of institutional settings so 
as to examine their robustness. 
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By examining the intraday patterns in China's stock market. chapter 5 has the 
following exploratory objectives. First, it shovs the intraday trading actk'wý 
patterns and documents a wide range of market characteristics. Second. it 
compares the patterns in China's stock market to those in other markets, and tries 
to explain the similarities and differences by considering the theoretical models 
and different market structures. 
1.3.3 Price Manipulation 
Huebner (1934) argued that stock-price manipulation is the most widely discussed 
aspect of stock markets. There are a large number of studies that examine 
theoretically and empirically price manipulation in a number of different settings 
(see Jarrow, 1992, Vila, 1989, Felixson and Pelli, 1999, and Vitale, 2000, etc. ). 
At the National People's Congress (NPQ in spring 2000, Premier Zhu Rongji 
remarked that China's stock markets had developed quickly, achieved much, but 
was still not well regulated. His concerns are about the rampant speculation, 
poor-quality listed firrns, defective regulation and widespread corruption. Zhu 
(1996) argued that the fraudulent behaviours have become significant problems in 
China. Gilley (2001) also pointed out that the wrongdoings in China's stock 
market include insider trading, false disclosure and market manipulation. Insider 
trading and price manipulations are not exceptional in China's stock market with 
Kang et al. (2002) pointing out that investment companies team up with large 
floc, Q 
CHAPTER] 
INTRODUCTION 
investors to manipulate share prices. and about 30% of stocks are being, 
manipulated at any given time. 
Allen and Gale (1992) found that it is the larger trades that move prices, ýN hich is 
associated with 'trade-based manipulation'. In contrast, Barclay and Wamer 
(1993) introduced stealth trading hypothesis, which predicts that privatel) 
informed traders use medium sized trades so as not to reveal their information. 
They found most of the cumulative stock-price change is due to medium-size 
trades. Similarly, Chakravarty (200 1) found that medium-size trades are 
associated with a disproportionately large cumulative stock price change relative 
to their proportion of all trades and volume. In addition, they found that the source 
of the disproportionately large cumulative price impact of medium-size trades is 
trades initiated by institutions. 
Given the presence of price manipulation it is unclear whether there would be the 
same need for privately informed investors to adopt stealth trading in China's 
stock market. Moreover, it is interesting to examine traders' trading strategy in a 
less developed regulatory regime. Chapter 6 of this thesis intends to test price 
manipulation hypothesis in addition to the stealth trading and public infon-nation 
hypotheses by investigating which trades move prices in China's stock market. 
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1.3.4 Investor Psychology 
Market microstructure research examines how prices are set under specific trading 
mechanisms. O'Hara (1997) viewed trading mechanisms as ýa t-, pe of trading 
game in which players meet at some venue and act according to some rules. ' 
There are three dimensions of a trading mechanism, which are the market 
participants, the exchange and the trading rules. Therefore, is a market 
participant's behaviour or psychology going to have an effect on prices? 
Behavioural finance has then emerged as an alternative view of financial markets. 
Behavioural finance theory rests on two major foundations: investor sentiment 
and limited arbitrage. Shleifer (2000) argued that investors are not fully rational 
in general. Many investors react to irrelevant information in forming their 
demand for securities and act as noise traders in the market because of their 
irrationality. Black (1986) confirmed that they trade on noise rather than 
information. If the theory of efficient markets relied entirely on the rationality of 
individual investors, the theory is questionable because investors' psychology has 
great influence. 
One of the fascinating subjects that should receive more attention from investors 
is the psychology of numbers. According to the EMH, share prices should follow 
a simple random walk process. However, prices tend to be observed more 
frequently at sorne numbers than other. Psychological experiments demonstrate 
more generally that clustering of outcomes at round numbers is a fundamental 
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attribute of human behaviour. Most research on price clustering has been 
conducted in western financial markets, "here there is manifest preference for 
trading at round numbers. The number preferences under Chinese culture nilght 
provide interesting insights. 
Brown et al. (2002) analysed the effect of Chinese cultural factors, such as 
preferences for specific numbers, on price clustering for six Asia-Pacific stock 
markets (Australia, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore and Taiwan). 
They found that Chinese try to avoid the *unlucky' number 4 because the 
pronunciation of 4 is similar to the phrase 'to die*. Chapter 7 of this thesis has a 
primary purpose of extending the work of Brown et al. (2002) testing whether 
cultural factors help explain price clustering in China's stock market. 
1.4 Overview of Findings 
The major findings are summarized in this section. Firstly, Chapter 4 investigates 
the evolution of China's stock market via analysing the ongoing predictive ability 
and profitability of simple, well known technical trading rules. It extends the 
analysis of Brock et al. (1992) and Tian et al. (2002) in two ways. It examines if 
the conclusions extend to other markets - namely, the U. K., Hong Kong and 
Japan. It also investigates that in the case of China whether the predictability and 
profitability of technical trading rules changed across the 1990's. The results 
suggest that while technical trading rules had short term predictive ability and 
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profitability in the Chinese stock markets during the 1990's. this lessened as the 
decade progressed and the markets evolved. The notion of stock markets 
evolving is supported by results for a number of the main developed markets 
where the technical trading rules had predictive abilaN during the 1970's that 
disappeared by the 1990's. 
Secondly, Chapter 5 examines the intraday variation in the bid-ask spread. trading 
volume and volatility in China's stock market. The results are different from 
previous research. It documents an L-shaped pattern of bid-ask spread and 
volatility. The volume pattern is relatively flat in the moming session with a 
marginal increase at the open and marginal decrease at the close; while it shows a 
J-shaped pattern in the afternoon session. The evidence in support of the two 
main theoretical models of intraday behavior, information models (Admati and 
Pfleiderer, 1989, and Foster and Viswanathan, 1990) and market closure model 
(Brock and Kleidon, 1992), is very mixed. Moreover, as the theoretical models 
have been developed in the context of quote-drive markets, it is felt that there is a 
room for a theoretical model to explain the intraday behavior in an order-driven 
market. 
Thirdly, chapter 6 extends Barclay and Warner's (1993) original work on stealth 
trading by analysing which trades move price for the emerging China stock 
market. China is an emerging market with a developing regulatory framework 
and lack of sophistication of the general investing public. Given the nature of 
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China's stock market, the price manipulation hypothesis is proposed in addition to 
the stealth trading and public information hypotheses examined by Barclay and 
Warner. Using high-frequency data the results shoýý that ýNhile medium and 
large-size trades are associated with disproportionatek large. overall. cumulati\e 
stock price changes, it is the large-size trades ýNhich have the largest effect on 
cumulative price increases. Thus, while there is some support for stealth trading, in 
the Chinese market, there are other effects in operation such as price 
manipulation. The results add to the current literature on stealth trading and 
would also be of interest to regulators in China to strengthen the regulation. 
Finally, Chapter 7 extends the work of Brown et al. (2002) on the impact of 
cultural factors on price clustering to the China's stock market and to an analysis 
of price resistance. The results support the presence of cultural factors impacting 
on price clustering with the digit 8 showing a higher propensity for clustering and 
the digits 4 and 7 showing a lower propensity. These results are further supported 
by an analysis of limit order prices. However, a range of measures for price 
resistance shows only the digit 0 as a significant resistance point. The theoretical 
contribution of this study is the addition of a new explanation for price clustering, 
namely cultural preference. This is broadly consistent with the proposition of 
behavioural finance theory that investors are not fully rational in general and they 
react to irrelevant information in forming their demand for securities; for example, 
the preference of the lucky number 8 among Chinese investors. This study also 
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enriches the market microstructure literature that not onl% the trading mechanism 
affects prices but the psychology of investors does so as v, ell. 
1.5 Contributions and Implications 
Generally, this thesis is a further contribution to a better understanding of the 
characteristics, the microstructure and market efficiency of the Chinese equity 
market. It is expected to contribute to the existing literature in the following areas. 
First, it contributes to the existing studies of market efficiency by invest lgati n go, the 
informational and operational efficiency, using both low-frequency and high- 
frequency data. Second, it provides further evidences of the market 
microstructure research by examining various issues in the Chinese equity market. 
Third, it extends the existing understanding of investors' irrationality from 
evidence of the Chinese cultural effects. 
Compared to extensive empirical work of the US market, the Chinese equity 
market has received relatively little attention. Jaffe and Westerfield (1985) 
suggested that the evidence of international markets other than the US may 
provide support for or against the proposition that the stock market anomalies are 
a world-wide phenomenon and not due to specific institutional arrangement 
in the 
United States. Since China is becoming an emerging global power, investors 
from the rest of the world will want to understand China's stock market better. 
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The results of this research will have implications for practical investment 
strategies. Particularly, with China's entrý into WTO, the Chinese equltý market 
attracts more and more foreign investors' attention. Thus. understanding the 
characteristics, the microstructure and market efficienc, v becomes Increasin-ul.,, 
important, in particular, for global institutional investors. 
This research could also serve as a reference for regulators and pollcý makers who 
are involved in the design of an efficient trading system. Despite the 
shortcomings of the regulatory framework in China, government has played an 
important role in the evolution of the equity markets. Efforts have been made in 
order to assure an honest and fair market, to enhance market efficiency with 
regard to the provision and pricing of broker/dealer services, and to enhance 
market efficiency with regard to the pricing of shares traded. Because of the 
tremendous importance of the equity market to the economy and the complexity 
of its microstructure, the equity has received analysis in depth and breadth. There 
is a further reason to the extensive research of the equity market: the designer of 
the trading systems and the regulators of the market do in fact have the power to 
improve the efficiency of the market's operations. Therefore, this research hopes 
to provide implications to the regulatory body to improve the market design and 
regulation. 
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1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis includes 8 chapters. The remainder of this thesis is organized as 
follows. Chapter 2 describes the background to China's stock market. including 
the brief overview of China's economy, the background to the stock market, and 
the institutional structure of the market as compared to other international markets. 
Chapter 3 generally describes the data used in this research. The rest of the thesis 
comprises four empirical studies. Chapter 4 investigates the evolution of market 
efficiency of China's stock market via analysing the ongoing predictive abilit,, 
and profitability of technical trading rules. Chapter -5 studies the 
intraday 
regularities of the volatility, volume and spread. Chapter 6 examines which trades 
move prices by testing the stealth trading, public information and price 
manipulation hypotheses. Chapter 7 is dedicated to studying the influence of 
cultural factors on price clustering and price resistance in China's stock market. 
Finally, chapter 8 summarizes the findings and discusses the possible implications. 
The limitations of the thesis and future research directions are also discussed in 
the final chapter. 
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CHAPTER2 
BACKGROUNDTO 
CHINA'S STOCK MARKET 
2.1 Introduction 
No matter what the measure, the growth of China's economy has been impressive. 
However, although the potential scale of its markets is huge. it is often difficult 
for westerners to fully comprehend. Particularly, since the stock markets in China 
emerged over a decade ago, several important issues remain unaddressed. This 
chapter, therefore, describes the background to China's stock market. Section 2.2 
briefly reviews China's economy. Section 2.3 discusses the major characteristics 
of China's stock market. Section 2.4 reviews the institutional structure of China's 
stock market and compares it with developed markets. Finally, section 2.5 
concludes. 
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2.2 Overview of China's Economy 
24 
China has adopted the planned economy sý stem since 1949. It embarked on its 
reform and open policy in 1979, and entered the era of the socialist market 
economy. China's role is increasingly important in the ýwrld econom,.. It is 
widely acknowledged that one of the most important changes in the ýNorld is the 
rapid development of China. Using statistics from the World Bank. the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) and the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). 
the position of China's economy in the world is summarized briefly as follows. 
Firstly, China is the largest country in terms of population, which has a population 
of 1.3 billion. It has the biggest market potential in the world. The real GDP 
(Gross Domestic Product) grew by 9.7 percent a year on average from 1990 to 
2003 (from ADB). It is important to remember that this was an economy starting 
from a very low base. Such a high growth resulted from exports, surging foreign 
direct investment (FDI), buoyant domestic demand, and expansionary fiscal and 
monetary policies. World Trade Organization (WTO) accession brought a 
significant increase in FDI. Out of the top 500 companies in the world, over 400 
have set up offices in China. China attracted FDI of over USD 53 billion in 2003, 
exceeding the United States for the first time and becoming the largest FDI 
recipient (from World Bank). 
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Secondly, China has the second largest foreign currencý reserve which exceeded 
USD 510 billion. The UN (United Nations) Conference on Trade and 
Development concluded that China is the second largest engine for ýýorld Z-- 
economic growth, after the United States. Measured at purchasing poý\er parit\ 
(PPP), China's contribution rate to the world economic growth in 1980-2000 was 
14 percent, ranking second in the world after the United States (from World Bank). 
Thirdly, China is the third largest importing country in the world. The volume of 
total amount of imports in 2003 reached over USD 410 billion. The contribution 
rate of China to world trade ranks third behind the United States and Japan (from 
NBS). 
Fourthly, China is the fourth largest exporting country with the volume of total 
exports reaching USD 438 billion in 2003 (from NBS). 
Fifthly, China is the fifth biggest investing country. By the end of year 2003, 
there are more than 7400 Chinese enterprises investing in over 160 countries and 
regions with a total investment of USD 33 billion (from NBS). 
Finally, China is the sixth largest economy in the world in terms of its economic 
size. China's GDP reached USD 1.4 trillion in 2003. China's economy is deeply 
integrated into the world economy. It makes 40 percent of the air-conditioners, 50 
CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND TO CHINA'S STOCK MARKET 26 
percent of the televisions and refrigerators, 60 percent of the gan-nents. and 80 
percent of the toys (from ADB). 
To conclude, China is an economy undergoing rapid transforination. The size of 
China's economy is likely to climb to the second largest by 2030. Its rapid 
growth has brought great business opportunities for the rest of the ý, Norld. All of 
the world's economic fortunes are now linked with those of China. Its dynamism 
makes it increasingly important for global economic Oromh. 
2.3 Background to China's Stock Market 
2.3.1 Fact and Figures 
China has been developing its stock markets for more than 14 years. Officials 
hoped the stock market would put household savings to use as financing for listed 
companies, most of which were state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Although the 
stock market is not large compared to those foreign markets, the growth has been 
impressive. Stock markets have played an important role in China's economy. 
Table 2.1 shows the total market capitalization and its percentage over the GDP 
from year 1992 to 2002. The total market capitalization reached some RMB 
3,800 billion at the end of 2002, which accounts for 37 percent of GDP. By 2001 ý 
China's stock market has become the eighth largest market in the ýNorld and 
Asia's second largest, as Table 2.2 shows. 
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Table 2.1 Stock Market Capitalizations and National Economy, 1992-2002 
(RMB bn) 
Year Market Capitalization Market Capitalization as % of GDP 
1992 104.8 1.9 
199 
-3 
5 3.3 10.2 
1994 '69.1 7.9 
1995 '47.4 5.9 
1996 984.2 14.5 
1997 1752.9 2 3.4 
1998 1950.6 24.5 
1999 2647.1 -131.8 
2000 4809.1 5 -33 .8 
2001 4352.2 45.4 
2002 38 
-33 
2.9 37 
(Source: China Securities Regulatory Commission, CSRC) 
Table 2.2 World Largest Stock Markets at Year-End 2001 
Country 
Market Capitalization 
$bn 
United States 
Japan 2,252 
United Kingdom 1 2,217 
France 1ý174 
Gen-nany 1,072 
Canada 701 
Italy 527 
China 524 
Switzerland 521 
Hong Kong 506 
(Source: Standard and Poor's) 
There are two stock exchanges: Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE), which is 
located in the coast city of Shanghai, and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) 
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located in the Special Economic Zone city of Shenzhen. The SHSE and SZSE 
were formally established respectively on December 19,1990 and on Julý 3.1991. 
The number of listed companies has increased from 10 in 1992 to 1.224 in 2002. 
as Figure 2.1 shows. Figure 2.2 shows that the amount of funds raised has 
increased steadily over years, and it reached a peak of RMB 210.3 bn in 2000. In 
China, shares are classified as domestic (A shares) and foreign (B shares and H 
shares) by holders' residency. The B share is a special type of share only for 
trading by foreign investors. The B share market is separated from the A share 
market. The B share markets of SHSE and SZSE are denominated in US dollars 
and in Hong Kong dollars respectively. Since China's currency (Renminbi, RMB) 
is not freely convertible, foreigners cannot trade A shares. and Chinese citizens 
cannot use their home currency to buy B shares and overseas equities. H shares 
are issued by Chinese companies and traded on the Stock Exchange of Hong 
Kong. 
Figure 2.1 Domestic Listed Companies, 1990-2002 
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(Source: CSRC) 
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Figure 2.2 Total Raised Capital, 1991-2002 
1--- ---, 
The development of China's stock market is so impressive that it has made 
foreign investors begin to take the market more seriously as an investment 
proposition. Despite the official statistics of the market, there appears a need for a 
more objective treatment to the market. The next section attempts to provide a 
more realistic picture of what China's stock market is really like. 
2.3.2 Ownership Structure 
In China, the A shares are classified as tradable and non-tradable shares. The 
non-tradable shares include: the state shares, the legal person shares, and the 
employee shares. The tradable shares are those A shares traded on the stock 
exchanges. The definitions of these shares are clarified as follows. 
The state shares are those held by the central government, local 
government, or entireýv government-owned enterprises. Ultimateýv, 
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the owner of state shares is the State Council of China. State 
shares are not allowed to be traded at the stock exchanges, but are 
tronsferable among domestic institutions upon approval q1- the 
CSRC. In most of the listed eompanies, the state is the largest or 
the majority shareholder. 
The legal person shares are shares owned by domestic institutions. 
A legal person in China is defined as a non-individual legal entity 
or institution. In official documents, domestic institutions, 
including stock companies, non-bank financial institutions, and 
State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), have at least one non-state owner. 
Securities companies, trust & investment companies, finance 
companies, and mutual fun& are major non-bank financial 
institutions. There is a subcategory called 'State-owned legal 
person shares'. It refers to shares held by institutions in which the 
state is the majority owner but has less than 100% shareholding. 
Like state shares, legal person shares are not tradable at stock 
exchanges, but can be transferred to domestic institutions upon 
approvalfrom the CSRC. 
The employee shares are offered to workers and managers of a 
listed company, usually at a substantial discount. These shares 
offerings are designed more like a benefit to employees than as an 
incentive scheme. Employee shares are registered under the title of 
the labour union of the company which also represents 
shareholding employees to exercise their rights. After a holding 
period of 6 to 12 months, the company may file with CSRC for 
allowing its employees to sell the shares in the open market. 
(Source: CSRC) 
30 
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Therefore, a typical Chinese listed company has a mixed ownership structure xý ith 
the state, legal person, and domestic individual investors as the three predominant 
groups of shareholders. Each of the three holds about 30% of total outstanding 
shares. It indicates that only about 30% of total outstanding shares are traded in 
the open market. Many listed companies do not issue employee and foreign 
shares. In those that do offer employee and foreign shares, they account less than 
10% of total outstanding shares. 
Z3.3 Market Size 
One of the myths that is often propagated about China's stock market is that 
China's stock market has grown extremely large and quickly. By 2001 China's 
had become Asia's second largest market and the eighth in the world. However, 
the official figure is questionable. The reason is that the official market 
capitalization figure includes all the non-tradable shares. It seems only reasonable 
that 'market capitalization' should only include shares traded 'in the market'. So 
the market capitalization should be calculated excluding those non-tradable shares. 
Table 2.3 shows the capital structure of listed companies at year-end 200 1. 
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Table 2.3 The Capital Structure of Listed Companies at Year-End 2001 
Type of share Proportion of total share capital (%) 
State shares .37 
Legal person shares 26 
Others 2 
Individual A-shares 26 
Individual B-shares 5 
Individual H-shares 4 
(Source: CSRC) 
If the market capitalization is recalculated using only the tradable share, China's 
stock market had a value of only about RMB 1.4 trillion ($170bn) at year-end 
2001. It then ranked at 20'h place among the world's market in 2001 after Brazil, 
Finland, and Argentina. 
Another common misperception is that China's stock market plays a vital role of 
the economy like the banks. However, the truth is that the stock market is still 
small relative to the size of the domestic economy. Although the stock market has 
been developing rapidly over the last decade, enterprises in China still rely 
heavily on banks. Table 2.4 shows the market capitalization compared to the size 
of their domestic economy of Asia's major stock markets. 
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Table 2.4 The Market Capitalization Compared to GDP of Asia's Ntajor 
Stock Markets at Year-End 2001 
Markets Market capitalization, Sbn Proportion of GDP, % 
J apan 2,252 54 
Hong Kong 506 
. 
312 
Korea 220 
China (non-tradable 
shares excluded) 
170 17 
Malaysia 120 13 6 
S ngapore 117 1.3) 6 
(Source: Standard and Poor's) 
To conclude, although China's stock market has been developing very fast. it is 
still small, relative both to other markets and to the size of its economy. 
Claessens (1995) argued that successful stock market development is stronglý 
correlated with low inflation, a legal framework that protects minority 
shareholders' rights, and the existence of sizeable institutional investors. The next 
section will discuss the regulatory framework of China's stock market and the 
associated problems. 
23.4 Regulatory Framework 
The development of stock markets inevitably leads to the establishment of a 
complete legal sYstem. La Porta et al. (1997,1998,1999,2000., and 2002) argued 
that the laws and the quality of their enforcement by the regulators and courts are 
essential elements of investor protection and finance of firms. When investors* 
rights are protected by law and well enforced by regulators or courts, investors are 
NN Illing to finance firms. In contrast. N,,, hen investors are not protected by the legal 
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system, firms have difficulties in getting finance from investors. Howe,, er. in 
China the establishment of relevant laws have been after the set-up of the stock 
markets, and they have been weak. 
The current legal framework of the stock markets is based primarily on the 
following national laws and regulations: the Certified Accountant Laxý issues in 
1993, Audit Law in 1994, Company Law in 1994, People's Bank of China Lav, in 
1995, Commercial Bank Law in 1995, Securities Law in 1998, and Accounting 
Law 1999. The key regulatory bodies involved in the lawmaking process are the 
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), the State Economic and Trade 
Commission (SETC), the Ministry of Finance (MOF), and the People's Bank of 
China (PBOC). 
The establishment of the State Council Securities Commission (SCSC) and the 
CSRC in October 1992 marked the formation of the regulatory body in China. 
The SCSC is the State authority responsible for exercising centralised market 
regulation. The CSRC is the SCSC's executive branch responsible for conducting 
supervision and regulation of the securities markets in accordance with the law. In 
April 1998, pursuant to the State Council Reform Plan, the SCSC and the CSRC 
were merged to form one ministry rank unit directly under the State Council. 
Both the power and the functions of the CSRC have been strengthened after the 
reform. A centralised securities supervisory system was thus established. 
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In September 1998, the State Council approved the Provisions regarding the 
CSRC's functions, internal structure and personnel, further confirming CSRC to 
be one of the enterprise units directly under the State Council and the authorised 
department governing the securities and futures markets of China. This 
strengthened and clarified the CSRC's functions, and made the CSRC the only 
centralised market regulatory body. 
2.3.5 Problems - Price Manipulation 
Despite its development, the weak legal framework has been causing problems in 
China's stock market. At the National People's Congress (NPC) in spring 2000, 
Premier Zhu Rongji remarked that China's stock markets had developed quickly, 
achieved much, but was still not well regulated. His concerns are about the 
rampant speculation, poor-quality listed firms, defective regulation and 
widespread corruption. One of the most famous economists, Professor Wu 
Anglian (2001), condemned that 'China's stock market is no better than a casino. 
At least in a casino there are rules. * 
Zhu (1996) argued that fraudulent behaviour has become a significant problem in 
China. Gilley (2001) also pointed out that the wrongdoings in China's stock 
market include insider trading, false disclosure and market manipulation. The 
insider trading and price manipulations are not exceptional in China's stock 
market. Kang, Yu and Jin (2002) pointed out that investment companies team up 
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with large investors to manipulate share prices, and about 30% of stocks are being 
manipulated at any give time. The well-known scandal of the centur, of Zhongke 
Chuangye (otherwise known as China Venture Capital) revealed much aboLit vho 
is involved in insider trading and price manipulation and how the game is plaýed 
(for detail see Kang, Yu and Jin, 2002)'. Surprisingly, it is v, 7idelý accepted by the 
individual investors that the market is full of institutional manipulation. The 
individual investors have no choices but to play against the manipulators by 
following their moves, for they believe that the manipulators have informational 
advantage and will always make the right decision. The only thing the 
manipulators need to think about is how to fool the individual investors and trap 
them to buy when they are selling. One reason of these wrongdoings is that the 
rewards far outrun the punishment. Usually those breaking regulations receive no 
more that a warning issued by the CSRC. Only in serious cases are fines and bans 
used. However, the fines rarely exceed a few thousand renminbi and are no threat 
compared to the several million that can be gained from a typical scam. 
As cited in Green's (2003a), there is a favourite saying among China's investors: 
'Seven lose, two even, one wins. ' It means that out of every ten of them, seven 
lose money, two break even and one makes money, the latter of whom is an 
institutional investor with inside information. Institutional investors dominate 
China's stock market. The individual investors are those who have always been 
There are two high-quality magazines as recommended by Green (2003a), Caijing (Finance and 
Economics) magazine andXin Caifu (New Fortune) magazine, that have campaigned for better 
regulation and have covered a series of major events that have forced the CSRC to strengthen the 
regulation and enforcement. 
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sacrificed by institutional investors' manipulative schemes. The onl% ý% a-, for the 
small investors to make money is to follow the manipulator's MON e. or eý en beat 
them, hopefully. 
The price manipulation is associated with another rnýth about China's stock 
market; Green (2003b) argued that China's stock market is often seen as being 
dominated by small individual investors. However, the truth is that individual 
investors account for only a small proportion of the market. The majoritý of 
individual share accounts are empty, disused or have been opened fraudulently by 
institutional investors. Officially, individual investors have opened some 68.7m 
share accounts by the end of 2002. However, the truth is that individual investors 
are far fewer than the official figures with institutions. Investors travel to rural 
areas to rent fanners' ID cards with which they illegally opened individual 
accounts. It allowed them to engage in complex schemes to manipulate share 
prices. A recent survey by the SHSE found that only 20m of its 35m accounts 
have shares in them, and that only 8m of them are actively traded. Furthermore, 
there are many simu jijin (privately raised funds) that act as an institutional 
investor without fon-nal registration with the government. A senior official at 
PBOC, Xia (2001) stated that there were more than 7,000 simujýin operating 
around the country by year-end 2000, and they were worth some 40% of the total 
tradable market capitalization. Because the funds of simu jijin are from rich 
individual, SOEs and other sources that are often influential and have inside 
IoGa 
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information, the simu jýin often act as manipulators. profiting from indk dual 
investors. 
The weak regulation and enforcement is common in all emerging markets because 
of officials' lack of expertise in regulation and the limited resources available. In 
China there have been improvements since mid-2001 that the CSRC announced 
2001 was to be 'regulatory year' and launched its most aggressive enforcement 
campaign. Progress has been made which includes the capacity building at the 
CSRC and expanding the role of the courts in regulation. 
2.3.6 Opening Up to Foreign Investors 
After 15 years of hard work and negotiation, China became a member of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) on December 11,2001. China made serious 
commitments in its WTO accession package to open its stock markets to foreign 
investors. 
First, upon accession China agreed it would allow representative 
offices of foreign investors to become special members of two 
Chinese stock exchanges. 
Second, the SHSE and SZSE issued rules in June and July 2002 
allowing foreign securities institutions to appýy for aB share 
transaction seat, 
FOCA 
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Third, the regulations on the establishment of. foreign-ini-estedfiind 
management companies, effective from Ali, 2002, allow loreign 
investors to establish fund management joint ventures with 33% 
ownership upon accession, and 49% ownership 3 years (, fier 
accessi on. 
Fourth, the regulations on the establishment of foreign- invested 
securities companies, effective from Juh, 2002, alloity fibreign 
investors to establish securities companies with up to 113 equity, 
share to underwrite A shares, and to undent, rite and trade B shares 
and H shares. 
(Source: CSRQ 
The Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII) scheme was promulgated by 
the CSRC and the PBOC on November 5,2002. The introduction of the QFII 
scheme could be seen as the milestone of the opening of the Chinese stock 
markets, for it opens the A share and domestic bond markets to foreign investment 
for the first time. It is also a positive sign of a wider reform of the Chinese stock 
markets. There are more than 25 leading foreign financial institutions that have 
been qualified since then, including Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley. and some 
other institutions. The opening-up to foreign investors would be beneficial in a 
number of ways. It could increase the capital available to domestic issuers, as 
well as introducing international expertise and experience into the market. It 
would undoubtedly deepen and improve the efficiency of China's stock market. 
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2 3.7 Summary 
This section has introduced the background to China's stock markets and se\eral 
special characteristics have been highlighted. Obviously, as an emerging market Z: ý 
China's stock market is less developed than those ýýell developed ones. China's 
stock market is still small, compared to that of other markets and to its o\\n 
economy. The market is dominated not by individuals but by institutional 
investors, most of whom are not formally registered with some involve in price 
manipulation. However, there is still cause for optimism. The government is 
working hard in improving the qualjtý of regulation. There is good reason to 
believe that China's stock market will grow in size and quality, and become a 
market worth investing in. 
Despite the growing interest in understanding the markets, the institutional 
structure of China's stock markets has seldom been studied. Section 2.4 will 
mainly examine the institutional structure of China's stock markets with a special 
focus on comparing it to that of the developed markets. 
2.4 Institutional Structure and International Comparison 
Recent research suggests that market microstructure, such as the trading systerns, 
has important effects on price discovery. With the innovations in communications 
technology, stock markets are in the process of rapid structural changes, and so 'it 
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is important to understand the relationship bemeen market structure and price 
formation, in order to evaluate the impact of these changes and to guide policy 
making. 
Therefore, this section compares the market microstructure of China*s stock 
market to that of the developed markets. First, section 2.4.1 discusses the 
institutional structure of China's stock markets. Second, section 2.4.2 offers 
international comparison of market microstructure among other five developed 
markets. 
24.1 Institutional Structure of China's Stock Market 
Although there is growing research interest about China's stock market, the key 
elements about the market microstructure, such as market design in terms of its 
clearance, settlement, and depository (CSD) facilities, and the trading process 
have not been documented systematically. These issues are fundamental for 
understanding China's stock market, and will be studied in detail in this section. 
The adoption of modem technology and a computerized automated order 
matching trading system, along with China's rapid economic growth have 
contributed to China's promising stock market development. In China, there are 
two trading systems: Securities Trading Automated Quotations System (STAQS) 
and National Electronic Trading System (NETS). Currently, most stocks on both 
163(a 
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exchanges are traded through the NETS, ýýhich is a centralized. computerized 
order-driven system. 
Both stock exchanges are open from Monday to Frida,, except on hol ldaý s. Both 
exchanges officially open at 9: 30 and close at 15: 00, ýý 1th a lunch break frorn 
11: 30 to 13: 00. There are, therefore, a total of four trading hours each da\. In 
addition to this, there is a pre-trading session from 9: 15 to 9: 25 each trading daý. 
Two trading methods are used by the order matching system: a periodic auction 
and a continuous auction. The morning opening prices are generated bý the 
periodic auction during the pre-trading session. In this type of auction, all orders I 
are submitted during the morning pre-trading session and are batched for 
execution at a single equilibrium price. It should be noted that the periodic 
auction is used only once per day. After the morning opening, unmatched buy 
orders constitute a downward schedule while unmatched sell orders constitute an 
upward schedule. The trading mechanism stays the same for the rest of the day 
and so there is a continuous market until closing. Further despite the lunch break, 
the afternoon session is a continuation of the morning session. 
In the continuous and discriminating auction, orders are matched with a price and 
time priority scheme. In this type of auction, buy and sell orders are submitted 
and auctioned off continuously. Matched orders are executed and then dispatched 
from the system, whereas unmatched orders remain in the system until they are 
executed or cancelled. The transaction prices of a particular auction are generated 
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contingent upon the bid/ask prices and time of order submissions. At present. the 
best three bid/ask prices and the according aggregate ýolurnes are revealed 
continuously to investors. Market orders and limit orders are the onlý mo order 
types allowed. A big market order will be split up by the s, stem once they ha,. e 
been submitted, and will be transacted at the best bid/ask prices till the order has 
been filled. In addition, a traders* identity will not be disclosed to public. 
The automated order matching system can instantaneous ly execute orders that 
have accumulated during the lunch break. This operation is different from the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange where the periodic auction is used twice per day. This is 
also different from the Hong Kong market where the morning and afternoon 
sessions open as a continuous market. 
All orders are valid for one day only. The smallest trading unit is 100 shares. The 
SHSE and SZSE use a single tick size, which is RMB 0.01 Yuan. Floor trading 
among member brokers and short selling are strictly prohibited. Any legally 
recognized transaction has to be carried out through the automated order matching 
system. There is no market maker to stabilize stock prices by trading for his own 
accounts. Settlement takes place on the next day (T+I) between a broker and his 
customer. 
In order to subscribe to and trade A shares, an individual investor must open an 
account with a broker. The broker issues the potential investor an account number 
foca 
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that will be quoted on all exchange settlements. The broker channels each order 
to his member broker on the floor of the exchanges. The member broker then 
records the order in the stock exchanges' centralized order matching sN stem. 
24.2 International Comparison ofMarket Microstructure 
While most of previous market microstructure research has been focusing on the 
US markets, this study not only analyzes the institutional structure of China's 
stock market but also pays attention to other developed markets. This section 
compares the market microstructure of five of the largest stock markets in the 
world. The differences of the institutional structure might ultimately affect the I 
price discovery process. 
24.2.1 New York Stock Exchange 
The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) is a centralised exchange. The NYSE 
adopts the order-driven system. Every security listed on the NYSE is assigned to 
a NYSE-assigned dealer, known as specialists, who is responsible for maintaining 
a fair and orderly market. The specialist sets the opening price after observing the 
limit order book in a single-price call auction. Most trading is conducted 
by 
brokers acting on behalf of customers, rather than by dealers trading for their own 
account. For this reason, the NYSE is often described as a specialist auction 
market. The normal trading hours of the NYSE are from 09: 30 to 16: 30. 
Before 
CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND TO CHINA'S STOCK MARKET 45 
1995, the settlement on stocks on the NYSE took place flýe business days after 
trading. In 1995, the three-day settlement period was introduced into the NNSE. 
The NYSE uses a single absolute tick size of US$ 1/16 that applies to most stocks. 
2.4.2.2 NASDAQ 
The NASDAQ (National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation) 
market is a dealer market. In contrast to NYSE, NASDAQ has no single 
specialist. The NASDAQ adopts quote-driven system before 1997. The 
NASDAQ's market structure allows multiple market participants to trade stocks 
through a sophisticated computer network linking buyers and sellers from around 
the world. In 1997, the NASDAQ implemented new order handling rules, and 
introduced a new trading system ECN (Electronic Communication Networks). 
The new rules required certain customer limit orders to be displayed in both 
market maker and the ECN. Therefore, the NASDAQ is a hybrid market now and 
adopts both quote-driven and order-driven system. Essential to the NASDAQ's 
market structure, market makers are independent dealers who actively compete for 
investor orders by displaying quotations representing their buy and sell interest, 
plus customer limit orders. Each market maker has equal access to NASDAQs 
trading system to all market participants. In contrast to the NYSE, trading on 
NASDAQ opens with competing dealers' posting quotes. The regular trading 
hours on the NASDAQ are from 09: 30 to 16: 30. The NASDAQ uses the same 
tick size as that of the NYSE, which is US$ 1/16, for most stocks. 
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2.4.2.3 London Stock Exchange 
In terms of market capitalization, the London Stock Exchange (LSE) is the third 
largest stock market in the world behind NYSE, NASDAQ. Currently. there are 
three trading systems for the UK domestic equities: the SETS (Stock Exchange 
Electronic Trading Service) order book, the SEAQ (Stock Exchange Automated 
Quotation), and the SEATS PLUS (Stock Exchange Alternative Trading Service). 
SEAQ is a continuously updated database, which distributes market makers' bid 
and ask prices digitally to the market. Specifically, the market makers quote the 
best price at which they are willing to buy (bid price) or sell (ask price) shares of a 
given stock on SEAQ electronic bulletin board, while actual trades are generally 
negotiated on the telephone. The market makers compensate for the risks they 
undertake in quoting constant bids and offers by adjusting the width of the bid-ask 
spread. 
The LSE introduced SETS, an electronic order book initially trading for the FTSE 
100, on October 2 oth, 1997. Unlike past quote-driven market makers system, the 
order book is based on the order matching system in which member firms display 
their bid and offer orders to the market on electronic order book, which makes it 
an order-driven system. A member firm shall only use the following types of 
order when entering orders to the order book: limit order. at best order, execute 
soca 
CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND TO CHINA'S STOCK MARKET 47 
and eliminate order, or fill or kill order. The tick size for securities is 0.25p, 0.5p 
or Ip depending on the price of securities. Other non-SETS stocks are traded on 
either SEAQ or SEATS PLUS. 
The LSE launched SEATS in October 1992. Where a stock attracts less than tNw 
competing market makers, or is listed on the Alternative Investment Market 
(AIM), it is traded on SEATS PLUS. SEATS PLUS is a combination of 
competing quote-driven system and order-driven system. A market maker is 
appointed for illiquid stocks and will be obliged to make continuous two-way 
quotes. Meanwhile, investors can post buy and sell orders at limit prices. 
From September 2 Othý 1999, the LSE advanced its opening hour to 08: 00, which 
was 09: 00 before, as part of the European Alliance market harmonisation. The 
closing time is 16: 30. There are eight and a half trading hours in total without a 
lunch break. There is a 10-minute opening auction period from 07: 50 to 08: 00. 
Participants may add/delete new limit or market orders during the opening action 
period. 
In order to reduce risk by shortening the period of credit between brokers and 
clients, the settlement period was reduced from T+10 to T+5 in June 1995. 
The 
LSE further reduced the settlement to T+3 with effect form February 5th, 200 1. 
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2.4.2.4 Tokyo Stock Exchange 
48 
The Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) is the fourth largest stock market in the world 
and the largest in Asia, in terms of market capitalisation. The trading on the TSE 
is order driven, and there are no market makers as in the NYSE. Stocks on the 
TSE are traded either in the First Section or the Second Section. The First Section 
handles active stocks while the Second Section is for inactive stocks. The most 
heavily traded First Section stocks were traded on the trading floor under the 
system called the Floor Order Routing and Execution System (FORES). The 
remaining First Section stocks and all of the Second Section stocks were traded 
electronically on the Computer Assisted Order Routing and Execution System 
(CORES). For stocks traded under CORES, all orders are submitted 
electronically. 
The closest counterpart to the NYSE specialist on the TSE is the saltori. The 
saitori plays a central role both in trades transacted through CORES and those 
transacted manually. Orders, which may be market or limit orders, are entered 
into the CORES by exchange members via their terminals. However, they are not 
matched automatically but through the manual intervention of saitori seated 
in 
front of screens on which the orders are displayed. The saitori members 
do not 
trade on their own account or make markets in the stocks. Their function 
is purely 
to match the orders received from the other members. 
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TSE trading takes place in two different trading sessions. The moming se,,,, ion 
begins at 9: 00 and ends at 11: 00, while the afternoon session begins at 12: 310 and 
ends at 15: 00. Trade at the beginning of each session is initiated through a single- 
price auction called the itayose. This is followed by the continuous market called 
the zaraba. Virtually all trades occurring under the zaraba mechanisms are the 
result of market orders hitting limit orders or limit orders crossing. The TSE uses 
a tick size that is a step function of share prices, which is from I to 10.000 Yen. 
2.4.2.5 Stock Exchange of Hong Kong 
The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong (SEHK) is a limited company oNýned by its 
member brokers. In terms of market capitalization, it is the seventh largest equity 
market in the world and is the second largest in Asia after the TSE. The SEHK 
relies solely on an order-driven system. There are no market makers or floor 
traders with special obligations. 
Trading is carried out on the exchange floor in two sessions each day, from 10: 00 
to 12: 30, and from 14: 30 to 16: 00 on weekdays. Trading is conducted through 
terminals in the Exchange's trading hall, and also through terminals at the 
members' offices. Investors place orders in the computerized market through 
brokers. Share trading originates from an investor order in the form of either a 
market order or limit order, but the trading system only accepts limit orders. 
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Orders are executed through an automated trading s%stem. knoýNn as the 
Automatic Order Matching and Execution System (ANIS), ýNhich is a 
computerized limit-order driven trading system. All brokers are directl\ 
connected to the AMS system. The AMS displaý's the five best bid and ask prices. 
along with the broker identity (broker code) of those ýNho submit orders at the 
respective bid/ask prices being shown, and the number of shares demanded or 
offered at each of the five bid/ask queues. The AMS currently supports both 
automatic order matching and the manual execution method. Under this dual 
operational mode, all securities are traded through the AMS and are divided into 
two categories: auto-match stocks and non-auto-match stocks. Orders in auto- 
match stocks are executed on a strict price and time priority basis. Orders are 
matched in those entered into the AMS, based on the best price. The queue 
position in the system is maintained until the orders are either completely filled or 
cancelled, or the end of the trading day, whichever comes first. At the end of the 
trading day, all orders are purged from the AMS. 
The SEHK maintains a finer tick size schedule than any other major stock 
exchange in the world. The SEHK tick size is a step function of the stock price. 
The SEHK has probably the most extreme version of a step function, with ten 
different tick sizes, whose ranges are from HK$0.001 to HK$2.50. 
To conclude, the SEHK is basically a continuous double auction market operated 
on a pure order driven system. Trades are done through a computer-assisted 
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system. Unlike the China and Japan markets ýýhere trading is facilitated by t\\o 
trading mechanisms (a call market and a continuous double auction market) in a 
trading day, the SEHK trading mechanism stays the same for the ýýhole trading 
day. 
2.4. Z6 Summary 
To summarise this section, the comparisons of the market microstructure between 
China's stock market and other markets are shown in Table 2.5. Since China's 
stock market has a different institutional structure to the developed markets, it 
may have different price discovery process. However, being an emerging market, 
China's stock markets have received relatively little attention in literature due to 
the lack of data in the past. The recent advent of high-frequency data from 
China's stock market has given researchers the chance to examine this emerging 
market empirically. 
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2.5 Conclusions 
This chapter first provides general descriptions about the background to China's 
stock market. Obviously, as an emerging market China's stock market is less 
developed than those well developed ones. However, since China's econorný has 
been growing so rapidly. and the stock markets are opening to the xýorld, Chinese 
stock markets may become one of the largest stock markets in the world in the 
near future. Therefore, the understanding of the nature of the markets is important 
not only to academics but also investors. Although China's stock market has been 
developing very rapidly, it is still small relative both to other markets and to the 
size of its economy. The regulatory framework is relatively weak, which has 
caused some problems, for example, price manipulation. However, Chinese 
government is working hard in strengthening the regulation, and the opening-up to 
the foreign investors would bring international expertise into the market, hence 
improving the quality of the market. 
In addition, since this study is about the market microstructure, it is necessary to 
examine the institutional structure of the stock markets. Unlike most North 
American stock markets that adopt quote-driven system, China's stock market is a 
fully centralized and computerized order-driven market. Most Asian markets, like 
SEHK and TSE, also depend on the order-driven system. In an order-driven 
market investors submit their orders for execution through an auction process. In 
contrast, the quote-driven sý stem depends on market makers to post prices. 'vVh i le 
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most of previous market microstructure research has been undertaken in quote- 
driven markets, the different institutional structure of China's stock market might 
provide further insight about how the price discoverý process is affected b-, the 
trading mechanism. 
In order to better examine the microstructure issue, high-frequenc-ý, data is 
employed in this research. With the financial support from the International 
Institute of Banking and Financial Services (IIBFS), a comprehensive hioh- tN 
frequency data set has been constructed. The next chapter will describe the data 
used in this research. 
CHAPTER. 33 
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CHAPTER3 
DATA DESCRIPTION 
3.1 Introduction 
The availability of high-frequency data has provided finance researchers with the 
enviable opportunity of being able to explore the market microstructure issue at 
the finest level of data. This is particularly important for some practitioners who 
make their investment decisions by observing tick-by-tick data. Low-frequency 
data, such as the daily prices, do not provide enough accuracy required by such 
traders in the increasing competitive and risky environment of today's financial 
markets. 
Compared to low-frequency data (e. g. daily or weekly data), high-frequency data 
offers further insights into the price discovery process, especially for market 
microstructure models. The market microstructure research examines the detailed 
operation of the markets: bid-ask spread, tick size, information diffusion and 
investor behaviour, etc. High-frequency data and market microstructure theory 
are natural complements. With the development of information technology, high- 
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frequency data became available for researchers to find out ho,, N, prices are formed 
related to the 'black box' of economics. 
This chapter briefly describes the high-frequency data used in this research. The 
structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 describes the data generallý. 
Section 3.3 discusses the data filtering criteria. Section 3.4 examines the relation 
between SHSE and SZSE. Finally, section 3.5 offers conclusions. 
3.2 Overview of Data 
3.21 Data Source 
The high-frequency data used in this research is from SinoFin Jnformation 
Services within the China Centre for Economics Research (CCER) at Beijing 
University. In terms of the history of empirical finance, the success of modem 
financial study stems from the CRSP (Centre for Research in Security Prices) 
database at the University of Chicago. In order to push forward the academic 
study of emerging markets, especially the Chinese financial markets, the data 
platform needed to be established. As a member of one of the most leading 
economics and finance research institution in China, Sinofin Information Services 
provides the domestic and international academe with a comprehensive and 
research- oriented standard database. 
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3.2.2 Data Description 
As has been discussed in chapter 2, Chinese companies issue three main t-, pes of 
shares: A shares, B shares and H shares. The A shares are exclusiveb, sold to 
Chinese nationals. The B shares are traded and purchased in foreign currency 
exclusively by foreigners. The H shares are issued by Chinese companies and 
traded on the SEHK. Moreover, the A shares are classified as tradable and non- 
tradable shares, and only the tradable A shares are those traded on the stock 
exchanges. Given the objective of this research, the data employed in this 
research is tick-by-tick data of 1,140 stocks' tradable A shares trading on 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. 
The sample period is from Is' August, 2001 to 31 s' July, 2002 for the period of 
twelve months. The Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index for the sample 
period is shown in Figure 3.1, and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange Composite 
Index for the sample period is shown in Figure 3.2. 
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The data consists of share codes, trading times, transaction prices and %olumes. 
trading amounts, opening and closing prices. the highest and IoNNest prices on each 
trading day, the best three bid and ask prices and the according volume. The data 
fields for the data file are summarized in Table 3.1 as fol loýN s. 
Table 3.1 Data File Description 
Data Type Length Description 
Code Char 6 The code of listed companies in Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
Time Bigint 8 Time of transactions in a day 
Close Numeric 9 Close Price of the stock on that day 
Open Numeric 9 Open Price of the stock on that day 
High Numeric 9 Highest Price of the stock on that day 
Low Numeric - 9 Lowest Price of the stock on that day 
New Numeric 9 Transaction price of the stock at the time 
Amount Numeric 9 Trading amount of the transaction 
Volume Numeric 9 Trading Volume of the transaction 
Buypricel Numeric 9 The highest bid price 
Buyprice2 Numeric 9 The second highest bid price 
Buyprice-3) Numeric 9 The third highest bid price 
SellPricel Numeric 9 The lowest ask price 
Sellprice2 Numeric 9 The second lowest ask price 
Sellprice'35 Numeric 9 The third lowest ask price 
Buyvol I Numeric 9 Volume at Buypricel 
Buyvo]2 Numeric 9 Volume at Buyprice2 
Buyvol-' 3 Numeric 9 Volume at Buyprice-3) 
Sellvoll Numeric 9 Volume at Sellpricel 
Sellvol2 Numeric 9 Volume at Sellprice2 
Sellvo13 Numeric 9 Volume at Sellprice-3) 
The data sample contains exactly the same information as what traders are able to 
observe from the trading system. The code of stocks differs across exchanges, for 
example, code for stocks in SHSE are 600***, and 000*** for SZSE. The format 
transaction time is displayed as 'year/month/date/hour/minute/second'. for 
flOGR 
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example, if a trade is transacted at 11: 23: 35 on 4 th August 2001. the transaction 
time will be 20010804112335. The transaction amount equals to the transaction 
price multiplied by volume. 
3.3 Data Filtering Criteria 
A total of 1,140 different companies were listed on the Shanghai Stock Fxchange 
(SHSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) during the sample. However, 
only 1,050 stocks (566 on the SHSE and 484 on the SZSE) were listed on both 
markets at all times throughout the entire sample periods and had a complete set 
of price data available. Three types of stocks' transactions are deleted from the 
data sample: the newly listed stocks, the de-listed stocks and the ST (Special 
Treatment) and PT (Particular Transfer) stocks. 
The newly listed stocks and the de-listed stocks that do not have a full twelve- 
month record are excluded. Another reason for excluding new listings is because 
Chinese IPOs (Initial Public Offering) are notoriously underpriced. For example, 
Su (1998) reported an average A-share IPO initial return of 136.4% in China. 
This unusual IPO underpriceing is likely to affect the results given the objectives 
of this research. 
The transactions of ST and PT shares are also deleted. In China when a listed 
company has experienced two years of net loss, it will be classified as a Special 
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Treatment share, and its daily price fluctuation is restricted ýýithin -:, ', 'o (10% for 
normal shares). If the income loss extends to a third year, the stock %\ill be 
classified as a Particular Transfer stock which ýk ill only be traded eýery Friday. 
These stocks are usually subject to heavy manipulation and have quite abnormal 
price behavior, so they are deleted from the data sample. 
Moreover, further actions have been taken to clean the transaction data. 
Transaction data occurring outside the normal trading hours are deleted. Only 
regular trades transacted within the four hours of normal trading hours are 
considered which is from 09: 00 to 11: 30 and 13: 00 to 15: 00. Other abnormal and 
incorrect data have also been deleted from the data sample, which account for no 
more than 0.1% of the total observations. 
3.4 Relation between SHSE and SZSE 
This thesis includes four empirical studies, and each of them contains a 
descriptive analysis of the data used in that particular study. Since each empirical 
study has its own objectives, the descriptive analysis of data is undertaken for 
each study, respectively. Thus, replicative analysis of data will not be undertaken 
in this chapter. 
However, because the data are from two stock exchanges, it is important to 
discuss whether the two exchanges will generate different results or not. This 
1630a 
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section intends to test the differences of price behaviour between SHSE and SZSE. 
People sometimes expect different results bemeen the mo exchanges: ho\ýever. 
the difference is slight. Both exchanges are national exchanges. not local ones. 
They are the only legal organized exchanges recognized in China. Not onk the 
listed companies but also the investors are from all over the country. Both stock 
exchanges adopt exactly the same trading system, as has been discussed in chapter 
2. The two stock exchanges are treated as ONE market ýNhen talking about 
China's stock market. The only difference is that the size of SHSE is bigger than 
SZSE, in terms of the number of listed companies, and this is due to a government 
policy shift. 
There has been research about trading and location (Feng and Seasholes, 2004, 
and Chan et al., 2003). Feng and Seasholes (2004) analyzed investors' trading 
behaviour, and found that individual investors engage in correlated trading 
behaviour in China. They showed that purchases and sales are highly correlated 
when investors are divided geographically. Investors who live near a firm's 
headquarters react in a similar manner to releases of public information. In China, 
brokerage rules require that an individual place all of his or her trades through the 
branch office where he or she opens the account. The data set employed in their 
study is the account-level data from brokers, and the data allow them to pinpoint 
an investor's location at the time he or she places a trade. The location of the 
stock exchanges does not provide any insights in their study. Therefore, it is the 
trading location, not the location of the stock exchanges, that may affect investor's 
loca 
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trading behaviour. Moreover, Girardin and Liu (2005) found the evidence of ýer-., 
similar movements in seasonality between the two stock exchanges ýNhatever the 
frequency, and confirmed that there is no difference between the behaN iour of 
prices in SHSE and SZSE. 
As shown in Figure 3.1 and 3.2, the shape of the movement of the two indices for 
both exchanges is almost identical. Together with the same institutional structure, 
both exchanges should give the same empirical results. Moreover, further tests 
have been undertaken to examine the correlation between the two exchanges. 
Table 3.2 Descriptive Analysis of the Daily Returns in SHSE and SZSE 
Table 3.2 reports the descriptive analysis of the daily return 
in SHSE and SZSE for the sample period from I August 
2001 to')l JuIv 2002. 
SHSE SZSE 
Mean -0.000.30877 -0.0003) -3) 95 
53) 
Standard Error 0.00047702 0.0004877.33 
Median 0 0 
Mode 0 0 
Standard Deviation 0.007691718 0.007864411 
Sample Variance 5.92E-05 6.18E-05 
Kurtosis 6.910925201 6.851856003 
Skewness 1.213655458 1.05 258 863.3 
Range 0.069242972 0.071485556 
Minimum -0.028415872 -0.03 )009759-3 3 
Maximum 0.0408271 0.041-3879633 
Sum -0.080280322 -0.08828-376 
Count 260 260 
Correlation 0.949721 
Table 3.2 reports the descriptive statistics and the correlation of the dailY returns 
in the SHSE and SZSE for the sample period from I't August 2001 to 3 I't July 
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2002. From 'Fable 3.2, almost identical results are found between t%N, o exchanýges. 
and the return correlation between SHSE and SZSE is about 0.95. It further 
confirms that although SHSE and SZSE are located in different cities, the\ are 
virtually the same markets. 
3.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has given general descriptions of the data used in this thesis. This 
comprehensive high-frequency database provides a platform for studying various 
important issues of China's stock market. 
This chapter also describes the relation between SHSE and SZSE. Although 
located in different locations, the two exchanges are virtually the same markets. 
Both exchanges are national exchanges, and adopt exactly the same trading 
mechanism. The price behaviour is found to be identical between the two 
exchanges. The empirical results should not be expected to be different across 
exchanges. 
The rest of this thesis includes four empirical studies organised on a subject by 
subject basis. The first empirical study starts with the investigations of low- 
frequency data across years, in order to provide a more general picture of the 
efficiency level of ýChina's stock market. The next three empirical chapters výill 
further the analysis by using the high-frequency data. TheN wili focus on the 
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areas of the intraday patterns, the trade size effects and inxestors' psxcholo, -, %. 
respectively. 
The first empirical study, chapter 4, intends to examine the evolution of market 
efficiency via the ongoing predictive ability and profitabilitý of ýýell known 
technical trading rules. Given the formation of the Chinese equitý market in the 
early 1990's, chapter 4 tries to understand whether trading behaviours have 
changed across years, and whether markets evolve towards efficiencý generally. 
CHAPTER 4 
THE EVOLUTION OF MARKET EFFICIENCY IN CHINA 67 
CHAPTER 4 
THE EVOLUTION OF 
MARKET EFFICIENCY IN CHINA 
4.1 Introduction 
China is increasingly being seen as a major economic force and one that is likely 
to be a key global player over the coming decades. A key part of the 
transformation of the Chinese economy into a global economic player is the 
development of efficient financial markets. Despite the impressive growth over 
the years, the emerging nature has led some to question whether China's stock 
market is as informationally efficient as its U. S. or European counterparts. 
In general terms, market efficiency implies that prices fully reflect available 
information. When prices are informationally efficient, no investor can 
consistently realize above normal returns by trading on the basis of existing 
information. However, there is much empirical evidence of predictabilit,, in 
recent financial research. For example. Campbell (1987), Fama and French (1989) 
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and Lewellen (2001 ), among others, found that the dividend -,,, -Ield. interest rates 
and financial ratios appear to forecast stock returns. Fama (1991) offered an 
excellent summary of the empirical studies on return predictabilitý. 
Since stock returns can be predicted, technical analysts attempt to forecast prices 
by using a wide range of techniques. Almost all major brokerage firms all oýer 
the world publish technical commentary based on technical analýsls on the 
markets and individual securities. Brock et a]. (1992) investigated mo of the 
simplest and most popular trading rules, moving average and trading range break, 
in the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJ1A) over a long sample period. They 
concluded that the technical trading rules possess significant forecast power. 
Their results have been further tested with the bootstrap methodology, and thus, 
are robust. Since then many studies in the finance literature have investigated 
technical analysis to deten-nine its validity as an investment too] (e. g., 
Bessembinder and Chan, 1995, and Hudson et al., 1996). All the results 
confirmed that technical trading rules possess significant forecast power for equity 
returns. However, Bessembinder and Chan (1998) argued that although the 
technical trading rules do have predictive ability in U. S. data, their use would not 
allow investors to make excess returns in the presence of transaction costs. 
More recently, Tian et a]. (2002) explored the predictability and profitability of 
technical trading rules in markets with different efficiency levels; namel, y, the U. S. 
and China. In the case of the U. S. they found rules to have no predictabilit, -,, after 
foca 
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1975, whereas their results give support to technical trading rules having both 
predictability and profitability for the Chinese markets across the 1990's. This 
empirical evidence of predictabilitY suggests that stock markets tend to be 
inefficient at their early stages. 
To reach its potential China will need to be able to harness investment capital 
from its own people and overseas' investors. and to achieve this it ýNill need 
efficient security markets. Many decisions need to be made in the creation of new 
financial markets (for example, the type of trading system, the forms of trading 
and the structure of regulation) and it is not a foregone conclusion they will be 
efficient from inception. In fact, in new markets where trading is still thin, 
disclosure practices of fin-ns are limited and there are institutional barriers to trade, 
it seems more likely that markets will initially be inefficient but, hopefully, evolve 
towards efficiency. 
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, it is to extend Brock et al. 's and 
Tian et al. 's analysis of technical trading rules to see if the conclusions extend to 
other developed markets - namely, the U. K., Hong Kong and Japan. Second, this 
chapter is to add to the limited, albeit expanding, literature on China's stock 
market (for example, see Bessembinder and Chan, 1995, and Tian et al.. 2002) by 
examining the evolution of the China's stock market via the ongoing predictive 
ability and profitability of well known technical trading rules. 
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Tian et al's results for the U. S. market are supported by the results for a number of 
the main developed markets where the technical trading rules had predictiý. e 
ability during the 1970's that had disappeared by the I 990's. The results of this 
chapter suggest that while technical trading rules had short term predIct've abilit,.,, - 
and profitability in China's stock market during the I 990"s. this lessened as the 
decade progressed. This indicates that while short term speculation may have 
been a dominant force in the past, the markets seem to be becoming more 
sophisticated and this has positive implications for the future role of the markets 
as a means of underpinning the development of the Chinese economy. 
Particularly, the results bave implications for practitioners that the tecbnical 
analysis has decreasing predictability and profitability in China's stock market. 
Practitioners might need to carry out more fundamental analysis when investing. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 reviews briefly the literature 
concerned with technical trading rules and market evolution. Section 4.3 presents 
the sample, the trading rules and methods of analysis. The empirical results are 
presented in section 4.4 and the final section offers conclusions. 
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4.2 Technical Trading Rules and Market Evolution 
4.21 Technical Trading Rules 
Given the support for the predictability of stock returns (for example, Fama. 199 1, 
and Pesaran and Timmennan, 1995), it is, perhaps, not surprising that authors 
have sought to identify the sources of predictability. Brock et al. (1992) tested 
two of the simplest technical trading rules, moving average and trading range 
breakout, and found them to have predictive ability in terms of the Dow Jones 
Index over the period 1897 to 1986. Hudson et al. (1996) conducted a similar 
type of analysis on the UK FTSE 30 index and found the rules to have predictive 
ability. More recently, Gencay and Stengos (1997 and 1998), Gencay (1998a, 
1998b and 1999), LeBaron (1998 and 1999) and Femandez-Rodriguez et al. (2000) 
have all found evidence to support the predictive abifity of technical trading rules. 
in terms of the objective of the current chapter it is worth noting that 
Bessembinder and Chan (1995) found simple technical trading rules to have 
predictive ability in the emerging markets of Malaysia, Thailand and Taiwan but 
had less explanatory power in the more developed markets of Hong Kong and 
Japan. 
More importantly, however, given the purposes of the current chapter, Tian et A 
(2002) found a wide range of technical trading rules to have no predictive abilitN 
for the US after 1975 but in the case of the Chinese markets during the 1990's 
EWA 
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they had both predictability and profitabilitN. In examining the predictabiliv, and I-- 
profitability of technical trading rules Tian et al. expanded the ý ariants of the rules 
from the 26 examined by Brock et a]. (1992) to 412. 
4.2.2 Market Evolution 
Much of finance theory depends, explicitly or implicitlý. on the notion of market 
efficiency and, therefore, not surprisingly, there has been extensive testing as to 
whether financial markets are efficient (for example, Fama, 1970,1991 and 1998, 
Baillie, 1989, and Campbell, Lo and MacKinley, 1997). In contrast to this 
extensive literature on market efficiency and the testing thereof, there has been 
little discussion of the mechanisms which might lead to its achievement. If 
markets are not efficient, and in the absence of an alternative mechanism, the 
theory of financial market efficiency seems to have to rely on an evolutionary 
mechanism. There is an implicit assumption in finance theory that natural 
selection will favour strategies that are more rational and effective in investments, 
capital budgeting, etc. This eventually leads to an efficient market, since only the 
most effective strategies can survive in the marketplace. 
Friedman (1953) argued that irrational agents will disappear from the marketplace 
since they should receive systematically lower than average returns and losses. 
Miller (1977) used the concept of evolution to reconcile the difference bet-N, ýeen 
financial theory and the actual decision procedures used b%, financial professionals 
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within a corporation. According to Miller evolutionarý mechanisms are at %ýork 
to give survival value to those heuristics that are compatible v, ith rational market 
equilibrium, however far from rational they may appear to be \ýhen examined up 
close and in isolation. Miller argues that it is not necessary that these eft-ment 
investors use highly sophisticated statistical and mathematical techniques to arrke 
at the efficient investment strategy. Evolution ensures that onk the heuristics 
with survival value will continue to exist. Zingales (1998) surnmarises the 
position of modem financial theory very well by concluding that most economic 
theories are either implicitly or explicitly based on an evolutionary argument. 
Despite its widespread use in finance as an implicit mechanism for the 
achievement of market efficiency, the term evolution has not been rigorousl,, 
defined nor described. One consequence of this state of affairs is that different 
approaches have been/might be used to explore the evolution of financial markets. 
A number of authors (for example, Bekaert and Harvey, 1995 and 1997, Classens, 
Dasgupta and Glen, 1995, and Campbell, 1996) have examined the ongoing 
correlations between the returns of emerging and developed markets. As an 
approach to testing the evolution of emerging markets it has the weakness that it 
needs to assume that as a market emerges it will become more correlated with 
developed markets. Another approach might be to examine changing market 
efficiency via testing predictability with a time varying parameter model. While 
this approach examines the predictability of returns, it does not examine the 
equal]y important, from an evolution of market standpoint, notion of profitabilit-,. 
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In contrast to these approaches, and following a ýkell developed literature on 
testing market efficiency, this chapter examines the evolution of the China's stock 
market via the ongoing predictability and profitability of simple, technical trading 
rules. 
4.3 Technical Trading Rules and Methods of Analysis 
4.3.1 Technical Trading Rules 
In analysing the efficiency of markets, standard statistical tests and the auto- 
correlation of one-day returns are used. Because the primary purpose of the 
current chapter is to extend the analysis of Tian at a]. (2002) across the two 
important dimensions of markets and sub periods in the case of China, for ease of 
exposition we only present results for the two technical trading rules (moving 
average and trading range breakout rules with a range of variants for each rule) 
used by Brock et al. (1992) and Hudson et al. (1996). With moving average rules, 
buy (sell) signals are generated when the short run moving average is above 
(below) the long run moving average. For the sake of conciseness, only variable 
moving average rules, as compared to fixed rules, are considered. The trading 
range breakout rule triggers a buy (sell) signal if the stock price moves above 
(below) a *resistance' (support) level defined as the maximum (minimum) price 
achieved by the stock over the previous period. Variants of both types of rule are 
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considered by defining the rules over different period lengths and \ýith different 
band widths 
6. 
4.3.2 Data 
These technical trading rules are analysed using daily stock indices data from a 
range of markets - the Shanghai and Shenzhen indices in China, the Hang Seng, 
index in Hong Kong, the Nikki 225 index in Japan, the FTSF All Share index for 
the UK and the Dow Jones Industrial index for the US. However, it is ýýorth 
noting that there are currently no tradable index assets to exploit aw, market 
inefficiencies in the Chinese stock markets. Due to the unavailability of the data 
of individual stocks, this study can only use daily stock indices for the analysis. 
With the development of the Chinese stock markets, it is believed that there will 
be tradable index assets in the future. Therefore, this research could be treated as 
a forward-looking study, and has implications for future usage. 
The technical trading rules are analysed using two different samples. Given the 
formation of the Chinese markets in the early 199Ws, sample I consists of data for 
all the indices (US, UK, Japan, Hong Kong and China) for the period 21 May 
1992 to 31 October 2003. To understand whether trading behavlours have 
changed in the Chinese markets, results for four equal sub-periods across the 
1990's are presented for the Chinese markets. In addition, to understand -whether 
We have extensively examined hundreds of variants of the technical trading rules and the results 
are not significantly different from those reported. I 
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market efficiency changes more generally. anaiNsis is undertaken on a similar 
sized second sample (sample 11) which consists of data for the period -1 1 
November 1969 to 21 November 1980 for the indices other than China's. This 
period has been chosen to form a distinctive but still comparable benchmark to 
that of sample 1. 
4.3.3 Methodolopv 
In examining whether the predictive ability could be put to profitable use in a 
costly trading environment, a -double or out" trading strategy is simulated (see, 
Bessembinder and Chan, 1995). Under this strategy investors double their 
investment in a stock index when there is a buy signal and liquidate their stock 
holding when there is a sell signal. The risk free interest rate is assumed to be 
zero in the current calculation. In the absence of transactions costs, the additional 
return (E) earned by technical trading relative to a buy and hold strategy is given 
as: 
Nh N, 
E (BR, - R, ) +Z (SR, -Rj) Equation 4.1 
Nh N, 
Equation 4.1.1 = 1] -Rj) , 
(2 * R, - R, ) +Y, (0 
N., 
(R, (R,, Equation 4.1.2 
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Where 
BR, is the trading returns on buy days; 
SRj is the trading returns on sell days; 
Nb is the number of days the doubled (buy) position is held. 
N, is the number of days the out (sell) position is held; 
Ri is the index return on day i; 
Therefore to breakeven the transaction cost for each transaction should be equal to: 
E 
Nb + N, 
Equation 4.2 
This estimate of breakeven cost is then compared with the estimated transaction 
cost, to examine the profitability of the trading rules cross different time period. 
Following the approach of Tian et al. (2002), the analysis corrects for the 
possibility of nonsynchronous trading. Scholes and Williams (1977) showed that 
the nonsynchronous trading of component securities induces spurious positive 
serial dependence in measured portfolio or index returns. Since the technical 
rules rely on positive serial dependence, their apparent success may reflect return 
measurement errors. Bessembinder and Chan (1995) evaluated this possibility by 
investigating the sensitivity of all results to the implementation of a one-day tag. 
Technical trading returns are measured beginning with the closing index value 
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one day after the technical signal is initiated. Omitting the first-daý return 
eliminates the bias in measured returns attributable to nonsýnchronous trading if 
each security trades during the intervening day. 
Furthermore, a bootstrap procedure is used (see Brock et aL, 1992, and 
Bessembinder and Chan, 1995) to accommodate dependencies across rules. The 
actual return data are scrambled by randomly drawing from the original series 
with replacement to construct simulated indices. The trading rules are applied to 
the simulated indices, and the returns for each trading rule and the mean return 
across trading rules are computed. This procedure is repeated 500 times to 
generate an empirical distribution of returns. The fraction of the simulations, 
which generate a return larger than that observed in the actual series. is recorded. 
This fraction is interpreted as a simulated p-value. 
4.4 Empirical Results 
4.4.1 Sample Statistics 
Table 4.1 contains summary statistics for one-day returns for the six indices. The 
mean daily returns for the various indices largely confirm common perceptions of 
these markets. The Chinese markets have shown returns that compare -ývell wit 
the developed markets. The Nikkie index has shown negative returns across the 
90's but showed very strong returns across the 70's; the Hang Seng index showed 
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exceptional daily returns during the 70's. The FTSE Ail Share has shoNNn fairk 
consistent returns across the two sample periods, while the Dow Jones index 
showed poor returns across the 70*s (reflecting both the oil crisis and the 
competition from the Far East) and very good returns across the 90*s (reflecting 
the strong bull market and the technology bubble). 
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All the indices show signs of skewness and kurtosis, xýith the Chinese markets 
showing relatively high levels of positive ske, ýýness and kurtosis. In addition, the 
Shanghai market shows higher levels of significant autocorrelation than the other 
markets during the 1990*s. Interestingly and relevant to the purposes of this paper. 
all the developed markets showed positive and significant first order 
autocorrelation during the 1970's. 
4.4.2 Price Predictability 
The results for the technical trading rules (VMA and TRB) for samples I and 11 
are shown in panels A and B of Table 4.2. The three sections of each panel refer 
to different variants of each rule. For example, the first section of panel a reports 
results for the VMA (1,50,0) rule where the short run moving average is defined 
over one day, the long run moving average is defined over 50 days and the 
percentage bandwidth is zero percent. Whereas the first section of panel b refers 
to the TRB rule where the breakout range is defined for the maximum/minimum 
values for the 5 days previous to the signal, there is a0 percentage band value and 
the buy or sell decision would be held for 5 days. The significance of the trading 
rules is generated by comparing the observed buy-sell returns to the bootstrap 
returns. The fraction of the bootstrap simulations which generate a return larger 
than that observed in the actual series is interpreted as a P-value. Clearly only 
positive values of the buy/sell average are relevant. Therefore, one tail tests of 
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significance are used. (Tables 4.2 and 4.3 report standard le%els of statistical 
significance with *** equalling 99%, ** 95% and * 90%). 
Fool 
IT, 
u 
z 
LLJ 
LL) 
ý4 
LQ 
< LLJ 
7 '7 
- 
cl) 
z 
=ý7, -CD 
UC 
> 
ri < öü u 
(D 
u0 r- * '22 r-1 .-= 4- c: 
20m C 
-c C, 
MAc: E 
(U 10m>- 
CU r- m0 Q) 1- -0 
m Q) 0--C 
C) 
CL ce U -ý- A 
ý:: 
> 
r- m-=. - ý 0 r- Z r- 
Q) ce = .-= 
,5, m -zi -0 = cli (Z U 
CC -0 -0 Q) 
E CD -M M oo a) 
r- r- 73 
ýa E=*, 7 ö-0 - u *Z: M UM r_ > r_ ý- C, ý CD CD uu CZ 
cu m 
Z: lý 
u0 ýn 0 
ýz0 0, 
>< 
LA 0 (Z r- 
-0 
CU 
CD 
> 
r_ M 10 >ý - 0EU (U == c2. c2 r- öß -0 LA u (A .- ce (4- p 
"M >- (D C) ccD r- r- M cE 
CU (A UM Q) t: vý U- 0- 1-- 0 
ct cri 
Cf 
-101 
Zý 
cr 
.7 
00 
C, 
-r C) - - 
kr) 
tf') 
C) CN 
kr) 
\, O - tr) Cý 
kn C) a) 
C) 00 
C) Cý 
1,0 - 1ý0 - rý - - (=> kr) C) 
C) 
C) 
C5 
00 00 00 C) 00 
(1-1 Ilt cý 
Z le Z 01 
CD (Z) 
cý cý CD CD 
Z 
FV 13uud 
,, 
r- Z. -- c 
CD Z, ýc oc r, I r- r, I kr, 
ý- CD rl) rI _r - rl 
00 oc oc : Y- 
00 00 
kr, r 
cc 
oo 
kf) 00 
00 
rl) kr) 
C, 
00 C) 
C\4 
C) 00 
C) rn 
C; 
C> C), 
kr) 
kr) 
C) 
c) CD "It 
rI 
rI 
ZZ Oý 
C: ) 
rn 00 
C: ) C: ) 
kf') 00 
00 
kf'ý 00 
00 
CD 
C: ) C> 
LU 
(rý r-) 
CD r- 
CD C-1 
cD e 
CD r- 
cý 
C/X 
C) 
cl 
ýa 
-'V PuBd 
cz 
ZM 
EN Flul-d 
-t I oc 
I 
C) 
z 
u 
z 
LLJ 
LLJ 
LLJ 
2 
LL. 
0 
z 
0 
LiJ 
LLI 
-(ý3 
ru 
; zt 
Q. 
ý_o 
7E. 
CID 
ri 
rI 
00 
rl) 00 
ý- ýo " - * ý0 C) 
CA C) 
v 
ýo ý10 m I- 
" 
It 
rn 
rn 
C) 
(Z-) 
C) 
C: ) 
C: ) 00 
Cý 
- rn (r) rn 't CD ý-0 
? o 1 0 - 
CD 
c" rq 00 CA 
4 "0 clý "- 
, r-) fl) CD 
CD t-- 
ý c CD 
c) rn 00 
00 V) 00 "0 
rn (In CI) r- 
C> 
C) C) 
fn r) " qN * 
00 
kri 
cn rl) 00 Cý * 
v 
: 
CD 
I, o 
"a 
-= wl 
1*8 Pul-d 
00 Rr, ýJ-, IL 
00 
00 
ON 
Cý v C: ) 
m r-I kr) V') kn C-, 
00 
(n kn ý10 cn 
(ýl C) 
C) m 
C) 00 
CD : I- 
C) C) 
kr) CN 
00 ON CN 
C) C) 
C) kr) C) 00 
10 
Cý 
- kr) 
00 
00 r- IC 
C) 00 
0 I'D 
0-ý C) 
CA >, :j> 
r1q -0 
CD 
DI Putd 
Z Z e-i 
, - Z ' , 
,Z ýrý "Z r- ý t - (f'ý - C> 
ý 
Z 
CD -1 CD Z, 
cý -: CD 
"0 
rn CD 
CD ý CD c v 
cý 
C: l 
kn 
C) 00 
00 
C) 
(-I 
110 t- 110 r- 
C) - 
C) ýt 
Cý 
kr) ýC) "tt 
C: ) 
cn 
C) ON 
(Z) 'T 
66 
kr) 
C) 't 
00 
110 kr) rn 
cs 
ýD- 
C) - 
6 
7- z cc un 
CO PuUd 
ý-) ý- I 
CHAPTER 4 
THE EVOLUTION OF MARKET EFFICIENCY IN CHINA 8f 
A simple conclusion emerges from the results for sample period I (the 90's) 
reported in panels A and B of the left hand columns of Table 4.2. In terms of both 
Chinese markets, only the short term variants of both technical trading rules are 
positive and significant. This implies that speculative forces are ex ident in the 
Chinese markets during the 1990's. For the rest of the markets during period I 
(the 90's), the picture is somewhat different if allowance is made for the signs of 
the coefficients and their significance. In terms of both the VMA and TRB rules 
only the Hong Kong market has a significant result (this is for the short term 
VMA rule) with a positive coefficient, perhaps, this is not surprising given the 
relationship between Hong Kong and China. However, in terms of the other 
developed markets, the short term rules do show significance during the earlier 
period of the 1970's (sample 11 in Table 4.2) for the FTSE and the Dow Jones. 
Therefore, these current results largely confirm the thrust of those presented by 
Bessembinder and Chan (1995) and Tian et al. (2002) with the Chinese markets 
showing significant results for the short term rules during the 1990's but the 
developed markets only showing significant results for the 1970's and even here, 
this is again only the case for short term rules. 
Given the results for the developed markets show that market efficiency tends to 
change across periods, results for four equal sub-periods across the 1990's are 
presented for the Chinese markets in Table 4.3. 
FOCA 
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Not Surprisingly. given the results for the ý, vhole period, the results of Table 4.33 
show only the short term variants of the VMA and TRB rules to be significant. at 
traditional confidence levels, in the separate sub periods. In general, the returns 
from the short term VMA and TRB rules and their significance. as compared to 
bootstrap returns, decline across the four sub periods of the 1990*s. This 
conclusion is supported by the significance, at the 10% level, of the Jonckheere- 
Terpstra teSt7 for ordered alternatives. Therefore, while it is not possible to draw 
completely unequivocal conclusions from Table 4.3, the results, when taking in 
their entirety, tend to suggest that the efficiency, as measured by the predictive 
power of technical trading rules, of the Chinese markets is improving across the 
199Ws. 
7 The Jonckheere-Terpstra test is used to test for ordered differences among returns in different 
sub-periods. It tests the null hypothesis that the samples are ordered in a specific a-prior, sequence. 
For the purpose of studying the change of the trading rules' predictability over time. the 
Jonckheere-Terpstra test for ordered alternatives is preferable to tests of more general class 
difference alternatives such as Kruskal-Wallis tests. One sided p-values for the Jonckheere- 
Terpstra test are reported. A small left-sight p-value supports the alternative h,, pothesis of 
decreasing order in returns across more recent timed periods, and vice versa. 
soca 
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Table 4.3 Results for Sub Periods 
This table reports the results for sub-periods for the two Chinese indices. The definitions of rows are same as those 
in table 4.2. Panel A reports the results for the variable-length moving average (VNIA) rules. Rules are identified 
as (short, long, band) where short and long are the short and long moving averages respectively, and band is the 
percentage difference that is needed to generate a signal. "N(Buy)" and "N(Sell)" are the number of buy and sell 
signals reported during the sample. "Buy-Sell" is the daily mean of buy returns minus sell returns which are 
generated buy the trading rules. Bootstrap p-values test for the difference between buy and sell returns. Panel B 
reports the results for the trading range breakout (TRB) rules. The "Buy-Sell" is the dailý mean of buy return minus 
sell return for a fixed holding period of 5,20, and 20 days. PL JT and PR_JT are the left-sided and right-sided p- 
value of Jonckheere-Terpstra test. 
Panel A VMA 
(1,5,0) (5,120,0) (5,200,0) 
Period Shanghai Shenzhen Shanghai Shenzhen Shanghai Shenzhen 
N(Buy) 331 303 353 306 398 300 
.0 N(Sell) 447 465 425 472 380 478 
Buy-Sell 0.005285 0.00257 -0.00183 -0.00071 -0.00143 -0.0014 
-0 
p-value <0.000 1 0.00998 0.894212 0.744511 0.824351 0.868263 
"a N(Buy) 425 438 535 503 575 437 0 .a 
V N(Sell) 336 323 247 207 345 C. C14 
.6 
Buy-Sell 0.000657 0.002421 0.000506 0.000218 -0.00029 0.001176 
p-value 0.251497 0.00998 0.359281 0.618762 0.752495 0.281437 
,a N(Buy) 414 414 473 461 545 533 
.0 N(Sell) 337 337 310 322 238 250 
Buy-Sell 0.001201 0.000999 0.000253 0.000335 3.8 1 E-05 7.01 E-05 
p-value 0.011976 0.033932 0.447106 0.443114 0.616766 0.634731 
N(Buy) 262 253 250 236 188 142 0 
N(Sell) 354 363 390 404 452 498 
Buy-Sell 0.00034 0.000956 8.4 1 E-05 0.00017 -0.0001 -7.4E-05 
p-value 0.383234 0.159681 0.608782 0.518962 0.620758 0.612774 
PL_JT 0.067339 0.099706 0.488091 0.068444 0.054388 
PR_JT 0.197425 
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Table 4.3 Continued 
Panel B TRB 
(1,5,0) holding 5 days (1,120,0) holdin g 20 days (1,200,0) holding 20 days 
Period Shanghai Shenzhen Shanghai Shenzhen Shanghai Shenzhen 
-a N(Buy) 74 73 11 9 4 
N(Sell) 103 105 33 34 26 22 
Buy-Sell 0.005542 0.002158 -0.00302 -0.00307 -0.00501 -0.00232 
p-value <0.000 1 0.027944 0.874251 0,94012 0.942116 0.866267 
N(Buy) 108 96 31 31 29 30 
N(Sell) 83 74 7 11 5 6 
Buy-Sell 0.001166 0.002266 0.000227 0.002034 0.000344 0.0022 83 
p-value 0.085828 0.001996 0.506986 0.229541 0.477046 0.209581 
,a N(Buy) 97 86 38 29 34 27 
N(Sell) 83 92 7 7 4 4 
2) Buy-Sell 0.000308 0.000153 6.56E-06 2.95E-05 -0.0006 -0.00051 
UO p-value 0.259481 0.39521 0.542914 0.355289 0.798403 0.756487 
"a Q N(Buy) 63 60 6 3 2 2 
N(Sell) 89 93 24 29 17 18 
-6 
Buy-Sell 0.000253 0.000389 3.67E-05 0.000898 0.000103 0.000885 
p-value 0.41517 0.343313 0.477046 0.237525 0.40519 0.237525 
PL_JT 0.0003 0.007029 0.146272 0.114178 
PR_JT 0.100793 0.442623 
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4.4.3 Trading Profits 
As been discussed by Brock et al. (2002), since technical trading strategies require 
frequent transactions, transaction costs should be carefully considered before such 
strategies can be implemented. The profitability of the rules for the Chinese 
markets is analysed in the presence of trading costs in the current section. Table 
4.4 reports the breakeven costs for each trading rule under the "double or out" 
strategy. Investors in China face the following trading costs: stock-broking bux 
and sell commissions, Chinese government stamp duty and bid-offer spreads. The 
estimation of the transaction costs in different periods is reported in panel C of 
Table 4.4. The government stamp-duty is levied on both the seller and buyer for 
each transaction and it has been changing across the 1990s ranging from 0.2 to 
0.5% (Shi et a], 2002). In terms of the buying and selling commissions, after Oct 
1996, the commission charges for A-share trading in both the Shenzhen and 
Shanghai exchanges were fixed at 0.35% by the authorities. This has been 
changed to a maximum of 0.3% from May 2001. The bid-offer spreads are 
considered to be the smallest transaction components in the Chinese stock markets 
and are often ignored by investors in practice. A typical effective spread in the 
Chinese stock markets is about 0.088% (Sun et al., 2002). This is partly due to a 
small tick size relative to the price level. The tick size is 0.01 Chinese Yuan and 
the average price is at a level of about 15 Yuan8. It is not unusual to find that the 
8 As Sun et al. (2002) point out, this fixed tick size is too small for high priced stocks and affects 
their market depth. They recommend a variable tick size system which would be similar to the 
Hong Kong and London markets to improve overall market liquidity. 
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price difference between the best sell and best bu,, is onl% one tick size. Therefore. 
the relative spread is very low. In summary. the overall one v, a,, transaction costs 
estimated for the whole period is about 0.75% 9. For the VMA trading, rules, onl, \ 
one-way transaction costs are involved as each transaction is closed bý another 
new transaction when a new signal is generated. For the TR-B trading rules ýN Ith 
different holding periods, two-way transaction costs are needed for each signal to 
open and close a position. 
The results in Table 4.4 strengthen the findings noted in the previous section. 
First, the breakeven transaction costs are found to be lower as the market changed 
across the 1990s for both markets. In panels A and B of Table 4.4 the over all 
breakeven costs have declined from period one to four. Second, comparing the 
breakeven costs with the estimated transaction costs, weak-form market efficiency 
is achieved for both markets as they changed across the whole period. 
9 This estimation of 0.75 1o for one-way transaction costs (1.5% for a txýo-ýNaý transaction cost) 
is 
similar to that is used in the study of Tian et al. (2002). 
100a 
CHAPTER 4 
THE EVOLUTION OF MARKET EFFICIENCY LN CHI\A 91 
Table 4.4 Breakeven Cost for Double and Out Strategy 
This table reports the mean breakeven costs for the double and out strategy relative to the bu,, and hold strateg, . Buý and sell 
signals are generated from variable length moving average rules (VNIA) in panel A and trading ran, -, e breakout rules (TRB) 
with 5,20 holding days in panel B. It reports the results for both the Shenzhen Stock Exchange and Ynanghal Stock 
Exchange for all periods and the 4 sub-periods. Panel C reports the estimated one-%Naý and tNw-Nýaý transaction costs. The 
information on commissions and stamp duty are from Shi et a], (2002). and the bid-ask spread information is from ", un et al. 
(2002). 
Panel A VMA 
(1,5,0) (5,120,0) (5,200.0) 
estimated 
Sub-periods Shanghai Shenzhen Shanghai Shenzhen Shanghai Shenzhen costs 
1 0,025858 0.011215 -0.109670 -0.032610 -0.08532 -0.109090 0.0074 
2 0.002658 0.011517 0.032961 0.007734 -0.01420 0.054100 0.0084 
3 0.005531 0.004549 0.016539 0.018730 0.00213 0.004571 0.0074 
4 0.001327 0.004090 0.004138 0.009864 -0.00589 -0.003662 0.0069 
All 0.008566 0.007994 -0.015560 -0.000210 -0.02539 -0.003154 0.0075 
Panel B TRB 
(1,200,0) holding 20 
(1,5,0) holding 5 days (1,120,0) holding 20 days day s 
estimated 
Sub-periods Shanghai Shenzhen Shanghai Shenzhen Shanghai Shenzhen costs 
1 0.027711 0.010791 -0.060423 -0.061437 -0.100287 -0.046312 0.0148 
2 0.005829 0.011331 0.004542 0.040689 0.006871 0.045656 0.0168 
3 0.001542 0.000766 0.002626 0.011786 -0.012084 -0.010139 0.0148 
4 0.001267 0.001944 0.000734 0.017965 0.002064 0.017707 0.0138 
All 0.009269 0.006305 -0.014943 0.000433 -0.026423 0.004246 
0.0151 
Panel C Estimated Transaction Costs 
Components Total 
One- 
Sub- periods Commissions Stamp duty Spread Way Two-Way 
1 21 May 1992 - 19 May 1995 0.0035 
0.003 0.0009 0.0074 0.0148 
2 20 May 1995 - 19 May 1999 0.0035 
0.004 0.0009 0.0084 0.0168 
3 20 May 1999 - 28 Jun 2000 0.0035 
0.003 0.0009 0.0074 0.0148 
4 29 Jun 2000 - 31 Oct 2003 0.0035 
0.0025 0.0009 0.0069 0.0138 
All 0.0035 0.0031 0.0009 0.0075 0.0151 
FoGa 
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4.5 Conclusions 
Equity market can be informationally efficient or operationailý efficient. In an 
informationally efficient market, prices fully reflect all available releýant 
information. In a perfect operationally efficient market, transaction costs are 
assumed to be zero. The results of this chapter shový that China's stock market is 
neither informationally efficient nor operationallý efficient. Stock retums could 
be predicted through technical trading rules. However, investors cannot make 
excess returns because of transaction costs. 
As a means of adding to the literature on China's stock market, this chapter has a 
further contribution that it has analysed the evolution of China's stock market. It 
extends the work of Brock et al. (1992) and Tian et al. (2002) analysing a wider 
range of developed stock markets and sub periods across the 1990's in the case of 
China's stock market. The results for a number of the main developed markets 
support those of Tian et al. for the U. S., in that though technical trading rules had 
predictive ability during the 1970's, this had largely disappeared by the 1990's. 
Similarly, the results suggest that while technical trading rules had short term 
predictive ability and profitability in the China's stock market during the 90's. this 
has generally lessened as the decade progressed. The evolution of markets is 
supported by the results for both the main developed markets and Chinese markets. 
Overall. the results for the evolution of both the developed and Chinese markets 
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bode well for China having stock markets that ý% ill underpin its dcý elopment over 
the coming years. 
This chapter examines the efficiency of China's stock market adopting lov, 
frequency data over the years. However, some practitioners make their 
investment decisions by observing tick-by-tick data. Therefore. it is important to 
explore the microstructure issues at finer levels of data ýý ith high-frequencN data. 
In the next chapter, high-frequency data will be used to further examine the 
market efficiency by investigating the intraday patterns of price behaviours. 
SOCA 
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CHAPTER 5 
INTRADAY PATTERNS 
5.1 Introduction 
The intraday variation of stock market activities has been ý% ell documented in the 
literature with the evidence of US data. Most stock markets in North America 
depend on market makers to set price and provide liquidity. For example, every 
security listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) is assigned to a NYSE- 
assigned dealer, known as a specialist, who sets the opening price and is 
responsible for maintaining a fair and orderly market. In contrast to NYSE, the 
National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation system 
(NASDAQ) has no single specialist but multiple dealers. Previous research has 
been focusing on the intraday variables, such as bid-ask spreads, trading volumes 
and volatility. For example, returns and its volatility tend to be greater at the open 
and close than at other time during the trading day and exhibit a U-shaped pattern 
(see Mclnish and Wood, 1985, Wood et al., 1985, Harris, 1986, Jain and Joh, 1988, 
and Mclnish and Wood, 1990b). The U-shaped intraday patterns have also been 
documented in bid-ask spreads (McInish and Wood, 1985. and AbhNankar, et al.. 
f0oa 
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1997), and trading volume (Jain and Joh. 1988, McInish and Wood. 1990a. and 
Atkins and Basu, 1995). Previous studies consider the possible explanations for 
the intraday patterns by considering the market vvith specialists or market makers 
(Brock and Kleidon, 1992. Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988, and Foster and 
Viswanathan, 1990). 
However, most stock exchanges outside North America, such as those in 
continental Europe and Asia, rely on the order-driven mechanism ,,, Ithout 
designated market makers. Although there is relativehy, sparse research on the 
markets under the order-drive system, other markets are being increasingly ýI 
researched, in addition to the US literature. The intraday variation has been 
documented for the London Stock Exchange (LSE) (Cai et al., 2004, Abhyankar, 
et al., 1997, Yadav and Pope, 1992, Kleidon and Werner, 1993, Naik and Yadav, 
1999, Taylor, et al., 2000, Ellul, 2001, and Ellul, et al., 2002), the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange (TSE) (Hamao and Hasbrouck, 1995), the Stock Exchange of Hong 
Kong (SEHK) (Ho and Cheung, 1994, and Cheung, 1995), and the Stock 
Exchange of Singapore (SES) (Ding and Lau, 2001). These findings suggest that 
the intraday anomalies are not due to the peculiarities of the US markets. 
The recent availability of intraday data from China's stock market 
has spurred 
investigations of intraday regularities in a different institutional setting. Research 
of China's stock market is important for the following reasons. 
First, the 
institutional setting of China's stock market 
is different from the US market in at 
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least three ways. They include the use of a fulb, centralized & computerized I 
screen based dealer system, the used of order-driven s, ystern ý, ý ithout an. % market 
makers or specialists, and a 90-minute lunch time. Second, it ýýould be useful to 
examine whether the intraday regularities are consistent vith the predictions of 
theoretical models, such as those of Brock and Kleidon (1992) or Admatl and 
Pfleiderer (1988). It is important that predictions of theoretical models are tested 
in a variety of institutional settings so as to examine their robustness. Finalk. the 
results would be of interest to market participants as well as regulators and policy 
makers who are involved in the design of an efficient trading system. 
By examining the intraday patterns in China's stock market, this chapter has a 
number of exploratory objectives. First, it shows the intraday trading activity 
patterns and documents a wide range of market characteristics. Second, it 
compares the patterns in China's stock market to those in other markets, and tries 
to explain the similarity and difference by considering the theoretical models and 
different market structure. 
The results can be summarized as follows. First, the bid-ask spread has an L- 
shaped pattern. The spread opens wide and narrows down in the first trading hour 
and is relatively stable for the rest time of the trading day. It shows only a 
marginal increase at the end of the trading day. The 90-minute lunch break does 
not change the spread. Second, the volume pattern is relatively flat in the morning 
session with a marginal increase at the open and marginal decrease at the close-, 
foca 
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while it shows a J-shaped pattern in the afternoon session. MoreoNer. both the 
numbers of trades and trade size contribute to the volume pattern. Third. the 
pattern of volatility is similar to the spread pattern in that it exhibits an L-shaped 
pattern. The findings have implications for market participants ýýho haNe 
discretion to time their trades to make profits. It also helps investors minimize 
risks to trade when bid-ask spread and volatifity are low. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 reviews the empirical evidence 
and Section 5.3 discusses the theoretical predictions of intraday patterns. Section 
5.4 discusses the data and methodology. Section 5.5 provides the empirical results 
and interpretations. Finally, section 5.6 concludes. 
5.2 Empirical Evidence 
5.2.1 Empirical Evidencefrom US Markets 
Brock and Kleidon (1992) and Lee, Mucklow and Ready (1993) found that the 
intraday width of bid-ask spreads for NYSE stocks display a U-shaped pattern. 
Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans (1997) documented that the bid-ask spread 
of NYSE stocks follow a U-shaped pattern by developing a structural model of 
intraday price fon-nation. Moreover. the U-shaped pattern of bid-ask spread is 
also observed in the LSE by Abhyanhar et al. (1997) and in the SEHK by Ahn and 
Cheung (1999). 
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Wood et a]. (1985), Jain and Joh (1988), Foster and Viswanathan (1990). %Iclnish 
and Wood (I 990a) and Gerety and Mulberin (1992) documented that the tradin L, 
volume (measured as the number of shares traded) follows a U-shaped pattern in 
NYSE and NASDAQ during the trading day. Geret-v and Mulherin (1992) argued I 
that overnight volatility causes increased volume at the open and close of the 
stock market. Atkins and Basu (1995)'s work indicated that the large volume at 
the beginning of the trading day could be the result of the aggregate amount of 
new information that becomes known overnight. 
French and Roll (1986) argued that return volatility is a direct measure of risk and 
an indirect measure of the level of information. Wood et al. (1985), Jain and John 
(1988), McInish and Wood (1990a) and Lockwood and Linn (1999) found a U- 
shaped pattern of volatility in the NYSE. Similarly, Abhyankar et at. (1997) 
found the volatility follows a U-shaped pattern in the LSE. 
Block et al. (2000) investigated institutional investor buy and sell decisions as a 
cause of the intraday patterns of common stock returns and trading volume. They 
found that buy decisions tend to be concentrated during the market opening and 
closing hours. In addition, the volume of portfolio manager decisions tends to 
be 
concentrated during the opening and closing hours as well. The results are 
consistent with not only the previous evidence but also the notion that the actions I 
of portfolio managers contribute to the intraday patterns of volume. Their 
FOCA 
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findings support the contention of Brock and Kleidon (1992) that the demand or 
supply imbalances that could lead to observed daily trading patterns. 
Chung and Zhao (2003) showed that intraday variation in spreads for NASDAQ- 
listed stocks has converged to intraday variation in spreads for NYSE-listed stocks 
after the implementation of the new order-handling rules. They attributed this 
convergence to the Limit Order Display Rule, which requires that limit orders be 
displayed in NASDAQ best bid and offer when they are better than quotes posted 
by market makers. They suggested that the different patterns of intraday spreads 
between NYSE and NASDAQ stocks reported in prior studies can largely be 
attributed to the different treatment of limit orders before the market reform in 
1997. They documented that after the market reform, the intraday pattern of 
NASDAQ spreads follows the familiar U-shaped pattern, which has been 
observed for stocks traded on the NYSE. 
5.2.2 Recent Evidencefrom Other Markets 
Bildik (2001) examined the intraday seasonalities of the stock returns in the 
emerging Turkish Stock Market which is an order-driven market using electronic 
trading without market maker. He showed that the stock returns follow a U- 
shaped or more precisely a W-shaped pattern over the trading day at the Istanbul 
Stock Exchange since there are two separate trading sessions in a day. Volatility is 
higher at the openings and follows an L-shaped pattern during the both sessions. 
SOCR 
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They concluded that the intraday seasonalities exist significantlý in the Turkish 
Stock Market as consistent with those of the international stock markets, 
Ding and Lau (2001) examined the intraday patterns in the Stock Exchange of 
Singapore by employing transactions data. They documented that the presence of 
a trading halt in the midday results in a double U-shaped return pattern. HoNýever, 
the 90-minute trading halt does not cause volume to be unusually high just before 
or after the trading halt. The patterns observed in the volume and bid-ask spreads 
are distinctively similar to those of the US, and have a U-shaped pattern. Trading 
activity (measured by the number of transactions) is not high at the beginning of 
the day but rises dramatically towards the market closing. 
Copeland and Jones (2002) extended the research on intraday patterns in stock 
and futures exchanges into the Korean market. Similar pattern to those found 
previously in the heavily investigated Western markets are observed, despite the 
differing mi cro structures, institutional framework and time zones between the 
East and West. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that the observed 
patterns reflect at least to some extent features of underlying investor behaviour. 
Ke et al. (2004) examined the impact of tick size on intraday stock price 
behaviour for stocks listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange. They found that the 
intraday patterns of bid-ask spread, return volatility, and trading volume are U- 
shaped. The U-shaped patterns are consistent with the information asymmetr% 
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hypothesis in that the degree of information asymmetry between informed trader 
and uninformed traders is higher near rnarket open and close. Moreover, %kang, et 
al. (1999) found higher volatilities of the Nikkei index futures at the opening and 
closing of the market. However, Chang et a]. (1993) found a double U-shaped 
return pattern for the Tokyo Stock Exchange, one in the morning session and the 
other in the afternoon session. Andersen et al. (2000) documented that the 
intraday volatility exhibits a double U-shaped pattern by examining the 5-minute 
Nikkei 225 index returns from 1994 to 1997. Similarly, Cheung et al. (1994) 
documented a double U-shaped intraday market return volatility pattern for the 
Stock Exchange of Hong Kong. The double U-shaped pattern of Tokyo and Hong 
Kong market might be because of the lunch break between morning and afternoon 
trading session. 
5.3 Theoretical Framework 
There are currently two major microstructure models for intraday variations in 
volatility, bid-ask spread and volumes to explain these patterns, which are the 
Admati and Pfleiderer's (1988) information model and Brock and Kleidon's (1992) 
market closure model. The former relies on the behaviour of some uninfon-ned 
(liquidity) traders who strategically execute their trades in order to minimize their 
trading costs. The latter, on the other hand, relies on portfolio rebalancing at 
trading halts based on the idea that the optimal portfolio is a function of the ability 
to trade. These alternate models explain the concentrated trading and the different 
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patterns in spreads, volume and volatility. 
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Admati and Pfleiderer's (1988) 
information model suggests that volume will be concentrated during the da\. and 
volume and volatility are positively correlated due to the presence of informed 
traders. Brock and Kleidon's (1992) market closure model predicts that volume 
and spread will be U-shaped during the day, volatility is independent of volume 
and spreads because information arrival is constant and thus follows no intraday 
pattern. 
5.3.1 Market Closure Model 
Brock and Kleidon (1992) examined the implications of periodic closure on the 
dynamics of volume and the bid-ask spreads in the dealership market. They 
argued that liquidity demand is more inelastic at the open and close of the market 
than the rest of the day, which is because of the following two reasons. First, the 
accumulation of overnight infon-nation in the absence of an opportunity to trade 
means that portfolios at the open have in general deviated form optimal holdings, 
resulting in opening trade to re-establish optimal portfolios. Second, in 
preparation for an overnight non-trading period, the optimal portfolios at the close 
will differ from those that are optimal during the continuous trading interval. 
More specifically, the market makers or specialists will be able to charge a larger 
spread at market open and close by exploiting these differentials liquidity demand 
elasticity when many traders will prefer to close their position without carrying 
ovemight risks. They predicted that volume is concentrated at the open and close, 
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and there exists wider bid-ask spreads at the same periods of time. thus a U- 
shaped panern. In addition, their model implies that volatility is independent of 
volume and bid-ask spread because information arrival is constant and thus no 
intraday pattern will be found in volatility. The prediction is supported by the 
evidence from the NYSE. 
5.3.2 Information-based Models 
The intraday patterns are broadly consistent with information-based models of 
market microstructure (Copeland and Galai, 1983, Glosten and Milgrom. 1985, 
Easley and O'Hara, 1987, Foster and Viswanathan, 1990, among others]. These 
models predicted that greater information asymmetry between informed traders 
and uninformed traders leads to wider spreads as uninformed traders attempt to 
minimize losses from trading with informed traders. The information models are 
based on the strategic interaction of informed traders and uninformed traders 
(liquidity traders or noise traders). The traditional information asymmetry model, 
presented by Copeland and Galai (1983), Glosten and Milgrom (1985) among 
others, assumed that in a stock market there exists two types of traders: informed 
traders who trade for superior private information and uninformed liquidity 
traders who trade for better liquidity. 
Copeland and Galai (1983) suggested that the spread wili exist independent of risk 
aversion, market maker's market power, or the inventory effects. However, it 
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does not incorporate the dynamic considerations. Glosten and Milgrom (1985) 
extended the previous model and develop a model to provide the insight of the 
market maker's pricing strategy. They addressed the market maker's learning 
problem, which sets a new direction in microstructure research. The abilltý of the 
market maker to team from the market suggests that information plays a role 
between price setting and underlying asset value, hence affecting prices. The 
market microstructure research thus moves to analyzing how the market maker 
learns from the market and how information affects the prices. Glosten and 
Milgrom (1985) demonstrated several important results in their model. First, a 
spread will exist independent of any transaction or inventory costs. Second, one 
could not predict future price by using current price. This finding is consistent 
with the efficient market hypothesis. 
After research about market makers, many researchers have addressed the 
uninformed traders' strategic behaviour in a variety of contexts (see Admati and 
Pfleiderer, 1988,1989, Foster and Viswanathan, 1990, and Seppi, 1990). Admati 
and Pfleiderer (1988) using a game-theoretic model posited that trading costs are 
the lowest in the periods when volume is highest because market makers compete 
to lower spreads in view of concentrated liquidity. They argued that volume will 
be concentrated during the day and explain that the concentration of trading and 
volatility at the open and close is because that these periods fail just after and just 
before the exchange is closed, which will cause an increase in discretionary 
liquidity traders and informed traders. This implies that prices are more 
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informative in periods ofconcentrated trading and that the volatility in the period 
when trading is not heavy is lower than that during periods of concentrated 
trading. 
Foster and Viswanathan (1990) predicted that information heterogeneity among :nI 
market participants generates pattems in volume, trading costs and volatilitý. 
Their model predicts that in equilibrium. both the market marker's sensitivity to 
changes in the order flow and the variance of price changes decline over the week. 
In addition, volume is the lowest when the information asymmetry is the largest. 
Foster and Viswanathan (1990) analyzed the interclay trading patterns when 
informed traders take their informational advantage across time. The most 
important finding of the model is the imbalance of infon-nation at the start of the 
trading week. The informed trader begins to trade with greater informational 
advantages at the start of the week, for they have more information on Monday. It 
results in a large price effects on Monday. It makes the market maker know that 
the order flow is information related. It also makes it optimal for the uninformed 
to delay their trade, and not to trade on Monday. 
If there is no information on weekends, the infon-national imbalance would not 
occur, which makes the trade patterns stay the same across days. However, given 
that there is more private information on Mondays. the uninformed traders might 
prefer to delay their trades. As in Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), the model also 
assumes that there are both discretionary and nondiscretionary uninfon-ned traders. 
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Discretionary traders are only allowed to delay their trades for at most one trading 
day, which means they might only be able to postpone trading from %Monday to 
Tuesday. It is also true in Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) that the discretionary 
uninformed traders act competitively in choosing when to trade. If there is no 
public information, the single informed trader chooses his order quantit,, only in 
order to offset the discretionary effects. Consequently, the behaviour of the 
uninformed traders only affects the profit gained by the informed traders, and 
there will be no pattern in security prices and variances with no entry of informed 
traders. 
When there is public information, the informed trader cannot offset the 
uninformed traders' trading behaviour, and trade patterns emerge. Moreover, the 
most interesting and important contribution of Foster and Viswanathan's (1990) 
model is that it allows for multiple equilibriums with single or dual periods of 
trade concentration being feasible outcomes. They demonstrate that in each 
equilibrium Monday volume is always lowest because the uninformed delay 
trading to avoid the informed trader"s information advantage. The variance of 
returns on Mondays also differs from other days. In both Foster and 
Viswanathan's (1990) and Admati and Pfleiderer's (1988) models, the ability of 
uninformed traders to delay trading introduces patterns in trade behaviour. 
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5.3.3 Predictionsfor China's Stock Market 
To summarize the theoretical models, information models predict that greater 
information asymmetry between infon-ned traders and uninformed traders leads to 
wider spreads as uninformed traders attempt to minimize losses from informed 
trading. Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) predicted that in equilibrium low bid-ask 
spreads and high volatility are associated with the period when volume is higher. 
However, Foster and Viswanathan (1990) predicted low bid-ask spreads and low 
volatility exist in the period when volume is higher. Differently, the market 
closure model proposed by Brock and Kleidon (1992) predicted that a U-shaped 
pattern should be observed in bid-ask spread and volume, but volatility is 
independent of volume and spread and follows no intraday pattem. 
However, all the theoretical models discussed are based on the US market, a 
quote-driven system with market makers or specialists. Since China's stock 
market adopts order-driven system, the difference of the trading mechanisms 
might make the intraday patterns different from what the theoretical models have 
predicted. 
Madhavan (1992) argued that the crucial function of a trading mechanism is to 
transform the latent demands of investors into realized transactions. The key to 
this transformation is price discovery, which is the process of finding market 
clearing prices. There are different ways to classiýN the trading mechanisms. One 
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distinction is made between continuous and periodic mechanisms. In a 
continuous market an investor's order is executed immediatelý upon submission. 
In a periodic system, however, investors' orders are accumulated for simultaneous 
execution at a pre-determined time. Another important distinction is often made 
between quote-driven and order-driven trading mechanisms. 
The quote-driven system depends on market makers to post prices. In a quote- 
driven market, investors can obtain price quotations from market makers prior to 
order submission. This mechanism is also known as a continuous dealer market 
because an investor need not wait for order execution, but instead trades 
immediately with a market maker. Almost all North American stock markets and 
a few exchanges in Europe operate under the trading system based on market 
makers for price-setting. By contrast, in an order-driven system investors submit 
their orders for execution through an auction process. Order-driven mechanism 
can operate either as continuous systems or as a periodic system. When the order- 
driven system operates as a periodic auction, the orders are stored for execution at 
a single market clearing price. While, in the continuous auction investors submit 
orders for immediate execution by dealers on the exchange floor or against 
existing limit orders submitted by public investors or dealers. The system is 
continuous, since orders are executed upon arrival, but operates as an auction 
because the price is determined multilaterally. Most stock exchanges outside 
North America operate under the order-driven mechanism without market makers. 
In addition, there is no exchange in Asia that depends on market makers. 
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There have been studies of order-driven markets (e. g., Ho and Cheun, -,. 1994. 
Bildik, 2001, and Ding and Lau, 2001), and the results from these markets are not 
entirely consistent with the theoretical models. Therefore. the evidence from the 
order-driven markets might be more appropriate to predict the intraday patterns in 
China's stock market. 
For example, the institutional structure of the SES (Stock Exchange of Singapore) 
is quite similar to that of China's stock market: including a fully computerized 
screen-based dealer system, the use of good-till-day limit orders, and a 90-minute 
lunch break. Therefore, the evidence found in the SES should also be the case of 
the Chinese markets. As discussed in section 5.2.2, the predictions of the intraday 
patterns for China's stock market should be similar to Ding and Lau's (2001) 
results. However, there is only one difference between the Chinese markets and 
the SES that SES does not have a batch trade at the open, which might provide 
further insights. 
5.4 Data and Methodology 
5.4.1 Data 
The data used in this study consist of time-stamped (to the second) lntradaý best 
bid and ask prices and volumes, and transaction prices and volumes. The sample 
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period is from the April to June, 2002 
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The results are shovýn for a sample 
consisting of 566 stocks trading on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE). 10 Only 
I 
regular trades transacted in the four hours of normal trading hours are considered 
in this study, which is from 09: 30 to 11: 30 and 13: 00 to 15: 00. Opening trades are 
excluded, because they are traded under a different mechanism. Each regular 
trade's price and volume, and the best bid and ask price and volume are extracted, 
and additional variables are derived from the existing database. The tick-by-tick 
data are then averaged into 5-minute observations, for it is manageable and easily 
interpreted to create dummy variables. Moreover, it allows comparison of the 
results with prior studies. 
5.4.2 Empirical Methods 
Variables, including return volatility (absR), volume (V), bid-ask spread (BAS), 
number of trades (NI) and trade size (TS), are defined as follows: 
Return Volatility (absR) - in terms of return, the logarithmic returns of each trade 
are summed to construct 5-minute returns. Volatility is measured by the absolute 
returns, as in Abhyankar's et al. (1997) and Cai et al. (2004). 
Volume (Vol) - volume is measured as the volume that shares are traded at 
transaction price. The 5-minute volume is the sum of the volume for each 
10 The analysis was conducted for both sets of stocks on SHSE and SZSE but as both samples gave 
very similar results, only the results for the 566 stocks listed on the SHSE during April to June, 
2002 are reported are here. 
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transaction within the 5 minutes. 
Bid-ask Spread (BAS) - following Abhyankar et al. (1997) and Cai et al. (2004) 
amongst others, the proportional spread rather than the absolute spread is used in 
this study. 
BAS, . 
Ask, -Bid, x 100 Mid, 
Equation 5.1 
Moreover, the proportional bid-ask spreads are standardized by dividing them by 
the mean of the series for that day. Standardization equally weighting the 
influence of the companies with larger bid-ask spreads, and also helps reducing 
heteroscedasticity. The number of trades (N7) is the number of trades in a 5- 
minute interval. Trade size (TS) is the average of volume of stocks traded per 
transaction. 
This study carries out simple descriptive statistics; for example, the graphical 
results. Plots are used to show the intraday patterns. Moreover, the statistical 
significance of each variable was tested by running three separate regressions. 
23 48 
Vi" 
= LaiD, + ao +Ya, D, + e,,, 
1=1 j=25 
Equation 5.21 
Where F- the dependent variables (retum volatility, volume and bid-ask spread) 
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at time t-, Ds are the ith explanatorý dummý variables at time t. D--l if the 
observation lies in the ith 5-minute of the trading day, and D=: O othervýise. There 
are 48 5-minute observations in total. 
This study adopts Hansen's (1982) Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) 
estimation to examine the statistical significance for the folloving reasons. Firstk. 
GMM estimates are robust to the presence of autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasti city, both of which we would expect to find in this t\ pe of data. In 
addition, autocorrelation and heteroscedasticit', will also be fixed b\ using Neýýc% 
and West's (1987) correction for serial correlation. SecondIN. the regression 
reports whether each of the dummy variables has a coefficient that is significantly 
different from zero. The size of the coefficient also indicates the relative 
importance of that time-interval with reference to the average importance over the 
intervals used in the estimation. Particularly, as has been discussed by Abhyankar 
(1997), each regression could also provide more insight to the changes in the 
dependent variable at the beginning and close of the market relative to activity 
during the middle of the day. 
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5.5 Empirical Results 
5.5.1 Inlradqýv Pattern of Spread 
11 
-" 
The information models predict that greater information asymmetry bemeen 
informed traders and uninformed traders leads to ýN ider spreads at market open as 
uninformed traders attempts to minimize losses frorn informed trading. The 
evidence from China's stock market shows vvider spreads at market open. Nýhich is 
broadly consistent with the predictions of information models. In Figure 5-1. the 
bid-ask spread has an L-shaped pattern, which is also consistent with the 
predictions and is similar to the reversed J-shaped findings of Cai et al. (2004), 
Ding and Lau (2001), McInish and Wood (1992) and Kleidon and Werner (1993). 
Figure 5.1 Intraday Pattern of Spread 
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The spread opens mJde and narrows doýNn in the first tradin-, -, hour and Is relatke I . ý, 
stable for the rest of the trading day. It sho\ýs onk a marginal increase at the end I- 
of the trading day. Even with a 90-minute lunch break the spread does not change 
too much before and after the break, ýý hich is consistent ýý ith the findings of the 
SES by Ding and Lau (2001). However. the market closure model predicts that 
the re-establishment of optimal portfolio makes the market makers charge a larger 
spread at market open and close, which helps explain the findings of NYSE 
(Brock and Kleidon, 1992, and Lee et A, 1993). LSE (Abh%ankar et al., 1997), 
Taiwan Stock Exchange (Ke et aL, 2004) and SEHK (Ahn and Cheuno, 1999), 
where U-shaped patterns of spread are documented. 
China's stock market is a pure limit-order market without market makers. The L- 
shaped intraday spread pattern can be explained by information models. In 
addition, the findings are consistent with most empirical evidence found in other 
order-driven markets. The wide spread at market open might be due to the 
information asymmetry between informed and informed traders. 
The results of the GMM estimation in Panel A of Table 5.1 confirm the validw, of 
the L-shaped pattern that the coefficients of the dummy variabies decrease and are 
significant for most of the trading day. 
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5.5.2 Intraday Pattern of Volume 
11: 1, 
Brock and Kleidon's (1992) market closure model predicted that much of the 
trading at the open and close are due to the inability to trade NN hen the market is 
closed. This prediction is supported by the U-shaped volume patterns found in the 
NYSE (Jain and Joh, 1988), NASDAQ (Chan et al.. 1995), SES (Dino and LaLl. 
2001 ), Taiwan Stock Exchange (Ke at al., 2004), and the Toronto Stock Exchange 
(McInish and Wood, 1990b). 
Figure 5.2 Intraday Pattern of Volume 
Intraday Pattern of Volume 
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However, the intraday volume pattern of China's stock market as shown in Figure 
5.2 is different from all the prior studies. Especially, it is not consistent with ýN hat 
is predicted frorn the SES evidence. It is relatively flat in the morning session 
". """+"""""" 
""" 
with a marginal increase at the open and marginal decrease at the close, ýNhile it 
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shows a J-shaped pattern in the afternoon session. In ýact. the \oýume is 
marginal], I y higher at the morning open and decreases towards the mornin-, -, close. 
Moreover, volume is lowest at the close of the moming session. The oýerall and 
average volume of the afternoon session is higher than that in the moming. and 
the volume is highest at the afternoon close. 
The relatively flat volume pattern at the open could be explained by the effect of 
the batch pre-trading session used in China's stock market. China*s stock market 
adopts a batch pre-trading session from 09: 15 to 09: 25, which is not ýýithm the 
normal trading time. As has been discussed in chapter 3 of this thesis, all orders 
are submitted during the pre-trading session and are batched for execution at a 
single equilibrium price, which is the morning opening price. After the morning 
opening, the trading mechanism stays the same at a continuous market in the rest 
of the trading day. Since this research does not include the transactions occurring 
in the pre-trading session, much of the 'actual' opening volume will not be 
observed. Thus, it makes the volume pattern relatively flat in the morning. 
While the lunch break causes two U-shaped volume pattern of the TSE (Chang et 
al., 1993, Hamao and Hasbrouck, 1995), it does not have the same level of 
significance of the effects in China's stock market. It only makes the volume zn 
higher in the afternoon session, which is after the lunch break. More interesting 1, v, 
the presence of a higher volume at the open and close of the afternoon session is 
consistent with Brock and Kleidon (1992). Therefore, apart from the eftect of the 
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different opening mechanism. the results are broadiv consistent \\ith the market 
closure model and evidence from other order-driven markets (Ding and Lau. 2001. 
and Chang et a]., 1993). 
This study further analyses the components of v, olume: the number of trade,, 
(Figure 5.3) and trade size (Figure 5.4). As has been discussed b,, Cai et al. 
(2004), both of the numbers of trades and trade size contribute to the VOILI[Ile 
pattern. Furthermore, the GMM estimations in Panel B. C and D of Table 5.1 
confirm the patterns observed in the plots. 
Figure 5.3 Intraday Pattern of Number of Trades 
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Figure 5.4 Intraday Pattern of Trade Size 
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-5.5.3 Intradty Pattern of Volafiliýv 
The pattern of voiatiilty shown in Figure 5.5 is similar to the spread pattern in 
Figure 5.1 that exhibits an L-shaped pattern. The finding for volatility is not 1: 1 1 
consistent with Admati and Pfleiderer (1998) who predict the variability of price 
changes to be higher in periods of concentrated trading because more information 
is revealed in this period by actions of informed traders. However, together with 
the pattern of spread and volume it is consistent with Foster and Vswanathan's 
(1990) prediction that low bid-ask spreads and low volatility exist in the period 
when volurne is higher. It is also consistent with the prediction from the evidence 
of the SES bv Dina and Lau (2001). 1b 
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Figure 5.5 Intraday, Pattern of Volatilitý- 
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Figure 5.5 shows that volatility is higher at the openings and folloýNs an L-shaped z:, - 
pattern for the rest of the trading day. The lunch break at the midday does not Z: ý II 
appear to affect the return volatility. The finding is not consistent with the 
findings of most other studies. It is neither a U-shaped pattern as found in the 
NYSE (Wood et al., 1985, Jain and John. 1988, Mclnish and Wood, 1990a, and 
Lockwood and Linn, 1999) and the LSE (Cai et al., 2004 and Abhyankar et al., 
1997), nor a double U-shaped pattern as found for the TSE (Chang et aL, 1993) 
and SEHK (Cheung et al., 1994). 
It suggests that investors in China prefer not to trade (low volume) at the market z: 1 
opening because there is higher risk (high volatility) and larger trading costs (high 
spread). The GMM estimations in Panel E of Table 5.1 confirm the results. 
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5.6 Conclusions 
This chapter examines the intraday variation in the bid-ask spreads. trading I 
volumes and volatility in China's stock market. The results can be summarized as 
follows. First, the bid-ask spread has an L-shaped pattern. The spread opens ýN ide 
and narrows down in the first trading hour and is relativelý stable for the rest time 
of the trading day. It shows only a marginal increase at the end of the trading da-,. 
The 90-minute lunch break does not change the spread. Second, the volume 
pattern is relatively flat in the morning session with a marginal increase at the 
open and marginal decrease at the close; while it shows a J-shaped pattern in the 
afternoon session. Moreover, both the numbers of trades and trade size contribute 
to the volume pattem. Third, the pattem of volatility is similar to the spread 
pattern in that it exhibits an L-shaped pattern. 
The evidence in support of the two main theoretical models of intraday behavior 
is very mixed. Information models (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Admati and 
Pfleiderer, 1988, Foster and Viswanathan, 1990) predict that greater information 
asymmetry between infon-ned and uninformed traders leads to wider spreads as 
uninformed traders attempt to minimize losses from trading with those who are 
informed. Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) predict that in equilibrium, low bid-ask 
spreads and high volatility are associated with the period when volume is higher. 
Foster and Viswanathan (1990) predict low bid-ask spreads and low volatilit, % 
exist in the period \\hen volume is higher. Differently, the market closure model 
CHAPTER 5 
INTRADAY PATTERNS 123 
proposed by Brock and Kleidon (1992) predicts that a U-shaped pattern should be 
observed in bid-ask spreads and volume, but volatiliv, is independent ot'volume 
and spread and follows no intraday pattern. However. none of the abo\ c models I 
could explain the intraday pattems of all three variables in China"s stock market. 
In contrast, the empirical evidence from other order-driven markets has offered 
better predictions. Moreover, as these models have been developed in the context 
of quote-drive market, it is felt that there is a room for a theoretical model to 
explain the intraday behavior in an order-driven market. 
To conclude, the intraday seasonality is closely related to the unique institutional 
features of the market being studied. The behaviour of the market variables 
especially at the open and close appears to be closely linked to the market 
institutional structure. The design of efficient trading systems should emphasize 
the price discovery process at market open and close. Future research will be 
needed to consider the theoretical explanation of the intraday behaviour in order- 
drive system. 
While the institutional structure of a stock market (e. g., order-driven or quote- 
driven) affects the price discovery process, the specific characteristics might also 
have effects as well. As has been discussed in chapter 2. one of the characteristics 
in the emerging Chinese equity market is price man'Pu lation. The next chapter 
will examine this issue by investigating which trades move prices. 
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6.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyses the price discovery process in the emerging Chinese stock 
market by examining which sizes of trades move price. The chapter examines the 
stealth, public information and large block trade/price manipulation hypotheses 
and concludes that while stealth trading has explanatory power for overall price 
changes, it is large block trades/price manipulation which best explain prices 
increases. 
The stealth trading hypothesis has a simple premise at its core; informed traders 
will try to hide their information by fragmenting their orders and this means they 
will, on average, use medium sized trades because small trades are too expensive 
and large trades run counter to their objectives. This literature has its roots in 
Kyle (1985) who argued that infon-ned investors attempt to camouflage their 
trades by spreading them over time, while Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) found 
that informed traders like to trade when liquidity volume is high. Barcla-, and 
foca 
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Warner (1993). however, were the first to focus on the informed traders' choice of 
trade size. Effectively. informed traders are unlikelý to use small sized trades 
because the profit potential from these positions is small. Equallý. large trades are 
unlikely to be used because of the issue of revealing too much information to the 
market. In addition, large trades are likely to suffer from the need to give price 
concessions. From both of these perspectives, informed traders ýN ill use medium- 
size trades to maximize their profits. 
The central predictions of the stealth-trading hypothesis concern the proportion of 
cumulative price movement across all trades of a given size rather than the price 
impact on a given trade. Because privately informed traders concentrate use on 
medium sized trades, and stock price movements are argued to be due mainly to 
private information, most of a stock's cumulative price change over a given 
period should result from medium-size trades. For a sample of all NYSE firms 
that were tender-offer targets between 1981 and 1984, which consists of 105 
different target firms with 108 tender offers, Barclay and Warner found most of 
the cumulative stock-price change is due to medium-size trades. The evidence is 
consistent with their hypothesis that informed trades are concentrated in the 
medium-size category, and the price movements are due mainly to informed 
traders' private information. 
Using audit trail data for a sample of NYSE firms, Chakravarty (2001) found that 
mediUni-size trades are associated with a disproportionately large cumulative 
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stock price change relative to their proportion of all trades and w1ume. ýýhich is 
consistent with the predictions of Barclay and Warner (1993). Moreoýer. since 
their data provided the identities of the traders, they found that the source of the 
disproportionately large cumulative price impact of medium-size trades is trades 
initiated by institutions. 
Anand and Chakravarty (2003) investigated and found support for stealth trading 
in the options markets. They found that informed traders tend to operate in 
medium sized trades of high leverage and high volume options, whereas they 
fragment their trades into small trades for high leverage and low volume. These 
results suggest the strategies of informed traders are not static and to 
accommodate this possibility, the analysis here is conducted for all prices, price 
decreases and price increases. 
In addition to the stealth trading hypothesis, Barclay and Warner (1993) argued 
that stock price changes might be caused by the release of public information. 
This public information hypothesis provides different empirical implications as 
compared to the stealth-trading hypothesis. As long as public announcements do 
not affect the distribution of trade sizes, the likelihood that the stock price change 
associated with a release of public information release will occur on a trade of a 
given size is directly proportional to the relative frequency of that trade size. 
Thus, under the public information hypothesis, the percentage of the cumulative 
price change occurring in a given trade-size category is directly proportionai to 
16)(Q 
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the percentage of transactions in that category. In contrast. the steal th-trad ing 
hypothesis implies that the proportion of the cumulative price chanue,, occurring 
on medium-size trades should be higher than the proportion of transactions in the 
small and large trade categories. 
A second alternative hypothesis is the large block trade/price manipulation 
hypothesis. Stock-price manipulation has a long history (see for example, 
Huebner, 1934) with the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 outlawing manipulation 
arising from two perspectives. First, is *action-based manipulation', which is 
based on actions that change the actual or perceived value of assets. Second, is 
'information-based manipulation' which is based on releasing false information or 
spreading false rumours. However, Allen and Gale (1992) discuss a third 
category - 'trade-based manipulation' - which occurs when a trader attempts to 
manipulate a stock simply by buying and selling, without taking any publicly 
observable actions to alter the value of the firm or releasing false information to 
change the price. Allen and Gale (1992) confirmed that it is possible for an 
uninformed speculator to make profits from the 'trade-based manipulation' with 
large traders frequently buying and then selling substantial blocks of stock. 
Aggarwal and Wu (2003) extended Allen and Gale's (1992) model to a setting 
where active information seekers try to ferret out information about the firm's 
prospects. In general, information seekers improve market efficiency and 
manipulators reduce market efficiency. Surprisingly, they found that increasing 
foGa 
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the number of information seekers may worsen market efficiency %k hen there are 
manipulators present. Because the information seekers compete t-Or shares. 
increasing the number of information seekers ýNlll increase the manipulators 
profit, thereby making manipulation more likely. Moreover, A, -, LarNýal and \Xu I -- 
(2003) found that stock prices rise throughout the manipulation period and then 
fall in the post-manipulation period. The implication of their findings that there 
will be more large-size trades during periods of price increases ýNill be further 
tested here. 
In the case of the large block trade/manipulation hypothesis, large-size trades 
should be associated with a disproportionately large cumulative stock price 
because of manipulation. This hypothesis is formalized as follows: 
large-size trades should be associated with a disproportionately large 
cumulative stock price increase relative to their proportion of all trades 
and volume. 
Given the hypotheses described above this study examines the price discovery 
process by analysing the relationship between cumulative price change and trade 
size and volumes. To take account of previous results, the analysis also considers 
the relationship between cumulative price changes and trade size for sub samples 
of price decreases and price increases. 
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While the results re ect the public information hN pothesis and giN e some support iI- 
for the stealth trading hypothesis. large cumulative stock price changes are found 
to be related to large-size trades and there is a strong relationship betxNeen these 
variables during periods of price increase. The results confirm that price 
manipulation does exist in China's stock market, as man% have argued (e., -,., Wu, 
200 1, and Gilley, 2001 ). This study has particular implications for the re, -, ulator-ý, 
bodies, such as the CSRC, that laws and regulations should be reinforced to 
improve the quality of the market and to protect investors. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 6.2 reviews the literature. 
Section 6.3 discusses the data and methodology, while section 6.4 presents the 
results. Section 6.5 offers conclusions and suggestions for further research. 
6.2 Literature Review 
6.2.1 Stealth-trading Hypothesis 
Kyle (1985) argued that informed investors attempt to camouflage their trades by 
spreading them over time. Furthermore, Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) found that 
informed traders like to trade when liquidity volume is high. However, the trade 
size issue has not been addressed in most of these models. Barclay and Warner 
(1993) first focused on the informed traders' trade-size choice. They argued that 
FOCA 
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if informed investors' trades are the main cause of stock-price movernents. this 
procedure should allow people to infer the size of their trades. 
First, the informed traders are unlikely to trade with small-sizes. for the profit 
potential from these positions is small. The large institutional investors will take 
larger share positions to maximize profits. Thus, informed investors' share 
positions consist of medium and large size trades. Second, ýN hether an informed 
trader spreads his trades or not depends on the expected price impact of the trades; 
for example, price concessions. Medium share positions are likely to be achieved 
in a single trade because the price concession for a medium-size trade is small, 
which finds support from the NYSE Fact Book (199 1, p. 20). It reported that the 
average stock showed no change or a 1/8 point price change in 3,000 shares of 
volume 84.4% of the time. To conclude, informed traders break their trades into 
medium-size trades to maximize their profits. 
Empirical research shows that cumulative stock price movements are due largely 
to private information revealed through trading, rather than to public information 
releases (e. g. French and Roll, 1986, Barclay et al., 1990). Moreover, Barclay and 
Warner (1993) first proposed the stealtb trading hypothesis, which finds support 
from empirical evidence. The central predictions of the stealth trading hypothesis 
concern the proportion of cumulative price movement across all trades of a given 
size rather than the price impact on a given trade. Because privately informed 
traders concentrate their trades in medium sizes, and stock price movements are 
FOOR 
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due mainly to private information, so most of a stock's cumulatke price change 
over a given period should take place on medium-size trades. 
Using audit trail data for a sample of NYSE firms Chakravarty (2001) found that 
medium-size trades are associated with a disproportionate k large cumulatke 
stock price change relative to their proportion of all trades and volume, ýýhich is 
consistent with the predictions of Barciay and Warner (1993). Moreover, since 
the data provide the identities of the traders, they found that the source of the 
disproportionately large cumulative price impact of medium-size trades is trades 
initiated by institutions. 
Although Barclay and Warner's (1993) focus on trade size, institutional features 
are also relevant to understanding both informed traders' trading strategy and 
which trades move prices. They have not examined the differing implications of 
market and limit orders, of which informed traders appear to use both (Comell 
and Sirri, 1992). Since China adopts a pure limit-order mechanism, the study of 
Chinese markets could enrich the understanding of informed traders' behaviour. 
6. Z2 Public Information 4vpothesis 
If volatility is caused by private information revealed through trading, the 
distribution of informed trades could be inferred. However, there are plausible 
alternative hypotheses about the cause of volatility. Barclay and Warner (1993) 
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argued that stock price changes might be cased by the release of public 
information, which is the public information hypothesis. The alternatiN e 
hypothesis provides different empirical implications to the prediction of stealth- 
trading hypothesis. As long as public announcements do not affect the 
distribution of trade sizes, the likelihood that the stock price change associated 
with a public information release will occur on a trade of a giýen size is directl'. 
proportional to the relative frequency of that trade size. Thus. under the public 
information hypothesis, the percentage of the cumulative price change occurring 
in a given trade-size category is directly proportional to the percentage of 
transactions in that category. In contrast, the stealth-trading hypothesis implies 
that the proportion of the cumulative price changes occurring on medium-size 
trades should be higher than the proportion of transactions in that category. 
6.23 Large Block TradeslManipulation Hypothesis 
Stock-price manipulation is the most widely discussed aspect of stock markets 
(Huebner, 1934). There were many ways for speculator to manipulate share 
prices; for example, the speculators could generally make profits from insider 
trading or from the release of false information. The Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 outlawed manipulation into two categories. The first is 'action-based 
manipulation', which is based on actions that change the actual or perceived value 
of the assets. The second category is 'information-based manipulation'. ýýhlch 
is 
based on releasing false information or spreading false rumours. However, there 
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is a third category of manipulation, -trade-based manipulation'. as di,, cussed b\ 
Allen and Gale (1992). It occurs kýhen a trader attempts to manipulate a stock 
simply by buying and selling, without taking any publicly observable actions to 
alter the value of the firm or releasing false infon-nation to change the price. Allen 
and Gale (1992) confirmed that it is possible for an uninformed speculator to 
make profits from the 'trade-based manipulation", vhich is consistent wth 
rational utility-maximizing behaviour. Large traders frequently buy and then sell 
substantial blocks of stock. even though they are apparentlN not interested in 
taking over the firms. 
Aggarwal and Wu (2003) extended Allen and Gale's (1992) model in a setting in 
which there are active information seekers trying to ferret out information about 
the firm's prospects. In general, information seekers improve market efficiency 
and manipulators reduce market efficiency. Surprisingly, they found that 
increasing the number of information seekers may worsen market efficiency when 
there are manipulators present. Because the information seekers compete for 
shares, increasing the number of information seekers will increase the 
manipulators' profit, thereby making manipulation more likely. So, the 
manipulation hypothesis in this study is formalized as follows: if there is 
manipulation, large-size trades should be associated with a disproportionately 
large cumulative stock price increase relative to their proportion of all trades and 
volume. 
loca 
CHAPTER 6 
WHICH TRADES MOVE PRICES 134 
Moreover. Aggarwal and Wu's (2003) found that stock prices rise throughout the 
manipulation period and then fall in the post-manipulation period. The 
implication of their findings is that there will be more large-size trades during the 
price increase, which will be further tested in this study. 
6.3 Data and Methodology 
6.3.1 Data Description 
The sample period is from the I st to 30th September, 2001 and the sample 
consists of 566 stocks trading on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE). '' On]y 
regular trades transacted in the four hours of normal trading from 09: 30 to 11: 30 
and 13: 00 to 15: 00hours are considered. The data consist of time-stamped (to the 
second) intraday best bid and ask prices and volumes, transaction prices and 
volumes. Additional variables such as percentage of volume and number of 
transactions are derived from the data. 
" The analysis was conducted for 566 stocks on the SHSE and 484 stocks on the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange (SZSE) for September 2001, May 2002 and June 2002 respectively. As all six samples 
gave similar results, however, only the results for the 566 stocks listed on the SHSE during 
September 2001 are reported here. 
soca 
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Table 6.1 Sample Statistics 
The data sample used in this study consists of 566 shares trading on Shanghai Stock 
Exchange in September 2001. It provides the mean, minimum, I' quartile. median, 4 th 
quartile and maximum of the returns (%), number of trades (in thousands). ýolume (in 
millions) and average trade size (in thousands) over the sample period. 
Mean Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
Return % -2.09 -25.05 -6.55 -2.10 2.00 29.28 
Number of Trades 
1000 4.02 0.50 2.59 3.45 5.18 11.94 
Volume of Trades 
'000,000 9.36 0.42 3.34 5.48 11.39 89.72 
Average Trade Size 
1000 1.96 0.52 1.24 1.64 2.28 10.33 
Table 6.1 shows that the mean return is -2.09%, and the average trade size is 
1,960 shares per trade. The first/last quartile with the lowest/highest retums will 
be further examined in the following sections. 
Barclay and Warner (1993) initially restricted attention to a sample of tender-offer 
targets, which display abnormal price increases before the initial tender-offer 
announcement. Chakravarty (2001) also used a restricted sample, which consist 
of stocks displaying a significant price increase (5%) over the sample period, in 
order to maximize the probability of detecting stealth-trading. They stated that 
the intuition behind selecting stocks with significant price increases is that any 
stealth-trading activity is likely to be focused on one side of the market. 
in order to provide more insiOhts, this study examines the sample of all stocks 
over the sample period. Moreover, it examines stocks with significant price 
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decreases and increases separately. No particular information eý ent is conditioned 
on the sample. 
6.3.2 Trade Size and Cumulative Stock Price Changes 
Consistent with Barclay and Warner (1993) and Chakravarty (2001), the trade- 
size categories are defined as small, medium and large. While Barclay and 
Warner (1993) and Chakravarty (2001) defined 100 to 400 shares traded in a 
single transaction as the small trade-size category, this is inappropriate for China's 
stock market as trades of 100 to 400 shares account for less than 25% of the total 
transactions. Accordingly, trades of 0- 999 shares are defined as small-size 
trades; trades of 1000 - 9,999 shares are defined as medium-size trades; and large- 
size trades are those of 10,000 shares or greater. Moreover, this study employs 23 
subcategories 12 to provide more detailed analysis. 
The method of calculating the cumulative stock price return follows Barclay and 
Wamer (1993) and Chakravarty (2001). A price change that occurs on a given 
trade is defined as the difference between the trade's price and the price of the 
previous transaction. For each of the 566 stocks, all price changes that occur on 
trades in a given trade size category over the sample period are summed. The sum 
is then divided by the cumulative price changes for the stock over the sample. 
12 0- 99,100 - 199,200 - 299,300 - 399,400 - 499,500 - 599,600 - 699,700 - 799,800 - 899, 
900 - 999,1000 - 1999,2000 - 2999,3000 - 3999,4000 - 4999,5000 - 5999.1 6000 - 6999,7000 - 
7999.8000 - 8999,9000 - 9999,10000 - 14999,15000 - 19999,20000 - 24999, and 25000 and 
over 
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Finally, the weighted cross-sectional mean of the cumulati,,, e stock price change 
(over the 566 stocks) is estimated, where the ýý eights are the absolute ý alue of the 
cumulative price change in each stock over the sample. More speclficallý. the 
following equations apply. 
Price Change 
PC, = 1ý - PI-I 
Equation 6.1 
where Pi is the transaction price 
Percentage of cumulative price change 
I IPCI 
PDP =" Equation 6.2 P, - PO 
Weighted percentage of cumulative price change 
556 
Y PDP, x (P,, j - P., j) 
WPDP - 
jý' 
556 
Equation 6.3 
1, (p", - P. ") 
J=j 
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6.3.3 Weighted Least Squares Regression 
138 
In order to test the above hypotheses Barclay and Wamer's (1993) eighted least I- 
squares regression is used. The following two regression models examine the 
relation between the percentage of cumulative price change, the dummý variables 
and percentage of volume or number of transactions. 
3 
WPDP L a, x DURMY,, + 13 x POT, + E, 
j=l 
3 
WPDP, aj xD UMATY, +)6 x PO Jý + c, 
Regression 6.1 
Regression 6.2 
wherej = 1,2,3 for categories small, medium and large, respectively, WPDPj is 
the weighted percentage of cumulative price change for firm i; DUMMY., 
represent the dummy variables for small, medium and large trade size, 
respectively. POT, is the percentage of number of transactions for the i-th firm, 
while POVj is the percentage of volume of for the i-th firm. Moreover, regression 
analysis is also carried out for the 23 subcategories as follows. 
23 
WPDP, L a, x DUMAff,,, + fix POT, + E, 
J=l 
2-, 
IVPDý= 
Regression 6.3 
Regression 6.4 
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In terms of the above models. if the stealth-trading, h%pothesis holds. onlý 
medium-size trades should be associated 'with a disproportionatel-v large 
cumulative stock price change relative to their proportion of all trades and ý, olume. 
Whereas, if the public-infon-nation hypothesis holds, the percentage of the 
cumulative price change occurring in a given trade-size categorN ýý ill be directlý, 
proportional to the percentage of transactions in that category. Finall\. if the large 
block/price manipulation hypothesis holds, large-size trades výill be associated 
with a disproportionately large cumulative stock price changes relative to their 
proportion of all trades and volume and this is effect should be more noticeable 
for a sample of price increases. 
6.4 Empirical Results 
6.4.1 All Price Changes 
For the cross-section of 566 stocks, Table 6.2 reports the mean percentage of the 
cumulative stock price changes (WPDP), the corresponding numbers (NOT) and 
percentages (POT%) of trades, the volume (VOT) and volume (POV%) 
percentages, and the ratio of percentage cumulative stock price change over the 
percentage of number of trades (WPDP/POT) and volume (WPDP/POV) in each 
of the three trade-size categories and twenty-three subcategories. A stock price 
change corresponding to a specific trade is defined as the difference between that I- 
IOCA 
CHAPTER 6 
WHICH TRADES MOVE PRICES 140 
trade's price and the price of the previous trade. For each stock. the percentage of 
cumulative price change for a trade of a -, iven size is the sum of all stock price 
changes occurring on trades in that size category (subcategor-, ) dkided by the 
total cumulative price change in that stock over the sample. The weighted cross- 
sectional mean of the cumulative stock price change are then estimated and 
reported where the weights are the absolute value of the cumulative price change 
of each stock in the sample. The proportion of trades (volume) is the sum of all 
transactions (volume), in a given size category, divided by the total cumulative 
trades (volume) in the sample. 
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Table 6.2 Analysis of Whole Sample 
For the cross-section of 566 stocks, Table 6.2 reports the mean percentage of' the cumulatke stock price 
changes (WPDP), the corresponding numbers (NOT) and percentages (POT' o) of trades, the volume (V0 I) 
and volume (POV%) percentages, and the ratio of percentage cumulatiýe stock price change oýer the 
percentage of number of trades (WPDP/POT) and volume (WPDP, POV) in each of the three trade-size 
categories and twenty-three subcategories. A stock price change corresponding to a specific trade is 
defined as the difference between that trade's price and the price of the previous trade. For each stock. the 
percentage of cumulative price change for a trade of a given size is the sum of all stock price changes 
occurring on trades in that size category (subcategory) divided by the total cumulative price change in that 
stock over the sample. The weighted cross-sectional mean of the cumulative stock price change are then 
estimated and reported where the weights are the absolute value of the cumulative price change of each 
stock in the sample. The proportion of trades (volume) is the sum of all transactions (volurne). in a uken 
size category, divided by the total cumulative trades (volume) in the sample. 
WPDP NOT POT% WPDP/POT VOT POV'o \k'PDP POV 
Small -57.33 1133.62 49.82 -1.15 456.65 8.62 -6.65 
0-99 2.41 19.1 0.84 2.87 0.99 0.02 120.50 
100-199 -14.59 162.53 7.14 -2.04 16.89 0.32 -45.59 
200-299 -12 190.44 8.37 -1.43 38.66 0.73 -16.44 
300-399 -13.47 165.74 7.28 -1.85 50.24 0.95 -14.18 
400-499 -4.16 107.29 4.72 -0.88 43.36 0.82 -5.07 
500-599 -18.68 226.66 9.96 -1.88 113.74 2.15 -8.69 
600-699 -0.81 81.62 3.59 -0.22 49.34 0.93 -0.87 
700-799 -0.64 66.44 2.92 -0.22 46.87 0.89 -0.72 
800-899 0.86 64.84 2.85 0.3 52.19 0.99 0.87 
900-999 3.74 48.96 2.15 1.74 44.37 0.84 4.45 
Medium 116.7 1041.87 45.79 2.55 2792.18 52.73 2.21 
1000-1999 13.08 495.81 21.79 0.6 630 11.9 1.10 
2000-2999 24.59 214.44 9.42 2.61 494.73 9.34 2.63 
3000-3999 18.7 115.94 5.1 3ý67 386.67 7.3 2.56 
4000-4999 17.36 66.03 2.9 5.98 288.46 5.45 3.19 
5000-5999 18.96 60.48 2.66 7.13 320.97 6.06 3.13 
6000-6999 7.24 33.46 1.47 4.93 213.22 4.03 1.80 
7000-7999 8 23.3 1.02 7.82 172.19 3.25 2.46 
8000-8999 4.97 18.66 0.82 6.06 156.54 2.96 1.68 
9000-10000 3.8 13.75 0.6 6.29 129.42 2.44 1.56 
Large 40.63 99.89 4.39 9.26 2046.62 38.65 1.05 
10000-14999 15.73 50.16 2.2 7.13 583.96 11.03 1.43 
15000-19999 6.22 18.15 0.8 7.79 308 5.82 1.07 
20000-24999 6.54 11.71 0.51 12.7 254.98 4.82 1.36 
25000 + 12.15 19.87 0.87 13.92 899.68 16.99 0.72 
Sun) 100 2275.37 100 1 5295.45 100 1 
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From Table 6.2 it is clear that most of the cumulative price change (\k'PDP) 
occurs in medium-size and large-size trades. Trades in the medium-size cateLorN 
are responsible for about 117% of the cumulatiýe price change. but onlý about 
46% of transactions and about 53% of volume. The subcategory ýý ith the largest I- 
effect is that of 2000-2999 shares. These trades account for about 250, 'o of the 
cumulative price change, but only about 9% of all transactions. Similark. ýý Ith 
only about 4% of the transactions the large-size trades cause about 41 % of the 
cumulative price change. The small-size trades cause -57.33% of the cumulative 
price change and comprise about 50% of transactions and about 9% of the volume. 
The combination effects of medium- and large-size trades are consistent with the 
prediction of stealth and large block trades/price manipulation hypotheses. There 
appears to be little support for the public information hypothesis that the 
percentage of the cumulative price change occurring In a given trade-size category 
is directly proportional to the percentage of transactions in that category. 
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Table 6.3 Regression Results of Whole Sample 
Table 63 reports the weighted-least-squares regressions of the percentage of the 
cumulative price change occurring in each trade-size categorý and subcate-, -'Or\ on dummy variables for the trade-size categories and subcategories, the percentage of 
transactions (regression 6.1 and 6.3), and the percentage of volume (regression 6.2 and 
6.4) occurring in that category. The weights are equal to the absolute cumulatke price 
change over the sample period. It also reports the Wald tests for regressions 6.1 and 6.2. 
which test if all dummy variables are all equal to zero, if the coefficient for the percentage 
of transactions (or volume) is equal to one, and if all dummy variables are equal to each 
other. *, **, and *** denote significant at 10%, 5% and I 'ýýO level respectlýek. 
Regression 6.1 
Variable Estimate tValue 
DummyS -1.1627 -6.92 
DummyM 2.1861 12.69 
DummyL 1.9295 7.63 
POT 0.1520 2.14 
POV 
adjRsq. 0.0235 
Wald tests 
Label Statistics ProbC hiSq 
S=O, M=O, L=O 295.7046 0.00 
POT=I 142.3747 0.00 
Regression 6.2 
Estimate tValue 
-1.2839 -8.38 
1.0626 5.76 
0.7073 2.66 
1.0418 13.87 
0.0377 
Wald tests 
Statistics ProbChiSq 
113.8708 0.00 *** 
POV=l 0.3101 0.58 
S=M=L 238.1550 0.00 109.7935 0.00 
M=L 0.7146 0.40 1.4234 0.23 
S=L 105.6517 0.00 43.6136 0.00 
S=M 225.1376 0.00 102.0137 0.00 
Continuing 
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Table 6.3 Continued 
Regression 6.3 Regression 6.4 
Variable Estimate tValue Estimate tValue 
Dummy 1 0.3650 0.76 0.4184 0.87 
Dummy2 -3.1028 -6.20 715 1 - 5.6 7 
Dummy3 -2.7085 -5.36 2.4117 - 5'. 03 
Dummy4 -2.8469 -5.74 2.7148 -5.66 
Dummy5 -1.0272 -2.11 -1.0110 -2.11 
Dummy6 -3.8951 -7.71 -3.9836 -8.27 
Dummy7 -0.3526 -0.73 -0.4284 -0.89 
Dummy8 -0.2828 -0.58 -0.3809 -0.79 
Dummy9 -0.0114 -0.02 -0.1375 -0.29 
Dummy 10 0.5374 1.11 0.4141 0.86 
Dummy 11 1.1360 1.99 -0.8177 -1.53 
Dummy 12 3.8606 7.75 2.13 27 4.21 
Dummy 13 3.0452 6.26 1.6857 3.41 
Dummy 14 2.9320 6.06 1.9468 4.00 
Dummy 15 3.2193 6.66 1005 4.30 
Dummy 16 1.2134 2.51 0.5325 1.10 
Dummy 17 1.3771 2.85 0.8404 1.74 
Dummy 18 0.8491 1.75 0.3547 0.73 
Dummy 19 0.6729 1.37 0.2813 0.57 
Dummy20 2.7039 5.58 1.0376 2.08 
Dummy2l 1.1240 2.27 0.3046 0.61 
Dummy 22 1.2842 2.51 0.6126 1.20 
Dummy 23 2.4648 4.74 0.6451 1.21 
POT 0.3265 3.87 
POV 1.0852 13.30 
adjRsq 0.0338 0.0459 
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Table 6.3 reports the weighted- least-sq uares regressions of the percentage of the 
cumulative price change occurring in each trade-size category and subcate, -, or,, on 
dummy variables for the trade-size categories and subcategories, the percentage of 
transactions (regression 6.1), and the percentage of volume (regression 6.2) 
occurring in that category. The weights are equal to the absolute curnulatiýe price 
change over the sample period. 
Under the public information hypothesis, the coefficient on each dummy variable 
in the regression should be zero, and the coefficient on the percentage of 
transactions in the trade-size category should equal one and for volume it should 
NOT equal one. If the public information hypothesis holds, the percentage of the 
cumulative price change occurring in a given trade-size is directly proportional to 
the percentage of transactions in that category, thus the coefficient on the 
percentage of transactions in the trade-size category should be one. Clearly, if 
this condition is to hold, the coefficient on the percentage of volume should NOT 
equalone. 
The results in regression 6.1 are not consistent with the public information 
hypothesis. The hypothesis that the coefficient for the percentage of transactions 
is equal to one can be rejected at the 0.01 level of significance. The hypothesis 
that all of the dummy variables are equal to zero can also be rejected at the 0.01 
level. The results in regression 6.2 show that the coefficient for the percentage of 
fo(a 
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volume is equal to one cannot be rejected at the 0.01 leýel of significance. The 
dummy variables being equal to zero is also rejected at the 0.0 1 leý el. 
The results indicate that the percentage of the stock-price change is smaller than 
predicted by the public information hypothesis in the small-size category, and 
larger than predicted in the medium- and large-size category. The coefficients are 
-1.1627,2.1861 and 1.9295 respectively. The results reject the public in formation 
hypothesis but support the stealth and large block trades/manipulation hypotheses 
with the cumulative price changes occurring on medium- and large-size trades. 
Furthermore, all the results from twenty-three subcategories are consistent with 
those from the three categories. 
For robustness purpose, stocks before the I't quartile and the 4 th quartile are 
separated from the whole sample. As shown in Table 6.1, stocks in the I" quartl le 
have negative price changes between -25.05% to -6.55%, and stocks in the 4 
th 
quartile have positive price change between 2.00% to 29.28%. The separation of 
the price-increase and price-decrease stocks provides more insights given 
Aggarwal and Wu's (2003) prediction that prices increase during manipulation 
period. 
FOGia 
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6.4.2 Cumulative Price Decreases 
147 
The results from Table 6.4 are consistent with those from Table 6.2 that most of 
the cumulative price decreases occur in the medium- and large-size trade 
categories. Trades in the medium-size category are responsible for about 144% of 
the cumulative price decrease, but with only about 45% of transactions and 56% 
of volume. The large-size trades cause about 52% of cumulative price decrease, 
but with only about 4% of transactions and 34% of volume. The subcategorN NN Ith 
the largest effect is that of 10000- 14999 shares. These trades account for about 
27% of the cumulative price change, but only about 2% of all transactions. The 
small-size trades cause -96.26% of the cumulative price decrease and comprise 
about 52% of transactions and about 10% of the volume. Moreover, the ratio of 
percentage cumulative share price change over the percentage of number of trades 
for each category are -1.86,3.22 and 14.25, which again confinns that 
large-size 
trades have a disproportionate impact on the cumulative price decreases. 
fa)(A 
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Table 6.4 Analysis of Significant Price Decrease 
For the cross-section of 141 stocks, this table reports the mean percentage of the cumulative stock price 
changes (WPDP), the corresponding numbers (NOT) and percentages of trades (POT%), the ýolume 
(VOT) and volume percentages (POV%), and the ratio of percentage cumulatiN e stock price change oý er 
the percentage of number of trades (WPDP/'POT) and volume (WPDP/POV) in each of the three trade- 
size categories and twenty-three subcategories. 
WPDP NOT POT% WPDP/POT VOT POVO 0 'A'PDP'PO%' 
Small -96.26 273.83 51.65 -1.86 110.54 10.04 -9.59 
0-99 7.72 4.53 0.85 9.05 0.23 0.02 386-00 
100-199 -37.47 38.16 T2 -5.21 3.96 0.36 -104.08 
200-299 -17.39 45.75 8.63 -2.01 9.28 0.84 -20.70 
300-399 -17.09 40.61 7.66 12.3 1.12 -15.16 
400-499 -3.12 25.97 4.9 -0.64 10.49 0.95 -3.28 
500-599 -27.89 56.26 10.61 -2.63 28.22 2.56 -10.89 
600-699 -3.03 19.33 3.65 -0.83 11.68 1.06 -2.86 
700-799 -1.52 15.92 3 -0.51 11.22 1.02 -1.49 
800-899 0.77 15.43 2.91 0.27 12.41 1.13 0.68 
900-999 2.75 11.89 2.24 1.23 10.76 O. Q8 2.81 
Medium 144.01 236.91 44.68 3.22 615.78 55.92 2.58 
1000-1999 14.82 116.38 21.95 0.67 147.2 13.37 1.11 
2000-2999 26.07 48.8 9.2 2.83 112.31 10.2 2.56 
3000-3999 23.24 25.83 4.87 4.77 86.02 7.81 2.98 
4000-4999 21.83 14.32 2.7 8.09 62.46 5.67 3.85 
5000-5999 26.13 13.26 2.5 10.45 70.21 6.38 4.10 
6000-6999 8.36 6.93 1.31 6.4 44.13 4.01 2.08 
7000-7999 10.21 4.86 0.92 11.15 35.88 3.26 3.13 
8000-8999 7.5 3.79 0.71 10.51 31.74 2.88 2.60 
9000-10000 5.84 2.75 0.52 11.26 25.85 2.35 2.49 
Large 52.26 19.45 3.67 14.25 374.9 34.04 1.54 
10000-14999 27.06 10.15 1.91 14.14 117.55 10.67 2.54 
15000-19999 8.43 3.43 0.65 13.05 57.85 5.25 1.61 
20000-24999 7.54 2.35 0.44 17.02 50.93 4.63 1.63 
25000 + 9.23 3.53 0.67 13.87 148.56 13.49 0.68 
Sum 100 530.18 100 1 1101.22 100 1 
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Table 6.5 Regression Results of Significant Price Decrease 
Table 6.5 reports the weighted-least-squares regressions of the percentage of the 
cumulative price change occurring in each trade-size category and subcategory on 
dummy variables for the trade-size categories and subcategories, the percentage of 
transactions (regression 6.1 and 6.33), and the percentage of volume (regression 6.2 and 
6.4) occurring in that category. The weights are equal to the absolute cumulatiýe price 
change over the sample period, It also reports the Wald tests for regression 6.1 and 6.2. 
which test if all dummy variables are all equal to zero, if the coefficient for the percentage 
of transactions (or volume) is equal to one, and if all dummN variables are equal to each 
other. *, **, and *** denote significant at 10%, 5ýý6 and I% level respectively. 
Regression 6.1 
Variable Estimate tValue 
DummyS -5.9299 -6.85 
DummyM 12.0651 14.10 
DummyL 10.1668 8.49 
POT -0.21129 -1.79 * 
POV 
adiRsq 0.1055 
Regression 6.2 
Estimate tValue 
-7.8789 -10.78 
6.4655 6.55 
5.6272 4.28 
1.0083 7.81 
0.1214 
Wald tests Wald tests 
Label Statistics ProbChiSq Statistics ProbChiSq 
S=O, M=O, L=O 382.0200 0.00 189.3643 0.00 
POT=] 104.2089 0.00 
POV=I 0.0041 0.95 
S=M=L 311.2163 0.00 179.1935 0.00 
M=L 1.7021 0.19 0.3538 0.55 
S=L 122.1757 0.00 86.8670 0.00 
S=M 289.0315 0.00 154.6332 0.00 
Continuing 
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Table 6.5 Continued 
Regression 6.3 Regression 6.4 
Variable 
_ 
Estimate tValue Estimate tValue 
Dummy 1 5.0111 2.27 5.4040 2.47 
Dummy2 -29.7747 -12.00 6.94 51 -12.33 Dummy3 -16.1791 -6.29 - 13.5 149 -6.17 Dummy4 -15.2054 -6.21 - 13.52 81 -6.17 
Dummy5 -4.1605 -1.81 -3.4226 -1.56 
Dummy6 -23.7624 -9.12 *** - 22 2.7984 -10.25 *** 
Dummy7 -3.5308 -1.57 -3.4016 -1.55 
Dummy8 -2.2065 -0.99 -2.2717 -1.04 
Dummy9 -0.5582 -0.25 -0.7689 -0.1 -1 1; Dummy 10 1.1006 0.50 0.8202 0.37 
Dummy 11 2.6736 0.78 -3.5473 -1.23 
Dummy 12 15.2466 6.25 8.6408 3.39 
Dummy 13 14.7168 6.48 9.3348 3.92 
Dummy 14 14.5894 6.55 10.6134 4.64 
Dummy 15 17.5341 7.90 12.8998 5.59 
Dummy 16 5.5178 2.49 -1.7721 1.24 
Dummy 17 6.9617 3.15 4.8344 2.18 
Dummy 18 5.2078 2.33 3.2416 1.45 
Dummy 19 4.1300 1.84 2.6129 1.16 
Dummy20 18.5948 8.39 11.9998 5.01 
Dummy2l 6.0014 2.67 2.8692 1.26 
Dummy 22 5.9340 2.52 3.2911 1.39 
Dummy 23 7.5445 3.14 0.7849 0.31 
POT 0.5383 2.95 
POV 1.1585 7.42 
adjRsq 0.1735 0.1853 
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The regression results from Table 6.5 confirm those from Table 6.3 in that Ný, hilst 
the public information hypothesis is rejected, stealth-trading and block 
trade/manipulation hypotheses are supported. The coefficients for each trade-size 
category are -5.9299 (-7.8789), 12.0651 (6.4655) and IOJ668 (5.62172) in 
regressions 6.1 (6.2), respectively. The results from the subcategories lead to the 
same conclusion. 
6.4.3 Cumulative Price Increases 
The results in Table 6.6 show that with about 48% of transactions the medium- 
size category causes only about 5% of the cumulative price increase. In contrast, 
the small-size trades cause about 76% of the cumulative price increase with about 
46% of transactions and about 7% of the volume, and the large-size trades cause 
about 20% of cumulative price increase with only about 6% of transactions and 
about 45% of volume. The subcategory with the largest effect is that of 100- 199 
shares. These trades account for about 31% of the cumulative price change, but 
only about 7% of all transactions. However, the ratios of percentage cumulative 
share price change over the percentage of number of trades for each of the three 
categories (small, medium and large) are -1.65.0.10 and 3.28. and this shows it is 
the large-size trades which have a disproportionate impact on price increases. 
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Table 6.6 Analysis of Significant Price Increase 
For the cross-section of 141 stocks, this table reports the mean percentage of the cumulatke stock price 
changes (WPDP), the corresponding numbers (NOT) and percentages of trades (POTIo), the ýolurne (VOT) and volume percentages (POV%), and the ratio of percentage cumulatiýe stock price change over 
the percentage of number of trades (WPDP/POT) and volume (WPDP POV) in each of the three trade- 
size categories and twenty-three subcategories. 
WPDP NOT POT% WPDP/POT VOT POV'o WPDP POV 
Small 75.8 307.23 46.06 1.65 123.88 6.56 11.55 
0-99 -9.76 4.96 0.74 -13.14 0.26 0.01 -976.00 
100-199 30.96 45.51 6.82 4.54 4.73 0.25 123.84 
200-299 23.01 52.17 7.82 2.94 10.6 0.56 41.09 
300-399 14.37 43.73 6.56 2.19 13.27 0.7 2 0.5 
-') 400-499 1.81 28.73 4.31 0.42 11.62 0.61 2.97 
500-599 12.33 59.32 8.89 1.39 29.78 1.58 7.80 
600-699 2.37 22.53 3.38 0.7 13.63 0.72 3.29 
700-799 1.38 18.63 2.79 0.49 13.15 0.7 1.97 
800-899 0.18 17.98 2.7 0.07 14.48 0.77 0.23 
900-999 -0.85 13.67 2.05 -0.41 12.39 0.66 -1.29 
Medium 4.6 319.94 47.97 0.1 912.05 48.28 0.10 
1000-1999 3.87 141.48 21.21 0.18 181.82 9.62 0.40 
2000-2999 5.12 66.2 9.93 0.52 153.82 8.14 0.63 
3000-3999 1.35 37.37 5.6 0.24 125.15 6.62 0.20 
4000-4999 -2.52 22.04 3.3 -0.76 96.63 5.11 -0.49 
5000-5999 -1.67 20.17 3.02 -0.55 107.47 5.69 -0.29 
6000-6999 -1.12 11.98 1.8 -0.62 76.47 4.05 -0.28 
7000-7999 0.34 8.56 1.28 0.27 63.41 3.36 0.10 
8000-8999 1.4 7 1.05 1.33 58.83 3.11 0.45 
9000-10000 -2.18 5.14 0.77 -2.83 48.44 2.56 -0.85 
Large 19.6 39.82 5.97 3.28 853.28 45-17 0.43 
10000-14999 -4.98 18.9 2.83 -1.76 221.8 11.74 -0.42 
15000-19999 2.59 7.4 1.11 2.33 125.99 6.67 0.39 
20000-24999 3.84 4.76 0.71 5.38 104.18 5.51 0.70 
25000 + 18.14 8.75 1.31 13.82 401.31 21.24 0.85 
Sum 100 667 100 1 1889.21 loo I 
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Table 6.7 Regression Results of Significant Price Increase 
Table 6.7 reports the weighted-] east-squares regressions of the percentage of the 
cumulative price change occurring in each trade-size category and subcategory on 
dummy variables for the trade-size categories and subcategories, the percentage of 
transactions (regression 6.1 and 6. and the percentage of volume (regression 6.2 and 
6.4) occurring in that category. The weights are equal to the absolute cumulati-'e price 
change over the sample period. It also reports the Wald tests for regressions 6.1 and 6.2, 
which test if all dummy variables are all equal to zero, if the coefficient for the percentage 
of transactions (or volume) is equal to one, and if all dummy variables are equal to each 
other. *, **, and *** denote significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectivel, ý. 
Regression 6.1 
Variable Estimate tValue 
DummyS 3.0421 3.05 
DummyM -1.8459 -1.78 
DumrnyL 3.1156 2.10 
POT 0.6354 5.60 
POV 
adjRsq 0.0207 
Wald tests 
Label Statistics ProbCbiSq 
S=O, M=O, L=O 18.8085 0.00 
POT=] 10.3116 0.00 
POV=I 
S=M=L 14.5324 0.00 
M=L 7.6934 0.01 
S=L 0.0017 0.97 
S=M 13.6686 0.00 
Regression 6.2 
Estimate tValue 
4.4358 4.88 
-4.4239 -3.98 
-2.0813 -1.28 
1.0424 8.44 
0.0326 
Wald tests 
Statistics ProbChiSq 
42.5765 0.00 *** 
0.1179 0.73 
42.1756 0.00 
1.7779 0.18 
12.8493 0.00 
40.4956 0.00 
Continuing 
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Table 6.7 Continued 
Variable 
Regression 6.3 
Estimate tValue 
Dummy 1 -7.1787 -2.52 
Dummy2 18.8739 6.35 
Dummy3 13.1095 4.39 
Dummy4 7.7658 2.65 
Dummy5 -0.2359 -0.08 
Dummy6 5.7809 1.95 
Dummy7 0.5399 0.19 
Dummy8 0.0495 0.02 
Dummy9 -0.7433 -0.26 
Dummy 10 -1.2675 -0.44 
Dummy 11 -3.8163 -1.11 
Dummy 12 0.6314 0.21 
Dummy 13 -0.7087 -0.25 
Dummy 14 -2.7228 -0.95 
Dummy 15 -2.0385 -0.71 
Dummy 16 -1.2862 -0.45 
Dummy 17 -0.1115 -0.04 
Dummy 18 0.6989 0.24 
Dummy 19 -1.8293 -0.63 
Dummy 20 -4.3527 -1.51 
Dummy2l 1.6375 0.56 
Dummy 22 2.7664 0.93 
Dummy 23 13.4309 4.55 
POT 0.4618 3.39 
POV 
adj Rsq 0.0404 
Regression 6.4 
Estimate tValue 
-6.8988 - 2.45 
21.2741 7.5 5 *** 
15.1767 538 
8.9990 3.19 
0.3299 0.12 
6.5283 2.31 
0.6612 0.23 
0.0293 0.01 
-0.8660 -0.31 
-1.4634 -0.52 
-8.4306 -2.71 
-4.8664 -1.63 
-5 ) . 43 16 -1.86 
-6.3430 -2.21 
-6.1409 -2.13 
-4.0195 -1.41 
-2.3505 -0.82 
-1.4092 -0.50 
-3.5112 -1.21 
-11.6906 -3.89 
-2.1288 -0.72 
-0.3321 -0.11 
4.8469 1.56 
1.1103 8.38 
0.0577 
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Regression results from Table 6.7 reject both the public information and stealth- 
trading hypotheses. In regression 6.1 the coefficients for the small-size and lar, -, c- 
size categories are 3.0421 and 3.1156, whereas the medium sized cate, -, or, \ has a 
coefficient of -1.8459. The results are presented more clearly f'rorn the tx\ent-, - 
three subcategories with only the trade-size categories of 100-199,200-299300- 
399, and 25000 and over having significant effect on cumulatke price increases. 
One interpretation of these results is that the manipulators take large positions so 
as to maximize profits and thereby move prices up. and individual investors 
follow the price increases. 
6.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has extended Barclay and Warner's (1993) work on stealth trading to 
the emerging China's stock market. While some support is found for stealth 
trading, the results point towards large size trades having the greatest 
disproportionate effect on price changes and this is especially the case for price 
increases. 
While we are unable to isolate the motivations behind this 'large trade size' effect, 
the results are aligned with a concern noted by a number of eminent individuals in 
China. At the National People's Congress (NPC) in spring 2000. Premier Zhu 
Rongji remarked that China's stock markets had developed quickly. achieved 
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much but was still not well regulated vith concems over rampant speculation. 
poor-quality listed firms, defective regulation and vvidespread corruption. In 2001. 
Professor Wu Jinglian condemned that 'China's stock market is no better than a 
casino. At least in a casino there are rules. ' (Wu, 200 1) 
If the current results are confirmed by further research, the pollc\ conclusions are 
both stark and obvious. First, there will need to be a stricter regime tracking the 
source of large block trades and large fluctuations in share prices. Second, 
penalties for purposeful price manipulation will have to be material and strictly 
enforced. Only then will China's stock market have the opportunity to benefit 
from an orderly price discovery process. 
More recently, Kang, Liu and Ni (2002) found that the price manipulation could 
be explained by behavioural factors. They argued that the syndicate speculators 
like to create bullish sentiment on China's stock market, which might lead to 
individual investors' overreaction and make them fail into the trap. Due to stock 
prices' overreaction, they found statistically significant abnormal profits for some 
short-horizon contrarian and intermediate-horizon momentum strategies in 
China's stock market. On one hand, their results broadly confirm the results of 
this current chapter that price manipulation exists in China's stock market, 
especially during the price increase period. On the other hand, they provide 
behavioural explanations for stock price behaviours, which has become 
increasingly popular among financial economists (e. g., Wang and Cheng. 2004, 
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and Coval and Shurnway, 2005, etc. ). The next chapter of thesis will examine the 
issue of investors' psychology. It will investigate the effect of cultural factors on 
price clustering and price resistance in China's stock market. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CULTURAL INFLUENCE ON 
PRICE CLUSTERING AND RESISTANCE 
7.1 Introduction 
Financial economists have become increasingly interested in the behavioural and 
psychological explanations for asset pricing anomalies since the emergence of 
behavioural finance. O'Hara (1997) viewed trading mechanism as *a type of 
trading game in which players meet at some venue and act according to some 
rules. ' He also argued that market participant is one of the three dimensions of a 
trading mechanism. Hence, the analysis of market participants* behaviour and 
psychology will enrich the traditional market microstructure research and provide 
further insights into the price formation process. 
'Man is neither infinite in faculties, nor in apprehension like a god (Hirshleifer. 
2001, pl576). ' The behaviour and psychological explanations have promise of 
capturing this reality. One of the fascinating subjects that should receke more 
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attention from investors is the psycholop of numbers. Psvcholo, -, Ical 1 -1 1- 
experiments demonstrate more generally that clustering of outcomes at round I 
numbers is a fundamental attribute of human behaviour. It is important to 
understand stock price clustering, for it is inconsistent ýN ith share prices folloýý ing, 
a simple random walk process. Recent studies document the tendenc\ of prices to 
cluster at round numbers. These effects are remarkablý persistent through time 
and across markets. The evidence seems to show that this phenomenon depends 
on the prediction of investors to place orders at round numbers. From a scientific 
view the research gives some insights in the way investors make their decision. 
Brown, Chua and Mitchell (2002) analysed the effect of Chinese cultural factors, 
such as preferences for specific numbers, on price clustering for six Asia-Pacific 
stock markets (Australia, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Philippines. Singapore and 
Taiwan). They only found support for Chinese cultural factors having an 
influence on price clustering in the Hong Kong (HK) market and explained the 
result by the cultural factors concerning numbers being stronger in the Cantonese 
speaking HK market than in the Mandarin speaking states such as Singapore and 
Taiwan, and because the HK market has a relatively high proportion of local 
individual traders, who are more likely to be influenced by cultural effects than 
foreign and institutional traders. 
The primary purpose of this chapter is to extend the analysis of Brown et al. 
(2002) by testing whether cultural factors help explain price clustering in China's 
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stock market. In addition to extending the analysis to the Chinese markets. it 
develops the analysis in a number of ways. First, it uses intraday data and a ran-, -, e 
of tests to give a more refined characterisation of price clustering. Second, it tests 
whether limit order prices explain price clustering. Third. it tests ýý hether cultural 
factors explain price resistance levels in the Chinese markets. 
The results of the paper offer support for Chinese cultural factors affecting price 
clustering and limit order prices in the Chinese markets but this support does not 
extend to the analysis of price resistance levels. In addition to the price clustering 
at digit 0 and 5 as found commonly in previous studies, this study finds that prices 
tend to cluster on digit 8 in China's stock market. It also finds that there is a 
lower propensity of price to cluster on digits 4 and 7. The results are clearly 
consistent with the predictions that Chinese people like the lucky number 8, and 
dislike the unlucky numbers 4 and 7. However, the cultural factors do not have 
impacts on price resistance level, with only the digit 0 being found to be a 
resistance point. The results of this study have implications for practitioners, 
especially global investors, that the unique Chinese culture has impacts on the 
price formation process. A good understanding of Chinese culture would help 
them make right investment decisions. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 7.2 briefly reviews the 
behavioural finance literature. Section 7.3 reviews the empirical evidence, and 
section 7.4 discusses the relevant theoretical explanations. Section 7.5 discusses 
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the data and methodologies used to analýse price clustering and resistance in 
China's stock markets. Section 7.6 presents the results. while section 7.7 offers 
conclusions. 
7.2 Review of Behavioural Finance Literature 
The EMH has been the central proposition of finance for nearly thirtý ýears. 
However, in the last twenty years both the theoretical foundations and the 
empirical evidence purporting to support it have been challem-, ed- Behavioural 
finance has emerged as an alternative view of financial markets. Behavioural 
finance theory rests on two major foundations: investor sentiment and limited 
arbitrage. 
First, Shleifer (2000) argued that investors are not fully rational in general. Many 
investors react to irrelevant information in forming their demand for securities and 
act as noise traders in the market because of their irrationality. Black (1986) 
confirmed that they trade on noise rather than information. If the theory of 
efficient markets relied entirely on the rationality of individual investors, the 
theory is questionable because investors' psychology has great influence, which is 
referred as investor sentiment. 
Second, the central argument of behavioural finance also states that real-ýwrld 
arbitracge is risky and therefore limited. The effectiveness of arbitrage relies 
f%63CQ 
CHAPTER 7 
CULTURAL INFLUENCE ON PRICE CLUSTERYNG AND RESISTANCE 162 
crucially on the availability of close substitutes. Howeý, er. securities do not haýe 
obvious substitutes in many instances. Even ýý hen individual securities ha-, e close 
substitutes, arbitrage is still risky because of the fundamental risk. Miller (1977) 
argued that the uncertainty and risk would imply divergence of opinion. If there is 
little or no short selling in a market, the demand for securities should come fi-om 
those who have the most optimistic expectations about them. However, ýN Ith 
increasing risk the divergence of opinion is likely to increase as ýN ell. makin- the 
expected returns lower for those risky securities. Even for risk neutral investors, 
their strategy will involve the use of risk premiums in evaluating securities. 
Furthermore, De Long et al. (1990) argued that even when individual securities 
have perfect and identical substitutes, the *noise trader risk' still makes the real- 
world arbitrage quite risky and therefore limited. 
A number of recent papers in finance literature have argued that behavioural and 
psychological factors account for asset pricing anomalies (Coval and Shumway, 
2005, Barberis et al., 1998, Daniel et al., 1998, Oclean, 1998, Benartzi and Thaler, 
1995, Shurnway, 1998, Barberis and Huang, 2001, and Barberis et al., 2001). 
Even some reputable economists in old days thought that individual psychology 
affects prices. For example, Keynes (1936) argued that animal spirits affect prices 
in stock markets. Markowitz (1952) proposed that people focus on gains and 
losses relative to reference points, which helps explain the pricing of insurance 
and lotteries. 
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In an effort to explain the anomalies caused by investors, it becomes popular to 
introduce psychological observations in financial research. This section proý ides 
the review of studies of behaviour finance and investors' ps%cholo, -, \. and 
examines how the behavioural and psychological factors affect price formation 
process. 
7.2.1 Overreaction 
De Bondt and Thaler (1985) are one of the first who introduced the psychological 
conception of 'overreaction' of investors and investigated whether such behaviour 
affects stock prices. They compared the performance of two groups of 
companies: extreme losers and extreme winners. They formed portfolios of best 
and the worst perfon-ning stocks over the previous three years. They then 
computed the returns on these portfolios over the following five years. They 
documented that the portfolios of prior losers outperform prior winners. They 
advanced the explanation of overreaction that the extreme losers have become too 
cheap and bounce back, whereas the extreme winners have become too expensive 
and earn lower subsequent returns. Similarly, Lehamann (1990) documented 
price reversals at monthly and weekly intervals. 
Subsequent to De Bondt and Thaler's (1985) study, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) 
recognized momentum phenomenon, which cannot be explained by Fama and 
French's (1996) three-factor model. They showed that movements in individual 
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stock prices over the period of six to melýe months tend to predict future 
movements in the same direction. The% predicted that short-term trends continue. 
Recently, Daniel and Titman (2001) and Cohen et al. (2002) enriched the 
understanding of momentum by focusing on the specific meaning of information 
rather than how people hear it. 
Fama (1998) argued that both contrarian and momentum phenomena tend to 
disappear in the long run, and therefore, they are not incompatible ýN ith efficient 
market hypothesis. However, Shleifer (2000) argued that 'ultimately efficient, 
however, does not mean efficient'. 
Some research uncovered other variables that predict future returns, for example, 
the market to book ratio. The market to book ratio are thought as a measure of the 
cheapness of a stock. Companies with high market to book ratios are the 
expensive growth firms, whereas those with low ratios are relatively the cheap 
value firms. The principal of value investing suggests investing in low market to 
book companies, because the high market to book ratios may reflect the 
overreaction to past good news and the over-optimism about the companies' 
future profitability. De Bondt and Thaler (1987), Fama and French (1992). and 
Lakonishok et al. (1994) found that portfolios of high market to book companies 
have earn much lower returns than those with low ratios. 
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7.2.2 Beliefs and Mood 
Daniel et al. (1998) developed a theory based on investors' overconfidence and 
changes in confidence resulting from biased self-attribution of investment 
outcomes. The theory suggests that investors overreact to private information 
signals and underreact to public information signal. Theý found that positive 
return autocorrelation can be a result of continuing overreaction, ýýhich is 
followed by a long-ten-n correction. Alternative]\,. Barberis et al. (1998) argued 
that a representative investor suffers from conservatism bias, and is reluctant to 
update his beliefs sufficiently even when observing new public information. In 
their theory individuals believed that earnings either follow a steady growth trend 
or are mean-reverting, while the actual earnings follow a random walk. 
An interesting paper written by Hirshleifer and Shurnway (2003) investigated the 
relationship between morning sunshine in the city of a country's leading stock 
exchange and daily market index returns. The analysis was carried out across 26 
countries from 1982 to 1997, and it found that sunshine is strongly significantly 
correlated with stock returns. These findings are difficult to reconcile with fully 
rational price setting. It could only be explained by psychological evidence that 
sunny weather is associated with upbeat mood, and mood affects prices. The 
implications Of the analysis of mood suggest that negative moods tend to stimulate 
effort at careful analysis, whereas positive moods are associated ", ith less critical 
and more receptive information processing. 
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7.2.3 Preferences 
Most literature that employs preference -based deviations from rationalitN is based 
on the prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979). They argued that the 
utility functions are derived as convex in the region of losses, kinked at zero. and 
concave in the region of gains. Kahnernan and Tversky (1982) found extreme risk 
aversion in the neighbourhood of zero, which perhaps is the most salient feature 
of prospect theory. Using experimental data, they estimated the slope below zero 
to be 2.25 times that above zero. Benartzi and Thaler (1995) and Barberis et al. 
(2001) modelled the behaviour of a representative investor with such preferences 
and explained the equity premium puzzle. Since the trader's utility is a function 
of daily gains or losses, the profits near zero will lead to extremely high 
subsequent risk aversion. A second aspect of prospect theory is that of risk- 
seeking behaviour in the region of losses. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) stated 
that a person who has not made peace with his losses is likely to accept gambles 
that would be unacceptable to him otherwise. It suggests that traders who have 
experienced losses are most inclined to take subsequent risks. Conversely, traders 
with profitable mornings tend to reduce their exposure to afternoon risk. 
Moreover, Thaler and Johnson (1990) documented the house-money effect that 
individuals have increasing risk tolerance as their wealth exceeds the reference 
point. Barberis et al. (2001) employed the house-money effect, and found that 
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investors are becoming more risk tolerant when their risky asset holdin, -,,, earn 
returns exceeding a historical benchmark. 
7.3 Empirical Evidence 
7.3.1 Price Clustering 
Osborne (1962) and Niederhoffer (I 965ý 1966) seem to have been the first to test 
whether some prices are more frequently observed than others and theN found that 
stock prices in the US markets are clustered on whole numbers, less on halves or 
quarters and least commonly on the odd eighths. Osborne (1962) sampled closing 
prices and found that 60.8 percent were at even eighths; hence, the tendency for 
even eighths to appear more frequently than odd eighths being termed the 
'Osborne Effect'. Niederhoffer (1965) documented clustering of limit orders on 
the books of specialists on the NYSE and found 84 percent of them are at the even 
eighths. The ratio of limit order closing prices at the even eighths (0,2,4,6) to 
those at the odd eighths (1,3,5,7) was 8.8: 1. He found clustering in the closing 
prices of actively and inactively traded shares, in high- and low-priced shares, and 
in noon closing prices. Higher-priced shares traded mostly at the integers and 
lower-priced shares settled at even numbers of eighths. Moreover, Niederhoffer 
(1966) suggested there is also a tendency for limit orders to be placed at familiar 
whole numbers, such as I Oý 25,50, etc. 
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Harris ( 1991 ) confirmed that stock price clustering is pervasIN e and the clustering 
distributions from the mid-nineteenth centurý appear to be no different from thoý, c 
observed in the late twentieth century. He found that clustering increased with I- 
price level and volatility. Moreover, price clustering is also found in international 
markets, such as in the Australian Stock Exchange b. -v Aitken et al. (1996) and on 
the Stock Exchange of Singapore (SES) by Hameed and Terr,, (1998). Aitken et 
a]. (1996) found that clustering increases with the price of the stock, ýý ith market 
volatility, own stock volatility, trade size and the size of the bid-ask spread. It 
decreased with trading frequency and also was lower for stocks Ný ith options 
traded on them. Hameed and Terry (1998) investigated the distribution of dalIN 
closing prices for 234 stocks that were traded on the SES Main Board between 
January 1980 and July 1994. The SES is an order-driven market with no market 
maker. Prices ending in multiples of ten cents were more common than prices 
ending in odd multiples of five cents; prices were more likely to end in even cents 
than odd cents, and least likely to end in fractional cents, and whole dollars 
occurred more frequently than half dollars, which were more frequent than price 
multiples of 10 cents. They also found that price clustering increased with a 
stock's price level and decreased with trading volume. 
Brown et al. (2002) analysed price clustering for large and small stocks for six z: l 
Asian-Pacific stock markets and found evidence that clustering occurs at 0,5 and 
even integers. Furthermore. they found that clustering at 0 and even numbers 
increases with the level of the stock price and declines NNith the precision výith 
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which a price is known. They also found that in the case of the Hong Kong, 
market there is some support for cultural factors explaining a preference for 8 and 
the avoidance of 4. 
In terms of the impact of cultural factors on price clustering. Heeler and Nouven's 
(2001) work on the patterns of price endings for samples of online shopping retail 
prices in American and five Asian markets (Malaysia, Hong Kong. Singapore. 
Japan and China) is of interest. Similar to the US. they found for the Asian 
markets that 0 and 5 are over-represented as compared to 1,2,3.4,6 and 7. They 
also found significant over-representation of 8 as compared to 9 for the Asian 
markets. The percentage of 8-endings for online prices in these markets is as 
follows; Malaysia 19.8%, Hong Kong 14.8%, Singapore 13.1 %, Japan 24.4%, and 
China 19.3%, compared with 17.3%, 3.0%, 26.6%, 1.8%, and 9.9% for the 9- 
ending, respectively. 
7.3.2 Price Resistance 
As well as prices showing clustering effects, there is also evidence that price 
barriers can also occur. Most research concerning price barriers has been carried 
out on stock indices. Donaldson and Kim (1993) examined the Dow 
Jones 
Industrial Average (DJIA) for the period 1974-1990 and found round numbers 
(such as 100 levels) functioned as support or resistance levels. When such a 
level 
ýN as passed through. the DJIA moved more up or down more than usual. 
Leý and 
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Varian (1994) analysed the DJIA over the period 1952-1993 and found feN\er 
observations around the I 00-levels. Koedijk and Stork (1994) studied indices in 
the US, Belgium, Germany, Japan and the UK stock markets oýer the period 
1980-1992 and found relatively few observations near I 00-levels and furthermore, 
these levels were less often passed through. 
7.4 Theoretical Explanations 
Given the objectives of this study and the fact that Brown et al. (2002) reviewed a 
range of theoretical explanations, only cultural explanations of price clustering 
and price barriers are considered here. 
In Chinese culture numbers are not just figures, but they also carry special 
significance and symbolism. Even the pronunciations or sounds of the numbers 
can suggest good or bad luck. The number 8 presents good luck to the Chinese 
because it sounds like multiply in Chinese, which indicates getting wealthy. 
Telephone numbers, licence plates and even residential or business addresses 
which use any of or a combination of those numbers are extremely popular and 
often cost more. For example, a special phone number. '88888888", was 
auctioned in China's Sichuan Province, for 2.33 million Yuan (US$280,723) 
(from China daily, 19/08/2003). More interestingly, the 2008 Beijing Olympics 
will begin at 8pm on 8 August. in keeping with one of the nation's luck% numbers 
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(from BBC news, 05/11/2004). These evidences suggest that the number 8 is well 
preferred in Chinese culture. 
This explanation is consistent with the results of Heeler and Nguyen %k here the 8- 
ending is found to be popular in Hong Kong and Malaysia, NNhere Cantonese 
Chinese is the major dialect. In Japan, the number 8 also has great sýmbolic 
significance. The Japanese writing of number 8 looks like the shape of a 
mountain (Sue-hirogari in Japanese), and thus the number 8 signifies *fan out', 
'grow', and 'be prosperous'. On the other hand, the number 4 in China suggests 
bad luck, as it sounds like die in Chinese and the number 7 sounds like anger, 
which is also not 'fancied' by the Chinese. From this perspective, there should be 
more price clustering on the number 8 and less on the numbers 4 and 7 in China's 
stock market. 
Prior work (e. g., Aitken et al., 1996, and Harneed and Terry, 1998) has established 
that individual stock prices cluster on round numbers and also Sonnemans (2003) 
finds that in individual stocks round numbers also act as price barriers. There is, 
therefore, a suggestion of a relationship between price clustering and price 
barriers. One possible explanation of this relationship is the use of limit orders. If 
stock price clustering is caused by a relatively large number of limit orders at 
round numbers, this may also cause barriers or resistance points at these numbers. 
Accordingly. the limit order book is studied as a means of further testing the 
foca 
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potential importance of cultural factors as explanations of price effects in the 
Chinese stock markets. 
7.5 Data and Methodology 
7.5.1 Data 
The data used in this study consist of time-stamped (to the second) intraday best 
bid and ask prices and volumes, and transaction prices and volumes. The sample 
period is from the I" to 3 Oth September, 2001. The results are shown for a sample 
consisting of 566 stocks trading on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE). 13 Onlý 
regular trades transacted in the four hours of normal trading hours are considered 
in this study, which is from 09: 30 to 11: 30 and 13: 00 to 15: 00. Opening trades 
are excluded, because they are traded under a different mechanism. Each regular 
trade's price and volume, and the best bid & ask price and volume are extracted, 
and additional variables are derived from the existing database. The last 
significant digit of each price (from digit 0 to 9) is extracted in order to test 
whether it is acI usterin g/resi stance point or not. 
II The analysis was conducted for stocks traded on both SHSE and SZSE for September 2001 and 
May 2002 but as all four samples gave similar results, only the results for the 566 stocks listed on 
the SHSE during September 2001 are reported are here. 
soca 
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7.5.2 Measures of Price Clustering and Price Resistance 
As a means of providing a comprehensive and detailed analysis of price clustering 
and price resistance a range of measures are considered. First, price clustering is 
measured from transaction price data with four measures. Second, limit order 
prices are analyzed to examine price resistance with two measures. Third, another 
four measures are constructed from transaction prices to study price resistance. 
7.5.2.1 Price Clustering - Transaction Price Analysis 
Prior studies (e. g., Sonnemans, 2003) have used the occurrence of prices 
(frequency) to measure price clustering, However, since price clustering means 
that some prices are more frequently 'observed', a single measurement of the 
appearance frequency may not to be sufficient; more specifically, price clustering 
may have volume and duration characteristics. For example, it would seem 
reasonable for price clustering to be associated with greater volumes of 
transactions at certain prices and for prices to stay longer at the clustering points. 
To capture these different aspects, price clustering is examined from the three- 
dimensional perspective of Frequency (F), Percentage Trading Volume (PcnIV) 
and Percentage Time Duration (PcntTD). The measures of these dimensions are 
constructed as follows. 
foc-oa 
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Frequency (F) 
The frequency Fj of each digit is calculated as follows. 
9 
N, 
YN, 
Equation 7.1 
174 
where i=0,1,2, ..., 8,9, and Ni 
is the number of transactions of each digit group. 
Percentage Trading Volume (PcntV) 
Trading volume of each transaction (V, ) within each digit group is summed to get 
Volume (Vi). In order to create a measure, which is comparable across different 
stocks, the Percentage Volume (PcntVi) is used. 
PcntV, -- 9 
V, 
where i=0,1,2, ..., 
8,9, and V, 
Percentage Time Duration (PcntTD) 
Equation 7.2 
foca 
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The time duration of each trade (in seconds) is calculated by usling the next trade*s 
trading time T, -j minus the current trade's time T,. All the time durations are 
summed within each digit group to get Time Duration (TD). 
TD, (T, 
+, - 
TI) Equation 7.3 
where i=0,1,2, ..., 
8,9, T, is the time stamp of each transaction t, and T,,, is the 
time stamp of the transaction after transaction t. The time duration is then 
standardized to get Percentage Time Duration (PcntTDj as follows: 
PcntMý -9 
TD, 
E TD, 
i=O 
7.5.22 Price Resistance - Limit Order Price Analysis 
Equation 7.4 
As discussed above, price resistance may be caused by limit orders submitted at 
certain prices. Both exchanges in China have a centralized electronic order-driven 
system where the trading mechanism is a continuous market during normal 
trading hours. Orders are matched with a price and time priority scheme. Limit 
orders are submitted by buyers and sellers and auctioned off continuouslý. 
Matched orders are executed and then dispatched from the system. ýýhereas 
Soca 
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unmatched orders remain in the s-vstem until the-, are executed or deleted. The 
transaction prices of a particular trade are generated contingent upon the best bid 
or ask prices and the time of order submissions. The Percentage Time Duration 
(QPcntTD) and Standardized Time-Weighted Volume (QSOTIVI) at the best bid 
and ask prices are used to examine price resistance. 
Calculation of QPcntTD is carried out in the same manner as of PcntTD above. It 
is worth noting that Standardized Time-Weighted Volume (QStdTWV) is used as a 
proxy to examine the market depth at each single time unit. In other words, it 
examines how fast and how much volume traders need to clear the limit order 
submitted and thus move the price. 
QStdTWV, =9 
QTWV, 
Y QTWV, 
i=O 
Equation 7.5 
where QTWV, is the Time- Weighted Volume of each digit group, and 
QTWý == Y, (Q V, x (QT, +l - QTI)) 
Equation 7.6 
where i=0,1,2, ..., 8,9, QV, is the quote volume of each observation. 
QT, is the 
time stamp of each observation. 
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7.5.2.3 Price Resistance - Transaction Price Analysis 
Prior studies have examined the price resistance v, ithin the context of stock 
indices. Donaldson and Kim (1993) found that the Dow Jones Industrial Average 
(DJIA) closed on average fewer times on index values in the neitghbourhood of 
I 00-levels. Ley and Varian (1994) also found fewer observations around the 100- 
levels for the DJIA. In contrast to these prior studies. the purpose here is to 
analyse price resistance in the context of individual stocks. In addition, some new 
measures of price resistance are developed. 
A resistance point makes it difficult for prices to cross; for example, it takes more 
volume and more time to cross a price resistance level. First, consider the price 
movements summarized in Figure 7.1. 
Figure 7.1 Illustration of Price Movement 
(PI) 
PO) 10 
( PO) 
----- No. 
cp 
0) 
P4) 
P, 
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In Figure 7.1, there are four types of price movement around Po, DU, t D. DD and 
UU. The DU (down/up) price movement means the previous price P, drops to Po. 
and (no matter how many transactions trade at price P,, ) then rises to P, xý hercas. 
with the UD (up/down) price movement, price moves up from P,,, PO and then 
down tOP4. Neither of these price movements can be classed as crosses and xýould 
indicate a price resistance level. In contrast, the DD (ilown (lown) Cross is the 
combination Of PIPOP4, and the UU (up/up) Cross is the P-'POP3 combination. 
With these different possible price movements, a digit would be seen as a price 
resistance level if statistics for DU+ UD are larger than those for DD+ UU. 
Within the 4 types of price movement, the Frequency (F), Average Number of 
Trades (AvgNT), Average Volume (AvgV) and Average Time Duration (AvgTD) 
are all examined. First, the Frequency (F) is carried out for each digit group's 4 
types of price movement (UD, DU, UU, and DD). Second, the Average Number 
of Trades (AvgN7) of each type of price movement within each digit group is 
calculated. For example, let the price of the first transaction move from f 1.95 and 
stay at f 1.96 for the next 3 transactions, and then move to f 1.97. In this context, 
it is a UU-Cross with the number of trades equalling 5. It will then be divided by 
the number of UU-Crosses to get the average number of trades of digit 6 for a UU 
cross. Similarly, continuing the UU-Crosses example, the Average Volume 
(, 4vgV) and Average Time Duration (AvgTD) are also averaged by the number of 
ULT-Crosses. 
fo(-a 
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7.5.3 Empirical Methods 
The last significant digit of prices should be uniformly distributed. if there is no 
clustering or resistance point. Moreover. if the last significant digit is not 
uniformly distributed, the statistical significance needs to be tested via 
nonparametric tests. The Wilcoxon (ranks of the observations) scores are reported 
and the Kruskal-Wallis (K-9) test is used to test whether the differences among 
the digits are statistically significant. More specifically, 
a(Rj) = Rj Equation 7.7 
where Rj is the rank of the observationj and a(R. ) is the Wilcoxon score. 
The K- W statistic is: 
W=[_ 
12 k R, ' 3(nT + 1) Equation 7.8 y 
n,, (nT + 
1) 
=, n, 
where 
k= the number of populations 
the number of items In sample i 
n7. = In, = total number of 
items in all samples 
R, = sum of the ranks for sample I 
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7.6 Empirical Results 
7.6.1 Price Clustering - Transaction Price Results 
Table 7.1 reports the results for Frequency (F). Percentage Trading I'olume 
(PcntV) and Percentage Time Duration (PcntTD) for digits 0 to 9. Trading 
volume is measured as the percentage volume and time duration is measured as 
the percentage time duration. For each of the measures, Table 7.1 reports the 
mean, standard deviation, and the mean Wilcoxon Score (across the 566 stocks). 
The K-W statistics are also reported, which test whether the digit groups are 
identical, together with the degrees of freedom and their p-values. Figure 7.2 
shows the results for the first column of each measurement in Table 7.1 . which 
is 
the mean of the trading frequency, percentage trading volume and percentage time 
duration measures for each digit group. 
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Figure 7.2 Price Clustering-Transaction Price 
Price Clustering-Transaction Price 
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Overall, the statistics for digits 0,5, and 8 for all three measurements are higher 
than those for the other digits. There are more than 25% of transactions trading 
on digit 0,15% of transactions on digit 5 and 11% on digit 8. In contrast, 
transactions on all the other digits are less than 10%, which is the theoretical 
probability of each digit's frequency. Especially, those statistics for digits 4 and 7 
are exceptionally lower. Only about 5% of trades occur on digits 4 and 7. The 
percentage volume and duration measures show similar results as reported for 
frequency. In addition, all the K-W statistics in Table 7.1 confin-n the statistical 
significance of the differences across the digits. 
The finding of price clustering at 0 and 5 is consistent with previous research 
(e. g., Osborne, 1962, Niederhoffer, 1965,1966, Harris, 1991, and Brown et al., 
2002). The results also support the finding in marketing research by Heeler and 
Nguyan (2001 ), who find that not only digits 0 and 5 are over- represented in Asia, 
but also digit 8 is significantly over- represented in pricing commodities. 
123456789 
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Furthermore, the preference for digit 8 and an aversion to digits 4 and 7 support 
the cultural preference hypothesis in the context of the Chinese markets. 
7.6.2 Price Clustering and Resistance - Limit Order Price Results 
Table 7.2 reports the results for Percentage Time Duration (QPcntTD) and 
Standardized Time-Weighted Volume (QStdTffJ1) by examining the limit order 
prices ending with the digits between 0 to 9. Similar to Table 7.1. It also shows 
the mean, standard deviation, the mean Wilcoxon Score (across 566 stocks), and 
the K- W statistics together with the degrees of freedom and their p-value. Figure 
7.3 shows the results of the first column of each measure in Table 7.22, which is 
the mean of those measurements for digits from 0 to 9. 
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Table 7.2 Results for Limit Order Price Analysis 
Table 7.2 reports the results for Percentage Time Duration (QPcntTD) and Standardized 
Time-Weighted Volume (QSIdTJH') by examining the limit order prices ending N%Ith the 
digits between 0 to 9. Similar to Table 7.1, it also shows the mean, standard deviation. the 
mean Wilcoxon Score (across 566 stocks), and the K-11'statistics together ýýIth the degrees 
of freedom and theirp-value. 
QStdTWV QPcntTD 
Digit mean STD MeanScore mean STD MeanScore 
0 28.82% 9.06% 5269.94 19.86% 5.91% 5221.00 
1 8.68% 3.87% 3040.00 9.91% 1.91% 3166.62 
2 8.14% 4.25% 2804.73 9.54% 1.74% 2960.35 
3 6.14% 3.00% 2037.45 7.84% 1.86% 2029.03 
4 4.28% 3.47% 1145.04 5.26% 1.86% 857.82 
5 14.56% 5.07% 4422.46 13.98% 2.72% 4631.26 
6 8.03% 4.30% 2755.13 9.31% 1.81% 2835.11 
7 4.38% 2.75% 1231.71 5.82% 1.83% 1067.42 
8 10.85% 5.32% 3686.60 11.43% 1.93% 3887.93 
9 6.13% 4.22% 1911.94 7.04% 2.27% 1648.46 
_KW_ 
3420.87 4079.44 
DF_KW 9 9 
P KW <. 000 I <. 000 I 
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Figure 7.3 Price Resistance-Limit Order Price 
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The results in Table 7.2 and Figure 7.3 confirm the finding of the last section that 
the digits 0,5, and 8 are preferred in China's stock markets. It indicates that 
investors like to put more limit orders at prices ending with digits 0.5 and 8 and 
consequently form clusters. About 29% of the limit order prices end with digit 0 
and these orders stay on the limit order book for about 20% of the time in the 
trading period. Moreover, digit 5 (or 8) also shows a higher propensity with about 
15% (11%) of the limit order prices ending with digit 5 (or 8) and these orders 
staying on the limit order book for about 14% (11%) of the time in the trading 
period. On the other hand, digits 4 and 7 show a lower propensity with only about 
4% of the limit order prices ending with these digits and only about 5% of the 
time in the trading period being on these digit endings. The K-W statistics also 
indicate that the digit groups are significantly not identical. 
SoCa 
0123456789 
Digit 
CHAPTER 7 
CULTURAL INFLUENCE ON PRICE CLUSTERING AND RESISTANCE 186 
The findings tend to support Sonnemans*s (2003) hypothesis that price clustering 
is caused by limit order submission, which could also cause resistance points. 
Whether or not they are resistance points depends on further results, mhich are 
discussed in the following section. 
7.6.3 Price Resistance - Transaction Price Results 
The results in this section are from examining resistance points directly. Table 7.3 
reports the mean of the four measures: Frequency (F), Average Number of Trades 
(AvgN7), Average Volume (Aygll) and Average Time Duration (4vgTD)- The 
measurements are reported for the 4 types of price movements for digits 0 to 9. 
The R/C is the ratio resistance over cross, which is calculated as 
(DU+UD)/(DD+UU). 
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Figure 7.4 shows the mean of the measurements by different types of price 
movement for digits 0 to 9. Panel A shows that the frequency of trades not 
crossing digit 0 (i. e., DU and UD) is substantiallý higher than that of trades 
passing through it (i. e., DD and UU). For the other digits the frequencies of 
trades not crossing the digit are lower than those of trades "hich pass through ltý 
them. These results suggest that digit 0 is the onk, resistance point. When the 
price reaches this point, it is more likely to bounce back than pass through. 
Although digits 0,5 and 8 are found to be clustering points, onk digit 0 is a 
resistance point. These results confirm previous findings of Donaldson and Kim 
(1993) and Ley and Varian (1994). 
Panel B of Figure 7.4 presents the average number of trades. Although the 
statistics for DU+UD are not larger than UU+DD within each digit, the digit 0 is 
found to be different from the other digits in at least two ways. First, the number 
of trades it takes to leave this digit is larger than the others. For example, for a 
DD-Cross it takes 4 trades to leave digit 0 and only about 3 trades to leave digits 
such as 1,2,3,4,7 and 9. Second, the ratio of (DD+UU)/ (DU+UD) for digit 0 is 
larger than others. These results confinn the findings in panel A that it takes 
more trades, or in other words it is more difficult to pass through digit 0. Hence, 
digit 0 is a resistance point. 
Panel C (Figure 7-4) shows average volume and Panel D (Figure 7.4) shows 
average time duration, respectively. The results in Panel C are similar to those in 
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Panel B because the volume of trades is highly correlated ý%ith the number of 
trades. Panel D shows that in general it takes longer to pass through a dignt 
(DD+UU) than to bounce back (DU+UD). 
In summary, the results confirm that prices are more likely to bounce back than 
pass through those prices ending with the digit 0. It also takes more trades, more 
volume and more time to cross the digit 0 than to bounce back. So prices ending 
with digit 0 form the only resistance point in China's stock markets, which is 
consistent with the previous findings of Donaldson and Kim (1993), Ley and 
Varian (1994) for the DRA, and Koedijk and Stork (1994) for the indices in four 
major stock markets (Standard and Poor Composite in the US, Brussels Stock 
Exchange Belgium, FAZ General Germany and the FTSE 100 in the UK). 
7.7 Conclusions 
The purpose of this chapter has been to extend the work of Brown et al. (2002) on 
the impact of Chinese cultural factors on price clustering to China's stock 
markets. The results show clearly the impact of cultural factors with there being a 
higher propensity to cluster on digit 8 (along with the digits 0 and 5 which has 
been a common finding in most prior work on price clustering in stock markets) 
and a lower propensity to cluster on digits 4 and 7. While these results are further 
supported by an analysis of limit order prices, a range of measures for price 
resistance levels shows no support for cultural factors, with only the digit 0 being I 
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found to be a resistance level. In conclusion, while cultural factors help to explain 
price clustering in the Chinese stock markets. they do not help to understand price 
resistance levels. 
Since the emergence of behavioural finance financial economists haýe groýýn 
more receptive to entertaining behavioural and psychological explanations. In the 
case of China, the special characteristics and unique culture might provide 
interesting insights. Broadly speaking, the Chinese culture is distinguished from 
the Western culture in many ways, even including how business is conducted. 
For example, in China it is the right 'Guanxi' that makes all the difference in 
ensuring that business will be functioned effectively and be successful. 'Guanxi' 
literally means 'relationships', and stands for any type of relationship. In the 
Chinese business world, it is the 'Guanxi' that smoothes all operations and 
minimizes risks, and thus is vital to any successful business strategy in China. 
This relationship is not simply between companies but also between individuals at 
a personal level. The relationship is not just before sales take place but it is an 
ongoing process. Western companies must pay close attention to this unique 
Chinese culture in order to achieve successful commercial activity in China. 
Since China has opened its door to the world, it becomes increasingly important 
for global investors to understand the influence of Chinese culture. This study has 
implication for practitioners, especially global investors, that it highlights the 
importance of the Chinese culture. In equity market, a good understanding of 
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Chinese culture would be of great benefits for global investors in making their 
investment decisions. Future research could further analyze the influence of some 
other special behaviour or psychology of the Chinese. Together . ýith the studies 
of market microstructure, the analysis of investors' behaviour and psychology 
would provide more comprehensive understanding of the Chinese equitý market 
for both practitioners and academics. 
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8.1 Introduction 
CONCLUSIONS 
Copeland and Weston (1988) argued that in an efficient capital market, prices 
fully and instantaneously reflect all available relevant information. To study the 
market efficiency, the perfect market assumptions need to be relaxed. Perfect 
capital markets require the following conditions: markets are frictionless, there is 
perfect competition, markets are infon-nationally efficient, and all individuals are 
rational expected utility maximizers. However, equity markets do not behave like 
that in real world: transaction costs exist, competition is not perfect, information 
costs, and investors are not fully rational. Since the equity markets are not a 
frictionless environment, the institutional design of a market will affect market 
efficiency. 
Market microstructure research examines how prices are set under specific trading 
mechanisms. Broadly speaking, a trading mechanism consists of three 
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dimensions: the market participants, the exchange and the trading rules. There are 
many factors under the heading of market microstructure that can affect the price 
formation process, for example, order driven versus quote driven markets, traders' 
trade size and even investors' psychology. This study employs microstructure 
analysis to examine various issues about the market efficiency and imestors' 
trading strategies in the Chinese equity market. 
This research first investigates the market efficiency and evolution of China"s 
stock market via analyzing the ongoing predictive ability and profitabifitý of 
simple, well known technical trading rules. Second, it employs high-frequenc-v 
data to document the intraday patterns of price behaviours. Third, it examines 
informed traders' trading strategy by analyzing which trades move prices. Finally, 
it studies the irrationality of investors by analyzing the effect of Chinese cultural 
factors on price clustering and resistance. 
The completion of this study answers the questions raised in chapter 1. While the 
financial markets throughout the world are being driven to achieve greater 
efficiencies and transparency, China's stock market has been evolving towards 
efficiency. However, the market is not yet efficient: for example, the calendar 
anomalies are found to exist. Moreover, prices could even be manipulated 
by 
large block trades. Consistent with behavioural finance studies. Chinese culture 
provides interesting insights into the price discovery process. 
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The findings of this research have implications not only for practitioners but also. 
more importantly, for regulators and pol icý makers who are iný oIN ed in the desi gn 
of an efficient market. Firstly, the QFII scheme in 2002 makes it possible for 
foreign investors to invest in the A share market for the first time, and this thesis 
hopes to help overseas' investors understand the characteristics, the 
microstructure and the efficiency of markets better. It could also improve 
domestic investors' understanding as well. 
Secondly, in recent years, several related strands of literature on laýý, institutions, 
finance and economic growth have emerged in financial economics. The research 
started from La Porta et al. (1998) that first established a significant positive 
correlation between law and finance (and hence economic growth). The central 
proposition in the law and economics literature is that laws matters for economic 
and market development. In the case of China, two excellent studies of Chen 
(2003) and Allen et al. (2005) have discussed issues of the legal development. In 
China, neither the legal nor financial system is well developed. Chen (2003) 
argued that in China the experience of economic growth and capital market 
development is more like 'growth-then-law', which is consistent with Coffee's 
(2001) 'crash-then-law'. Moreover, he confirmed that capital markets are the 
most conducive to the formation of a politically powerful constituenc,, and hence I 
more aggressive legai change. In order to improve the market design and the 
legal system, a thorough understanding of the characteristics, the microstructure 
and the efficiency of the equity market is needed in the first place. This thesis 
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hopes to serve as a reference for the policy makers and the regulators. such as the 
CSRC, to design an efficient market. 
The present chapter has two objectives. First, it is to summarize the major 
findings. Second, it is to discuss the limitations of this study and the future 
direction of research. Therefore. the structure of this chapter is as folloxNs. 
Section 8.2 summarizes the major findings. Section 8.3 comments on the 
limitations of this study and discusses the future research direction. 
8.2 Summary of Major Findings 
8.2.1 Market Efficiency and Evolution 
Since there has been a long debate about whether the stock market is efficient, 
people might ask a very simple question whether China's stock market is 
efficient or not. If not, given the rapid development of the market has it been 
evolving towards efficiency? Chapter 4 investigates the market efficiency and 
evolution of China's stock market, and concludes that the market is not efficient 
but has been evolving. 
Chapter 4 extends the work of Brock et al. (1992) and Tian et al. (2002) 
investigating the evolution of China's stock market via anal-vsing the ongoing 
predictive ability and profitability of simple. well known technical trading rules. 
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It analyses a wider range of developed stock markets and sub periods across tile 
1990's in the case of China's stock market. The results su-, -, -, -, est that ý, ýhile 
technical trading rules had short term predictiýe ability and profitabilit", in the 
Chinese stock markets during the 1990's, this lessened as the decade progressed 
and the markets evolved. The notion of stock markets evolving is supported bý 
results for a number of the main developed markets NN here the technical trading 
rules had predictive ability during the 1970's that disappeared bý the 1990's. 
The evolution of markets is supported by the results for both the main developed 
markets and Chinese markets. It is consistent with the prediction of market 
evolution that if markets are not efficient, and in the absence of an alternative 
mechanism, the theory of financial market efficiency seems to have to rely on an 
evolutionary mechanism. Overall, the results for the evolution of both the 
developed and Chinese markets bode well for China having stock markets that 
will underpin its development over the coming years. 
8.2.2 Intraday Patterns 
Chapter 5 examines the intraday variation in the bid-ask spread, trading volume 
and volatility in China's stock market. The results can be summarized as follows. 
First, the bid-ask spread has an L-shaped pattern. The spread opens wide and 
narrows down in the first trading hour and is relatively stable for the rest of the 
trading day. It shows only a marginal increase at the end of the trading day. The 
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90-minute lunch break does not change the spread. Second, the volume pattern is 
relatively flat in the morning session v, ith a marginal increase at the open and 
marginal decrease at the close: while it shows a J-shaped pattern in the afternoon 
session. Moreover, both the numbers of trades and trade size contribute to the 
volume pattern. Third, the pattern of volatilit,, is similar to the spread pattern in 
that it exhibits an L-shaped pattern. 
Although the findings suggest that the existence of the intraday anomalies is not 
, patterns 
due to the peculiarities of the US markets, the different shapes of intraday 
provide further insights. The evidence in support of the two main theoretical 
models of intraday behavior is very mixed. None of the theoretical models could 
explain the intraday patterns of all three variables in China's stock market, not 
even in the US or any other markets. Moreover, as these models have been 
developed in the context of quote-drive market, it is felt that there is a room for a 
theoretical model to explain the intraday behavior in an order-driven market. 
8.2.3 Price Manipulation 
Chapter 6 has extended Barclay and Warner's (1993) work on stealth trading, to 
the emerging China's stock market examining which trades move prices. Given 
the nature of the China's stock market, the price manipulation hypothesis 
is 
proposed in addition to the stealth trading and public infon-nation h,, potheses 
examined by Barclay and Warner. Using high-frequency data the results show 
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that while medium and large-size trades are associated ýýIth disproportlonatelý 
large, overall, cumulative stock price changes, it is the lar-e-size trades xýhich 
have the largest effect on cumulative price increases. Thus. výhile there is some 
support for stealth trading in the Chinese market, the price manipulation 
hypothesis finds stronger support. 
The results are aligned with the concerns noted by a number of eminent 
individuals in China. If the current results are confirmed by further research. the 
policy conclusions are both stark and obvious. First, there will need to be a 
stricter regime tracking the source of large block trades and large fluctuations in 
share prices. Second, penalties for purposeful price manipulation will have to be 
material and strictly enforced. Only then will China's stock market have the 
opportunity to benefit from an orderly price discovery process. 
8. Z4 In vestors Psych ology 
Chapter 7 extends the work of Brown et al. (2002) on the impact of Chinese 
cultural factors on price clustering in China's stock markets. The results show 
clearly the impact of cultural factors with there being a higher propensity to 
cluster on digit 8 (along with the digits 0 and 5 which has been a common 
finding 
in most prior work on price clustering in stock markets) and a lower propensity to 
cluster on digits 4 and 7. While these results are further supported 
b,, an analysis 
of limit order prices, a range of measures for price resistance 
levels shows no 
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support for cultural factors, with only the digit 0 being found to be a resistance 
level. In short, the results suggest that investors' psycholo, ---, does haý e effects on 
prices, which is broadly consistent with the proposition of behavioural finance 
theory. It also enriches the market microstructure literature that not onk the 
trading mechanism affects prices but the psychology of investors does so as ýý ell. 
8.3 Constraints of the Thesis and Future Research Directions 
The advent of high frequency data has been a unique opportunity for researchers 
to study market microstructure at the finest level of data. Unfortunatel--,, the data 
used in this study does not include some useful information, such as neýýs data. 
The lack of the news data limits this study to explore further insights. 
First, due to the unavailability of the news data, this study fails to examine any 
subject associated with infon-nation diffusion. For example, Barclay and 
Warner's (1993) work of stealth trading has focused on a sample of tender-offer 
targets that have large abnormal price increases before the initial tender-offer 
announcement. They believed that some traders have valuable private 
information during the preannouncement period, which provides a good testing 
ground for their predictions. Although they also investigate all NYSE fin-ns in the 
1981-1984 period, the results are weaker than for the tender-offer 
preannouncement period. Chapter 6 of this thesis is not able to condition an-v 
particular information on the sample. Moreover, it becomes more important to 
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examine information diffusion when the price manipulation hypothesis finds 
support. Chakravarty (2001) extended the framework of Allen and Gale ( 1992). 
and presented empirical evidence on stock price manipulation in the United States. 
They considered what happens when a manipulator can trade in the presence of 
other traders who seek out information about the stock"s true N alue. In a market 
without manipulators, the information seekers unambiguously improve market 
efficiency by pushing prices up to the level indicated by the informed party's 
information. In a market with manipulators, more information seekers imply 
greater competition for shares, making it easier for a manipulator to enter the 
market and potentially worsen market efficiency. 
The relationship between the incidence of information and market activity is of 
fundamental importance to financial economics, because the EMH is concerned 
about the link between information and the change in asset's price. In broad 
terms, it suggests that all relevant information should be incorporated in the price. 
O'Hara (1997) argued that knowing how quickly information is assimilated into 
security prices might yield new insights into the nature of market efficiency. 
Research has been undertaken to consider the speed of adjustment of security 
prices to new information (Hong et al., 2000). Future research should pay more 
attention to examine the relation between price behavior and information floxý. if 
data is not a problem. 
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Second, compared with extensive research on the quote-drken markets. 
theoretical models on the order-driven market is sparse. For example. significant 
intraday patterns have been documented in chapter 5 and previous literature. 
However, the intraday patterns found in order-driven market, ýýhich is different to 
those found in quote-driven markets, cannot be full\ explained bý existing 
theoretical microstructure models. The existing literature on market 
microstructure suggests that trading systems have important effects on the price 
discovery process (see Cohen et al., 1986, and Schwartz, 1988). Order-driven 
systems and quote-driven systems have quite different price formation and return 
generating processes. These differences in trading systems may lead to different 
empirical findings. 
In a quote-driven market, investors can obtain price quotations from market 
makers prior to order submission and trade immediately with a market maker. By 
contrast, in an order-driven system investors submit their orders for execution 
through an auction process. The differences between the two systems provide an 
important area of further study. First, more empirical research should be carried 
out in order-driven markets to examine whether it is the fundamental difference in 
trading systems that generates different intraday patterns. Second, theoretical 
models are definitely needed. 
Finally, although the institutional structure of the stock market is found to affect 
prices, it is difficult to specify the models in the actual microstructure setting. In 
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the real world it is the investors, no matter ý, N hether theý are rational or irrational. 
who actually trade. Their behaviors are too complex to be modeled accurately. 
This makes it more interesting to analyze traders' behavior and ps\cholo, -, N and 
how they affect the price discovery process. Financial economists ha,, e grown 
more receptive to entertaining psychological explanations: for example, 
Hirshleifer's (2001) survey assessed the theory and evidence regarding investor 
psychology as a determinant of asset prices. More recentl%r, Coval and Shumv, av 
(2005) documented strong evidence that behavioral biases have effects on prices. 
Not surprisingly, strong demand has emerged for empirical work to investigate 
how behavioral and psychological factors influence investors' decisions. 
Therefore, the future research direction should pay more attention to investors' 
behavior and psychology. 
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